Margaret Thatcher, British public opinion and German reunification, 1989–90

ABSTRACT

Using opinion poll data collected for the United States Information Agency, the European Commission and various media organisations, this article analyses British public opinion towards German reunification in 1989 and 1990. Contrasting the public’s views with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s hostile approach towards German unity, it demonstrates that the British public were largely supportive of the principle of German reunification. Nevertheless, there was uncertainty about reunification’s consequences. Furthermore, significant generational differences existed, with Britons who experienced life during periods of war in the first half of the twentieth century expressing greater concern about the prospect of a united Germany.

KEYWORDS:

• German reunification
• Great Britain
• Margaret Thatcher
• public opinion

Supplemental data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2023.2191950.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Coinciding with the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s opening, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office released a selection of diplomatic documents as part of their Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO) series. See Patrick Salmon, Keith Hamilton and Stephen Twigge, eds., German Unification 1989–90: Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume VII (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). Prime Minister’s Office records are also available – and, alongside FCO documents, interviews with key participants and published and unpublished diaries, Charles Moore consults these in his authorised biography of Margaret Thatcher. See Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography. Volume Three: Herself Alone (London: Allen Lane, 2019), chs. 15–16.

² For the perspective of key German actors, see Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Propyläen, 1996), 196 and 306; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Errinerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 676 and 692; and Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 115–16. For US officials see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 116–17, 165, 171 and 216–17; and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 216–17.

³ For Thatcher’s fellow ministers, see Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 381–9; John Major, The Autobiography (London: Harper Collins, 1999), 175; and Alan Clark, Diaries (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), 275–7. For criticism from Conservative Members of Parliament, see, in particular, Edward Heath, The Course of My Life (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), 712–13. For the reflections of FCO officials, as well as government ministers, see Gillian Staerck and Michael Kandiah, eds., ‘Anglo-German Relations and German Reunification’, Witness Seminar held 18 October 2000 (Institute of Contemporary British History, 2003); and ‘Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990, German Unification, 1989–1990’, Witness Seminar held 16 October 2009 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office). For Thatcher’s advisers see Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London: John Murray, 1997), 108–13; George Urban, Diplomacy and Disillusion at the Court of Margaret Thatcher: An Insider’s View (London: I B Tauris, 1996), chs. 7–9; and Charles Powell, ‘Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990, German Unification, 1989–1990’, Witness Seminar held 16 October 2009 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 77.

⁴ See, for example, Norbert Himmler, ‘Discord over German Unification: Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl’, in Britain and Germany in the Twentieth Century, ed. Manfred Görtemaker (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 197–212; Sabine Lee, Victory in Europe? Britain and Germany since 1945 (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 198; Jacques Lévesque, ‘In the Name of Europe’s Future: Soviet, French and British Qualms about Kohl’s Rush to German Unification’, in Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, ed. Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 95; Patrick Salmon, ‘The United Kingdom: Divided Counsels, Global Concerns’, in German Reunification: A Multinational History, ed. Frédéric Bozo, Andreas Rödder and Mary Elise Sarotte (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 153–4; Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Papermac, 1999), 359; Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unification, 1989/90’, in Uneasy Allies: British-German Relations and European Integration Since 1945, ed. Klaus Larres (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 123; Philip Stephens, Britain Alone: The Path from Suez to Brexit (London: Faber and Faber, 2021), 232–3; and Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the European Union from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 89.

⁵ See especially John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, vol. 2 (London: Cape, 2000), 640. Charles Moore, her authorised biographer, is more magnanimous in his concluding remarks about Thatcher’s attitude. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 554. Nonetheless, his account is not uncritical of her actions during this period. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher, chs. 15–16.

⁶ See; Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 633–4; and Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 471. While not contained in a biography, journalist Hugo Young also argues this. See H. Young, This Blessed Plot, 357–9 Thatcher’s foreign policy advisor Charles Powell also attributes Thatcher’s response to generational factors. See Charles Powell, ‘Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990, German Unification, 1989–1990’, Witness Seminar held 16 October 2009 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 75.

⁷ For the former, see Klaus Rainer Jackisch, Eisern gegen die Einheit: Margaret Thatcher und die deutsche Wiedervereinigung (Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, 2004), 297–8. For the latter, see Salmon, ‘The United Kingdom’, 161; and Lee, Victory in Europe?, 200–1. In contrast, detailed analysis of French public opinion exists. See Marie-Noëlle Brand Crémieux, Les Français face à la reunification allemande: automne 1989–automne 1990 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 33–49. Public opinion at an overall population level in Britain, France and other European countries is also briefly discussed elsewhere. See Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1994), 196.

⁸ Will Jennings, John Kenny, Andra Roescu, Stuart Smedley, Nick Or, Kathleen J. Weldon, Peter K. Enns, Kelsie E. Norek and Jessica R. Riggs, UK Gallup Poll collection, 1956-1991 (Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2022).

⁹ See Jackisch, Eisern gegen die Einheit, 297–8, 314.

¹⁰ Patrick Salmon, for example, argues ‘Thatcher’s hostility did not reflect any deeper antagonism towards Germany on the part of the British population’. See Salmon, ‘The United Kingdom’, 161.

¹¹ See John Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War: The British and Germans since 1890 (London: Little, Brown, 2006); and Alexander Heinz, ‘Oh, German! I Thought There was Something Wrong with you’: West Germany in British Perceptions, 1969–1975 (Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag, 2013), 96–154.

¹² See Ben Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 1945–2017 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020); and Anthony King and Robert Wybrow, eds., British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 1937–2000: The Gallup Polls (London: Politico, 2001), chs. 15 and 17.

¹³ Thatcher’s official biographer Charles Moore is among those who argue she strongly opposed reunification. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 483. Going further, Hugo Young claims Thatcher sought to stop reunification from taking place. See Young, This Blessed Plot, 359. Other accounts offer greater nuance; these recognise Thatcher’s concerns but claim that she primarily was determined to slow the process down. See Salmon, ‘The United Kingdom’, 153; and Lévesque, ‘In the Name of Europe’s Future’, 89.

¹⁴ See Robert L. Hutchings, ‘The United States, German Unification and European integration’, in Bozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, 119–32; and Mary Elise Sarotte, Not One Inch: America, Russia and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), chs. 1–3.

¹⁵ Jacques Lévesque, ‘In the Name of Europe’s Future: Soviet, French and British Qualms about Kohl’s Rush to German Unification’, in Bozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, 95–106; Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification (Oxford: Berghahn, 2009); and Vladislav Zubok, ‘Gorbachev, German Reunification and Soviet Demise’, in Bozo et al., German Reunification, 88–108.

¹⁶ Leopoldo Nuti, ‘Italy, German Unification and the End of the Cold War’, in Bozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, 191–203; and Gregory F. Domber, ‘Pivots in Poland’s Response to German Unification’, in Bozo et al., German Reunification, 179–201.

¹⁷ Hansard HC Deb, vol. 162, columns 943–1007. 1 December 1989.

¹⁸ Hansard HC Deb, vol. 165, columns 1047–8. 25 January 1990.

¹⁹ Hansard HC Deb, vol. 167, columns 1140–2. 22 February 1990.

²⁰ Hansard HC Deb, vol. 168, column 862. 7 March 1990.

²¹ Hansard HC Deb, vol. 170, column 1189. 4 April 1990.

²² Lee, Victory in Europe?, 201–2.

²³ Dominic Lawson, ‘Saying the Unsayable about the Germans’, The Spectator, July 14, 1990, 8–10.

²⁴ ‘Seminar on Germany: Summary Record’, enclosure contained within Letter from Mr Powell (No. 10) to Mr Wall, March 25, 1990, reproduced in DBPO, series III, volume VII, 504–8. This was leaked to the Independent on Sunday newspaper and Der Spiegel magazine in July. See Neal Ascherson, ‘Be Nice to German Bullies, PM Told’, Independent on Sunday, July 15, 1990, 1.

²⁵ Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘Beware, the Reich Is Reviving’, The Times, October 31, 1989, reproduced in Harold James and Marla Stone, eds., When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification (London: Routledge, 1992), 221–3.

²⁶ For Thatcher’s controversial public outbursts see Robert Keatley, Glynn Mapes and Barbara Toman, ‘Thatcher Sees East European Progress as More Urgent Than Germans’ Unity’, Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1990, A12; and Hans Hielscher and Leonie Wild, ‘“Alle gegen Deutschland – nein!”’, Der Spiegel 13, March 25, 1990, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/alle-gegen-deutschland-nein-a-76f7132f-0002-0001-0000-000013507157?context=issue (accessed 14 June 2022).

²⁷ Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 640.

²⁸ Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 791.

²⁹ Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 791.

³⁰ Ibid., 795–9.

^{31 [}For commercial Gallup surveys see : Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, British Gallup Poll: CQ946, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31075419; and British Gallup Poll: CQ008A, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31075699. Aspects of the data from survey CQ946 were reported in the Daily Telegraph. See Clare Hargreaves, ‘Poll Backs Reunification’, Daily Telegraph, November 25, 1989, 10.

A third Gallup commercial survey, conducted in November 1989, contained two questions eliciting opinion towards people leaving East Germany for West Germany following the opening of the Berlin Wall. These data have not been analysed here. See: British Gallup Poll: CQ947, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31071993

For the USIA surveys see: USIA Poll # 1989-I89069: German Reunification, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083925; USIA Poll # 1989-I89087: Post Bush/Gorbachev Summit, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083927; USIA Poll # 1990-I90013: Winter 1989 Security, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083928; USIA Poll # 1990-I90023: NATO/UNIF Rider, ICM (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083929; USIA Poll # 1990-I90035: Pre-Washington Summit Telephone Survey, NOP, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083930; and SIA Poll # 1990-I90053: Post Washington Summit, NOP (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1990), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083932. A seventh USIA survey, conducted in November 1989, contained questions on developments in East Germany – namely opinions of newly installed SED General Secretary Egon Krenz and whether the East German leadership would permit promised free elections to take place. However, these data have not been analysed here. See: USIA Poll # 1989-I89076: Pre-Bush/Gorbachev Summit, Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1989), Dataset, https://doi.roper.centre/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31083926.

³² For respondent-level Eurobarometer data see Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 33 (Spring 1990). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1753 Data file Version 1.1.0, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10891; and Eurobarometer 34.0 (Oct-Nov 1990). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1960 Data file Version 1.0.1, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10892. A Flash Eurobarometer poll conducted in November 1989 also contained questions related to German reunification. However, data from this are not analysed in this article. For a report containing this data, see: Commission of the European Communities, ‘Eurobarometer: Nr. 32 Early Release: Flash November 1989 Release’ (December 14, 1989), 6–8, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ebsm/api/public/deliverable/download?doc=true&deliverableId=41934 (accessed 16 June 2022). Ipsos UK kindly provided data tables, stored in their private archive, for the three MORI polls. MORI data can also be found at the Archive of Market and Social Research (AMSR). See MORI, British Public Opinion, Issue 11.10 (December 1989/January 1990), 4, AMSR, BP 11.10; MORI, British Public Opinion, no. 12.01 (February 1990), 11, AMSR, BP 12.01; and MORI, British Public Opinion, no. 13.07 (August 1990), 9, AMSR, BP 13.07. Data were also reported in media publications. See ‘They Like It and They Fear It’, The Economist, January 27, 1990, 49–50; and David Smith, ‘Voters feel Ridley’s Theme is Legacy of a Past Age’, Sunday Times, July 15, 1990, 14. For NOP reports, see NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 80 (March 1990), 30, AMSR, NOR80; and NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 82 (July 1990), 10–12, AMSR, NOR82.

For reporting of the additional Gallup poll see Anthony King, ‘Germans Trusted by Most Britons’, Sunday Telegraph, July 15, 1990, 3.

³³ Data cover Great Britain only. Data for Northern Ireland are available via Eurobarometer. However, these have not been analysed because the other surveys analysed here did not include Northern Ireland as part of their samples.

³⁴ This definition is not perfect. However, it has been influenced by the availability of age-related variables in the relevant datasets and to ensure consistency of analysis.

³⁵ Given their general importance in shaping political attitudes, online appendix tables also contain, where available, bivariate analysis according to gender, social grade and education level. Where relevant, bivariate analysis has additionally been carried out according to subject-specific attitudinal measures (such as attitudes towards NATO and European integration).

³⁶ See Patrick Salmon, ‘Preface’, in ed. Salmon, Hamilton and Twigge, German Unification 1989–90, ix–xiii.

³⁷ Genscher, Errinerungen, 676. Meanwhile, Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown was frequently critical of Thatcher’s approach during this period. See Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries, vol. 1, 1988–1997 (London: Penguin, 2000), 83–4, and quotes attributed to Ashdown in George Jones, ‘Thatcher Warns Bonn Against Rush to Unity’, Daily Telegraph, February 19, 1990, 1.

³⁸ See Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries, vol. 1, 1988–1997 (London: Penguin, 2000), 83–4, and quotes attributed to Ashdown in George Jones, ‘Thatcher warns Bonn Against Rush to Unity’, Daily Telegraph, February 19, 1990, 1.

³⁹ Daily Mail, February 20, 1990, 9.

⁴⁰ Respondents were asked: ‘Some people say that East and West Germany should be united to form a single state, others say that East and West Germany should remain separate states. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?’

⁴¹ Respondents were asked: ‘From the point of view of the Germans/Europe as a whole, is it better for Germany to be divided or united?’

⁴² An NOP poll from February 1990 also provides evidence of the latter. According to this survey, 22% disapproved of German reunification, with this increasing to 48% among those aged 55 and over. See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, Issue no. 80 (March 1990), 30, AMSR, NOR80. The exact question wording NOP used is unclear, while no detailed data tables are available in NOP’s report.

⁴³ The exact question wording was: ‘Do you personally favour or oppose the formation of one nation by the unification of East and West Germany?’ This question differed to that which MORI asked in November 1989. This asked: ‘Do you think it would be a good idea for the two Germanys to be re-united or not’? Unlike that in January 1990 and July 1990 which included a neutral mid-point response, only binary answer options were available for this question, with 67% answering ‘Yes’ and 27% ‘No’.

⁴⁴ 6% answered ‘Don’t know’ in January compared to 5% in July.

The proportion of Britons in favour of German reunification was significantly lower than in France and the United States, with opposition twice as strong. British support was most similar to that in Poland, although Polish opposition was stronger. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Table 2.4.

⁴⁵ Respondents were asked: ‘Are you personally in favour of, or opposed to, the unification of the two German states?’

⁴⁶ There was a decline in the proportion answering ‘Don’t know’ from 17% to 12%. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 2.5 .

⁴⁷ The question asked: ‘How likely do you think it is that Germany will be united within the next 5 years: very likely, fairly likely, not very likely or not at all likely?’ All but those answering ‘very likely’ were asked a subsequent question about the likelihood of reunification occurring within the next 10 years, with another question – following the same logic – asking about reunification taking place within the next 20 years. Data presented here only relate to the first iteration of this question.

⁴⁸ The availability of this answer option potentially influenced opponents of German unity to respond with their general preference regarding reunification in mind, as opposed to their prediction of when it would likely occur.

⁴⁹ The questions asked: ‘In your opinion, how likely is it that a reunified Germany would present an economic/military threat to Britain – is it very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not likely at all?’ The February 1990 survey referenced ‘to the UK’ rather than ‘to Britain’.

⁵⁰ The questions asked: ‘Do you think that a united Germany would or would not pose an economic threat to western Europe?’, and ‘Do you think that a united Germany would or would not pose a military threat?’

⁵¹ This asked: ‘Some people have said that a reunified Germany would become the dominant power in Europe. If this were to happen, would you be worried, or not?’

In January British opinion was in line with that in France. In contrast, more than two-thirds of Polish respondents (69%) expressed that German dominance in Europe would worry them. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Tables 4.3.

⁵² This asked: ‘Would you say you are worried because Germany may try to expand its territory again, or because the German economy may become too strong, or because it may lead to a revival of Nazism, or for some other reason?’

⁵³ Framing the question around Germany becoming ‘the dominant power in Europe’, as well as the fact the response options were prompted, potentially helps explain this.

⁵⁴ Responses to this question in Britain in January differed markedly to those in France, where a majority (55%) felt Germany’s economy may become too strong. In Poland, concerns about territorial expansion (54%) were as prevalent as worries about the possible return of Nazism (53%). For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States in January 1990 see Online Appendix Tables 4.4.

⁵⁵ NOP Political, Social, Economic Review 82 (July 1990), 12, AMSR, NOR82.

⁵⁶ Sarotte, Not one Inch, 102–4.

⁵⁷ Across the post-war period, polling had found a consistent strong majority of Britons of the view that NATO was essential for the country’s security. See Clements, British Public Opinion, 74–6.

⁵⁸ In October 1989 the question wording was: ‘In your opinion, how important is it to our country’s security that Germany remain within NATO, that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of Western Europe, the US and Canada – is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important?’ Subsequently, the first part of the question was altered to: ‘In your opinion, how important is it to our country’s security that a united Germany be a member of NATO?’

⁵⁹ Frustratingly, there is no common measure of views regarding NATO. Three different measures have therefore been used – see Online Appendix Table 5.1.

⁶⁰ This asked: ‘On balance, would you prefer to see a reunified Germany as part of NATO, or outside NATO as a neutral country?’

⁶¹ For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Table 5.2.

⁶² The exact question wording was: ‘Assuming that West and East Germany were to be united and thinking of the long run, do you think that the United Germany would ally themselves with Western Europe, with Eastern Europe and Russia, or be neutral?’

⁶³ See Stephen Wall, ‘Margaret Thatcher and the Single Market’, Global Policy 13, no. S2 (2022): 30–8.

⁶⁴ Thatcher’s scepticism about specific proposals for deeper integration was generally in line with public opinion. But her outspoken general criticism of the integration project was not. Indeed, by the turn of the decade around half of the British public were of the view that the country’s EC membership was a good thing – a record level during Britain’s period of membership. See Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 92–3, 101–3; Richard S. Flickinger, ‘British Political Parties and Public Attitudes towards the European Community: Leading, Following or Getting Out the Way?’, in British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1994, ed. David Broughton, David M. Farrell, David Denver and Colin Rallings (London: Routledge, 1995), 197–214; and Jorgen Rasmussen, ‘“What Kind of Vision is that?” British Public Attitudes Towards the European Community during the Thatcher Era’, British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 1 (1997): 111–55.

⁶⁵ Germany’s decision to accept an IGC on EMU is seen as a quid pro quo for securing French backing for reunification. See, for example, Hans Stark, ‘Helmut Kohl and the Maastricht process’, in Bozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, 251.

⁶⁶ For the relationship between Britain’s ERM membership and German reunification, see Helen Thompson, ‘The UK and the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 1978–90’, in From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945, ed. Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), 227–40; and William Keegan, David Marsh and Richard Roberts, Six Days in September: Black Wednesday, Brexit and the Making of Europe (London: OMFIF, 2017).

⁶⁷ Respondents were asked: ‘In your view does the prospect of a united Germany make it more or less acceptable for the European Community to become a closer political union, or does it make no difference?’ One in ten (10%) felt it made the EC becoming a closer political union less acceptable, and 7% said they did not know. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Tables 6.1.

⁶⁸ Flickinger, ‘British Political Parties’.

⁶⁹ This asked: ‘Thinking of the possible effects of political developments in Germany on European integration, which of the following statements come closest to your own personal opinion?’ 28% replied that they had not thought about the matter, with 9% responding ‘don’t know’. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 6.2.

⁷⁰ One in 10 were undecided, with 12% answering ‘don’t know’. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 6.3.

⁷¹ MORI’s question asked: ‘Nicholas Ridley, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in Mrs. Thatcher’s Government, has said about the joint European Monetary Policy: “This is all a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has to be thwarted.” Do you agree or disagree with Mr. Ridley?’ Gallup asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed that: ‘Proposals for European monetary union [are] “all a German racket to take over Europe.”’ See Anthony King, Germans Trusted by Most Britons’, Sunday Telegraph, July 15, 1990, 3. The exact NOP question wording is unclear. See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 82 (July 1990), 10–12, AMSR, NOP82.

⁷² See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 82 (July 1990), 10–12, AMSR, NOP82. No detailed data tables are available, with the analysis contained in the NOP report focusing on the fact disagreement was strongest among 18–34-year-olds.

⁷³ MORI’s question tested this statement in more general terms, asking: ‘Nicholas Ridley has also said: “Being bossed by a German … would cause mayhem in this country”. Do you think Mr. Ridley was right or wrong to make such a statement?’ In comparison, Gallup’s question framed this statement more around EMU, by asking whether respondents agreed with the statement: ‘If [the European] Community led by Germany imposed tight financial discipline on Britain, “it would cause absolute mayhem” in Britain.’

⁷⁴ See Anthony King, ‘Germans Trusted by Most Britons’, Sunday Telegraph, July 15, 1990, 3.

⁷⁵ This favourability broadly reflected that in France. See Brand Crémieux, Les Français, 36–9.

⁷⁶ See Jorgen Rasmussen, ‘‘What Kind of Vision is that?’ British Public Attitudes Towards the European Community During the Thatcher Era’, British Journal of Political Science 27, no. 1 (1997): 111–55.

⁷⁷ Concern was also concentrated among older generations. See Heinz, ‘Oh, German!’, 107–8, 113.

⁷⁸ Heinz, ‘Oh, German!’, 113.

⁷⁹ Brand Crémieux, Les Français, 48.

⁸⁰ Ramsden, Don’t Mention the War, 366.

⁸¹ The desire to see a reunified Germany as part of NATO can be seen as consistent with the strong public support that NATO has received in Britain. Meanwhile, the division over whether German reunification necessitated more Europe reflected the general British coolness towards advancing integration. See Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 84 and 133–4.

⁸² Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 256–7.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the ‘Social and Political Change in Britain: Gallup Polls 1945-1991’ project (Project Reference: ES/S000380/1); Economic and Social Research Council, July 2019 – June 2022.