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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the relationship between national security policymaking and the defence sector. The goal is to understand how a lack of attention to national security policymaking affects the defence sector and vice-versa using Brazil as a case study. Our main argument is that a lack of attention in national security policymaking by civilian elites can weaken political controls over the armed forces, inhibit effective defence reforms that challenge military prerogatives, and, over time, reinforce militarization in national security policymaking, especially in its three main pillars: defence, intelligence, and public safety. We call this process national security neglect. Our case study shows that as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to dealing with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking. Civilians also delegated civilian posts to the armed forces in defence, public safety and intelligence, instead of engaging in broader reforms. This led to a vicious cycle of military dependency, deteriorated the already fragile political controls over the armed forces, inhibited defence reforms, and increased the military role in the state and society.
Acknowledgments
We thank Vinicius Mariano de Carvalho, Oscar Medeiros Filho, Augusto Teixeira Jr., Tamiris Pereira dos Santos, Florence Keen, Raúl Zepeda Gil, Michael Davies, Rodrigo Fagundes Cezar, Matheus de Oliveira Pereira, Diego Lopes da Silva, and anonymous reviewers for insightful suggestions and feedback.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the Brazilian government.
Notes
1. National security policymaking refers to the “the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s strategic goals” (Chuter Citation2011, 13). We here consider there are two main axes of national security policymaking: (1) effective national security structures or institutions (e.g. committees, councils etc) with decision-making/coordinating powers; and (2) national security documents (policies and strategies to provide political direction). These national security documents provide “an official description of how a state aims to provide for its own security” and it has “an overarching national vision as the basis for the development of other documents” (DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Citation2019b).
2. Defence sector refers to “the domain of public administration responsible for military power”. It should be considered as larger than just the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence to include political leadership, executive authorities, defence industry and other agencies involved in defence affairs (DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Citation2019a).
3. Here civilianisation means “a transfer of control and/or a selected number and type of working positions from military to civilian personnel” (Ratchev Citation2011, 14).
4. For our argument, we consider militarization as growing military influence in decision spaces and decision-making process. See: Flores-Macías and Zarkin (Citation2019).
5. Here “public safety” and “public security” are used as synonyms and basically refer to the basic set of domestic governmental policies and organizations (federal, states, municipalities etc) primary responsible for protecting the public and upholding their rights and freedoms (e.g., crime prevention, law enforcement and policing, fire and disasters prevention and response, emergency medical services and criminal justice system).
6. Military prerogatives refer to “those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relations between the state and political or civil society” (Stepan Citation1988, 93).
7. In this paper “internal security” and “homeland security” are used as synonyms and essentially refer to the coordination across all national level policies and organizations responsible for national security and the safety of the public within national territory. In this sense, the “public safety” policies and organizations, as well as parts of the “intelligence” and “defence” policies and organizations can be understood as components of the broader “internal security” policy area, that is, ‘comprising police and law enforcement measures, judicial tools, intelligence, border and transportation security, and critical infrastructure and civil protection measures (Anagnostakis Citation2017, 6).
8. Delegation is the voluntary transfer of civilian positions to the military. In general, “it implies that civilians in positions of governmental leadership not only have the authority to do so, but have done so voluntarily, uncoerced” (Pion-Berlin Citation2020, 82).
9. The problem of civilian delegation of posts to military officers also occurs in more developed states and affect civil-military relations worldwide. See: Gibson and Snider (Citation1999) and Pion-Berlin (Citation2020).
10. Military autonomy ultimately refers to institutional decision-making authority and is closely can be related to institutional interests to preserve prerogatives (Pion-Berlin, 1992, p. 84).
11. Militaries in Latin America have several other missions beyond defence. Among them, “support to national development” or support to public policies in whatever area the state has a weak capacity is a very common one. See: Pion-Berlin (Citation2016).
12. Other public policies may also have national security dimensions. According to Kaunert et al. (Citation2012, 5) “[t]he new security environment that appeared in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has led to the development of a security dimension in a growing number of policy areas, such as asylum and migration, transport, critical infrastructure protection and civilian crisis management among others.”
13. Democratic governance of security and defence sectors refers to “democratic management and implementation of defence and security policy” (Cottey et al. Citation2002, 32).
14. We understand efficiency as “the best possible defence within a socially acceptable level of allocated resources” (Ratchev Citation2011, 4) and effectiveness as “institutions fulfil their respective roles, responsibilities and missions to a high professional standard”(DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Citation2019c, 3).
15. We understand governance as the “exercise of power and authority affecting the provision of any public good” and referring to a “general concept that includes governmental decisions but also informal practices, actors and values that shape their implementation” (DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance Citation2019c).
16. Some may argue that discussions of security sector governance can be considered a liberal and western-centric perspective towards the security sector. This could lead to a military and security isomorphism worldwide. Debating these issues is not the focus of this article. See: Pretorius (2008).
17. Some authors consider the “justice sector” as part of the “security sector”. Though there are close links between them, we adopt a less broad definition.
18. National security’ appears only in Art. 173: “Except for the cases provided in this Constitution, the direct exploitation of economic activity by the State will only be permitted when necessary for national security imperatives or for relevant collective interest, as defined by law”.
19. Lei 7.170/1983.
20. 42 organizations were part of SISBIN in 2019 (e.g., ministries and security, defence, health, transport, telecommunications, agriculture and the environment agencies).
21. Lei 9.296/1996.
22. Lei 13.260/2016.
23. Resolução 2/2013-CN.
25. Medida provisória 696/2015.
26. Systems Coordination Secretariat, Secretariat for Defence and National Security Affairs and Secretariat for Security and Presidential Coordination.
27. See: https://www.gov.br/gsi/pt-br/assuntos/acervo/imagens/2019/organograma-2019-vf.jpg. (accessed:October2020).
28. Decreto 8.903/2016
29. Despite being reserve of the Brazilian Army, the military police and the military firefighter corps are subordinated to the governors of the states, the federal district and territories.
30. Decreto 5.289/2004.
31. Lei 13.675/2018.
32. The division between military and civil police has deep historical roots in Brazil (e.g. 1831 – Military Police of São Paulo and 1841 – Civil Police of São Paulo). The demilitarization and the unification of the police are two frequent points in the Brazilian debate on public safety.
33. Ministério da Justiça/DPF. Prestação de Contas Ordinária Anual Relatório de Gestão do Exercício 2014.
34. Under Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety were merged.
35. Despite being constitutionally illegal, police strikes are rather common.
36. Data: January/2019-May/2020.
37. LC 117/2004, and 136/2010.
38. Portaria 597/2000, Comandante do Exército.
39. Portaria 996/2016, Comandante do Exército, “Instruções Gerais do Sistema de Assessoramento Parlamentar do Exército”.
40. The Brazilian Ministry of Defence is responsible for the political direction of the Armed Forces. However, directives are very difficult to implement because the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force have administrative, budgetary, and financial autonomy according to the LC 97/1999. Each Force Commander can decide about structures, strategies, doctrines, personnel, resources, and defence diplomacy. In reality, there are overlapping and unclear roles and functions between the MoD and the service branches (e.g, strategic planning, doctrine and operations, budget and finance, joint professional military).
41. There are no typical civilian posts or civil service within Brazilian MoD.
42. Political appointees refer to non-permanent posts appointed by ministers, and that do not have to be approved by the Congress. These posts range from higher to lower levels.
43. Parecer 51/2012-CN.
44. Decreto Legislativo 179/2018
45. Diretriz Ministerial de Planejamento 06/2020.
46. LC 97/1999.
47. Lei 13.954/2019.
48. General Braga Netto became Chief of Staff (Casa Civil) of the Bolsonaro Government in 2020.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Raphael C. Lima
Raphael C. Lima is a PhD student in War Studies at King’s College London. He holds a MSc. in International Relations at the Interinstitutional Graduate Program San Tiago Dantas (São Paulo State University, Campinas State University and PUC-SP) (2015) and a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from São Paulo State University (2012). He was a Research Coordinator at the Brazilian Army’s Strategic Studies Center – CEEEx (2017-2019), researcher at the Institute for Applied Economic Research – IPEA (2016-2019), and technical advisor for National Defence at the Secretary of Strategic Affairs of the Brazilian Presidency (2015). His most recent articles have been published at Defence Strategic Communication (NATO, Latvia) and IPEA (Brazil). He is the co-editor of the volume “Desafios Contemporâneos para o Exército Brasileiro” (2019) published jointly by the Institute for Applied Economic Research and the Brazilian Army.
Peterson F. Silva
Peterson F. Silva is a Professor at the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra - ESG, Ministry of Defence). PhD in International Relations (University of Sao Paulo – USP, Brazil). Associate-researcher at the Aerospace & Defence Industries Studies Laboratory (LabA&D/UNICAMP) and at the Brazilian Army’s Strategic Studies Center – CEEEx (2016-2018). Researcher (volunteer) at Pandia Calogeras Institute (IPC, Ministry of Defence) (2015-2016). His most recent articles have appeared in such journals as US Air Force Journal of the Americas, Escenarios Actuales (Chile), and Revista Transformación Militar (Colombia). The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the Brazilian government.
Gunther Rudzit
Gunther Rudzit is an Associate Professor of International Relations at ESPM and an invited professor at Brazilian Air Force University. His articles have appeared in peer-review journals such as Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, and Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa. He was director of Brazilian Association of International Relations (2009-2013) and advisor to the Minister of Defence of Brazil (2001-2002). He holds a PhD in Political Science from University of São Paulo and a M.A. in National Security Studies from Georgetown University.