Nationalizing the multi-ethnic borderlands: state surveillance and security policies in interwar Turkey and Romania

ABSTRACT

This article aims to elucidate Turkey and Romania’s state policies in their multi-ethnic frontier regions, namely Eastern Anatolia and Transylvania, and their security-oriented strategies towards those, regarded as a threat to national unity and territorial integrity during the interwar period. Two post-imperial nation-states, Turkey and Romania followed similar policies towards national consolidation, as both aimed at constructing and then consolidating centralized and homogenized nation-states in the 1920s. In this process, the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia and the Hungarians in Transylvania were seen as the primary security risks to the state, because of their demographic concentration, linguistic unity, and dense population in a particular territory, as well as capacity to resist the emerging central authority. Drawing mostly on primary sources, this research demonstrates that the level of conflict in multi-ethnic regions was overwhelmingly affected by the extent of state-imposed security and surveillance policies within the nationalizing framework of interwar Turkey and Romania.

KEYWORDS:

• Security and surveillance
• Nation-building
• Interwar period
• Hungarians in transylvania
• Kurds in eastern anatolia

Acknowledgment

The author would like to thank Dilek Barlas, Yonca Köksal, and Shosh Westen for their helpful comments and guidance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Financial support

The archival research in Bucharest was partially financed by the Erasmus+ Internship Program during the author’s doctoral studies. Thus, the author is grateful for the program as well as the host institute, the Center for Turkish Studies at the University of Bucharest, that made the archival research possible at the National Archives in Bucharest.

Notes

1. In this study, I often use the phrase ‘a non-dominant group,’ since the Kurds in Turkey are not legally characterized as a minority. A minority is often referred to as a legal status, a form of international recognition, something which the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia lacked, unlike the Hungarians, Germans, and Jews in Transylvania.

2. Rogers Brubaker points out that ‘Nationalizing states are conceived as incomplete or unrealized nation-states, yet destined to be a nation-state, by their ruling elite. These states are mostly heterogeneous and are seen as insufficiently national in a variety of senses. The core nation is conceived as being in a weak cultural, economic, demographic position within the state; therefore, the language, culture, demographic position, economic and political hegemony of the state bearing nation tended to be promoted.’ (Brubaker 1996, 63).

3. In 1910 only 17.6% of Romanians were settled in urban areas, compared to 53.4% of Hungarians. To overcome this imbalance, the Romanian government embarked on a nationalist programme to create a Romanian urban middle class which could be appointed to serve in the cultural, economic, and administrative institutions of the cities (Scurtu and Boar 1995, 35).

4. In 1934 the inspectorate suggested inciting a rival tribe against Seyit Rıza to balance his mounting authority over other tribal leaders in Dersim and the surrounding areas. BCA 30.10/ 110.742.1.

5. In fact, prior to September 1925, Çankırı deputy Mustafa Abdülhalik (Renda) penned a proposal and offered a settlement programme for the Turks to the east of Fırat River. Even while promoting Turkishness here, the intention was that Kurdish people scattered throughout the province should also be brought into the Turkish fold.

6. Designated as fugitives, it was confirmed that members of the Cemilpaşazade family were in Aleppo with the consent of the French authorities. They were allowed to stay in Aleppo since they were renting an apartment in the downtown. When interrogated by the French, they confessed that that they were about to start a riot in Turkey, so they had concerns for their lives (a death sentence was waiting to be issued). BCA 30.10/ 113.771.2.

7. BCA 30.10/ 113.771.7.

8. Zafer Toprak, Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012), 531–582.

9. Mesut Yeğen argued that the problem of the Kurds stemmed from the Turkish state’s consistent denial of their identity and existence.

Mesut Yeğen, Devlet söyleminde Kürt sorunu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 109–129.

10. TNA AIR 23/416, 4 February 1930, f.26a-26 g.

11. BCA 30.10/ 1.5.5.

12. There was cooperation between Yado and Cibranlı Sadık, who also sided with the Cemilpasazades in the name of the Kurdish cause in 1929. All of them were in contact with the Armenians because of their shared enmity towards Turkey. BCA 30.10/ 113.771.9.

13. BCA 30.10/ 69.457.14.

14. This apprehensiveness led to panic among the locals, leading the fugitive Kurds to decide to cooperate with the Armenians and 150ers in order to assassinate Atatürk and top bureaucrats. BCA 30.10/ 69.457.14.

15. ANIC Fond Manuilă Sabin (1853–1947), Dosar XII/77 bis, f.2–5.

Romanianization refers to various state policies in the political, economic, and cultural domains that mainly targeted the minority populations in Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. These policies sometimes took the form of exclusion in the territories that were newly integrated after 1918.

16. ‘Bune şi Rele din Ardeal,’ Universul, 15 May 1921.

17. Ibid.

18. According to a memorandum by A. J. Balfour regarding the minorities in Transylvania, Bucharest’s form of government was described as autocratic, and the country could be described as a Crown colony under military domination. Bratianu’s Liberal Party and its method of conducting elections were criticized with the statement that the Hungarians in Transylvania were deprived of any power sharing in the local administration. It was stated that Cluj had enjoyed some kind of local autonomy with other Hungarian towns before WWI, but the new Romanian administration had refused to hand over power to the local administration anymore.

TNA FO 371/8918, 27 October 1922.

19. ‘Irredentismul Maghiar,’ Universul, 28 May 1921.

20. ANCJ Inspectoratul de Poliție Cluj, Inventar 399, dosar 2/1923.

21. ANIC Fond Manuilă Sabin (1853–1947), Dosar X/77 f.2–4.

In the Foreign Ministry Archive documents, the standoff distance is stated as minimum 30 km from the border.

AMAE Fond 71/1921-1944 Transilvania, Vol.1, f.28.

22. Old Kingdom (Vechiul Regat) corresponds to the pre-WWI territories of Romania, respectively Moldavia and Wallachia.

23. The same argument was used for the Hungarian officials, who came to Northern Transylvania after its annexation by Hungary in 1941.

24. Egry, Minority Elite, Continuity, and Identity Politics in Northern Transylvania, 187.

25. For instance, Romanian gendarmeries shot some voters while elections were underway in Hunedoara province following an argument between Hungarians and Romanians. It was alleged that the Hungarians had insulted the Romanians by calling them ‘Vlach fools’.

‘Romani Ucişi de Jandarmi Roman in loc de Voturi,’ Patria, 8 June 1926 in ANIC Hatieganu Emil (1893–1958), Dosar 59, f.41.

26. On 12 February 1924, Saxon representatives issued a statement addressing the need for German schools because the level of German language education was low.

Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii (CNSAS) Fond Documentar, Dosar No. 11518, Comunitatea Saşeasca din Romania (1923–1932), 12 February 1924, f.52.

27. Ibid. 29 July 1924, f.86.

28. Ibid. 2 May 1924, f.73.

29. ANIC Fond Comitetul Central al PCR (1921–1949), Collectia 50, Dosar 87, f.1.

30. The General Meeting of the Hungarian Party (PNM) assembled in Tirgu Mureş on 22 May 1923.

TNA FO 371/9967, 18 July 1924, f.142.

31. The Hungarian-Siculian Society, which was founded in support of the League of Nations, published a pamphlet in 1922 citing their grievances from 1919 to 1922.

TNA FO 371/7700, 27 October 1922, f.177–241.

32. As Irina Livezeanu shows, Hungarians living along the border were regarded as ‘true Magyars’ rather than the Szeklers, who were differentiated as being different from the rest of the Hungarians because of their culture and lifestyle. However, this was not the case for the Hungarians on the western frontier with Hungary; they were therefore subjected to harsh Romanianization policies. Due to the high security risk, the idea of replacing them with Romanian refugees coming from Hungary was also under considered.

33. BCA 30.18.1.2/ 80.97.10.

34. BCA 30.18.1.2/ 39.62.13.

35. The two other large-scale examples in the late 1930s were the transfer of Talos tribe leaders to Yozgat and Bilecik in 1938, and Tillo tribe sheikhs from Siirt to Balıkesir, Manisa, Bursa, and Kastamonu in 1939.

BCA 30.18.1.2/ 84.62.19 & BCA 30.18.1.2/ 87.47.14.

36. The distribution of banned Hungarian newspapers was a source of concern, and the officials had difficulties in detecting those since most of them were sent by mail.

ANCJ Inspectoratul de Poliție Cluj, inventar 399, dosar 239, 11 August 1936 & 10 September 1936.

37. ANCJ Inspectoratul de Poliție Cluj, inventar 399, dosar 239, 13 October 1936.

38. ANCJ Inspectoratul de Poliție Cluj, inventar 399, dosar 239, 14 January 1937.

39. ANCJ Inspectoratul de Poliție Cluj, inventar 399, dosar 795, 8 January 1937.

40. CNSAS Dosar No. 14593, 21 March 1938, f.314.

41. There were serious objections by the Arab population of the respective area to the French regime’s plan.

BCA 30.10/ 69.457.14.

42. The French regime also formed new villages and primarily resettled Armenians along the northern border with Turkey. The Turkish authorities regarded this policy as a threat to Turkey and carefully watched over the situation. BCA 30.10/ 69.457.14.

43. From a different perspective, Ramazan Öztan suggested that the Balkan states start to revisit their populations, especially in the borderlands where there were overlapping claims. In the 1930s, revisionism posed an increasing threat, and the accompanying unrest could have the effect of convincing the Balkan Muslims to flee from their native land to the Turkish kin-state. The exodus of Muslims also affected the precise timing of the Resettlement Law in Turkey; thus, transnational dynamics and interstate rivalries showed their impact in the changing demographic contexts (Öztan 2020, 96).

44. They were certainly not allowed to leave their homes unless the government told them to do so.

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc01302510.pdf Accessed on 01.05.2021.

45. TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi. Devre IV. Cilt 23. İçtima 3. 14.06.1934., 144–145.

46. The remaining ones who could, hid in the mountainous terrain. In addition to these people, 2,000 more were ordered to be gathered and immediately transferred to the West. BCA 30.18.1.2/ 85.107.16.

47. It was not just pro-Kurdish propaganda that circulated in the region but also religious rhetoric. For instance, the gendarmerie arrested some people who had participated in a religious ceremony in Kurdish, a striking example of what lengths the security forces went to in order to maintain law and order. Ibid.

48. BCA 30.10/ 128.920.12.

49. In 1938, the Hungarian Party revealed its intention through its hypothetical solution to create a corridor through Oradea, Cluj, Tirgu-Mureş, Sfântu Gheorghe, a strip of territory including Timişoara, Oradea, Satu-Mare, and autonomy for Transylvania, paving the way for a dual regime of Hungary-Transylvania. The report criticized György Bethlen’s party, condemning its negative stance towards Bucharest over the previous 20 years and accusing it of ‘taking directives from Budapest.’ CNSAS Fond Documentar, Dosar11032 14 November 1938, f.143.

50. CNSAS Fond Documentar, Dosar 10,770, 6 August 1934, f.1–3.

51. As an example, the Transylvanian Literature and Cultural Society (ASTRA) posited the idea that ever since unification in 1918 Romania had been surrounded by dangerous enemies with no nearby allies. According to a secret service report, the ASTRA society sent a letter to King Carol in 1938, indicating that, considering the threat posed by its revisionist neighbours, the country had no trustworthy allies. CNSAS Fond Documentar Dosar 11,032, f.197–202.

52. British files indicate that Hungary had the same security concerns back in the early 1920s because of the alleged activities of agent-provocateurs crossing over the border. The Hungarian minister, Baron Rubido Zichy, believed that the Romanian secret police sent these agents to foment unrest in Hungary. Yet, there were other allegations regarding plots with irreversible consequences that might have happened in Romania (a plot against the royalty).

TNA FO 371/7706, 20 November 1922, f.54–62.

53. Gábor Egry argued that despite being a centralized country for years, the central organs of Greater Romania still could not rely on local administrative units to maintain policies, for there was no guarantee that the local officials would carry out what Bucharest wanted them to do (Egry 2017).

54. The apex of this process came with the law on the employment of Romanian personnel enacted in July 1934, which stipulated the percentage of minorities that could be employed by a company. The law stated that at least 80% of the employees and 50% of the leadership of every commercial, industrial, or trading company with more than 20 people should be ethnic Romanians (Gidó 2009, 19).

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Berk Emek

Berk Emek is a Ph.D. in History, graduated from Koç University in 2021 with merit. He received a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Koç University (2012) and a master’s degree in Political Science from Central European University (2015). He also spent two semesters in Romania as a research assistant and visiting fellow, respectively at the Babeş-Bolyai University (Fall 2017) and the University of Bucharest (Fall 2019). His comparative studies largely focus on the nation and state-building strategies, ethnic questions, and minorities in the Balkans during the interwar period.