From transformation to adaptation: analysing the Spanish military change (2004–2020)

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the Spanish Defence Staff launched an “adaptation” process to adjust the structure of the force and its catalogue of military capabilities up to the year 2035. It replaced the “transformation” that had guided the country’s defence planning from 2004 to 2018 to develop the future armed forces model envisaged in the 2003 Strategic Defence Review. This article begins by analysing the transformation process and its main effects on the evolution of the Spanish military and the reasons behind the drive to adapt. It then goes on to explain its main components and objectives, and concludes by scrutinising the main factors that may condition its development.

KEYWORDS:

• Transformation
• adaptation
• defence planning
• defence policy
• Spain

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the reviewers for their thoughtful comments and efforts towards improving the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Led by the Ministry’s political authorities, advisors, and members of parliament such as Jordi Marsal from the Socialist Party, the SDR was a milestone as it was the first (and only) comprehensive review of Spanish defence and military policy. Despite the involvement of Spain’s scarce defence community, the change of government in 2004 (after a legislature marked by the breakdown of foreign policy consensus with the support of the Iraq war and the 3/11 Madrid bombings) supressed further developments. The new government only endorsed the measures related to the CHOD’s attributions and the organisation of the armed forces (Dulysh 2016; Colom-Piella 2016).

2. This broad transformational agenda was set out in the SDR. However, some of the specific indicators such as network centricity, effects-based operations or capability-based planning (Galbreath, 2004; Jasper 2009; Marquina and Diaz 2010) were established later. Spain also joined the Multinational Interoperability Council, deemed by Boyer (2004) to be an important factor for harmonising the transatlantic transformation. Specific research is needed, but the leadership of General Félix Sanz (Chief of Defence – JEMAD), Admiral José María Terán (Chief of the Joint Defence Staff – JEMACON) and Colonel José Enrique Fojón (Head of the Armed Forces Transformation Unit – UTRAFAS) and civilians such as Jordi Marsal (an historical member of the Congressional Defence Committee and renowned expert in defence issues) might help to explain how transformation took off. Lacking political leadership, facing bureaucratic inertia and no internal incentives to change, they could have used the SDR and NATO’s agenda to promote the change in the Spanish military.

3. The 2004 National Defence Directive (NDD) linked transformation to the achievement of the future model of armed forces, jointness, technological innovation, acquisition of new weapons systems, professionalisation and a new military career (Presidency of the Government 2004, 8–9).

4. The 2008 NDD prioritised transformation as a means to define new capabilities, enable joint operations, and outsource non-essential services (Presidency of the Government 2008, 10). The 2012 directive stressed the need to undertake this process “ … to tackle Spain’s growing strategic challenges, at a time of limited resources” (Presidency of the Government 2012, 6). The 2020 NDD asserts the “ … Armed Forces must be capable of undertaking a constant adaptation and transformation to allow them to tackle multiple and changing threats and challenges” (Presidency of the Government 2020, 1). However, transformation seems to be synonymous with military modernisation (appearance of the Minister of Defence before the Congress of Deputies, 20 February 2020).

5. This association was originally made by the SDR. It also justified this modernisation to meet national needs and contribute to the capability requirements identified in the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the European Capability Action Plan. Those also served to justify the acquisition of these SAPs.

6. Justified by politico–strategic (national defence and military capability harmonisation with NATO and the EU), economic (their acquisition costs) and industrial needs (national technological development and workload for the sector), their funding was based on a system of industrial pre-financing (Fonfría 2015). This started with the granting of interest-free loans for the development of the system, a schedule of payments with MoD funds to the contractor when the system was delivered and their subsequent reimbursement of the cash advances to the Public Treasury (Pérez et al. 2017, 29).

7. This clashes with the minister’s apparent willingness to strengthen the UTRAFAS (Appearance before the Defence Committee of the Congress to report on the general lines of the defence policy, 30 June 2008). This could reinforce the hypotheses of the role played by mavericks in leading Spain’s transformation.

8. Inaugural speech by Carme Chacón (14 April 2008). Her first appearance before the Congressional Defence Committee and the 2008 NDD maintain those objectives (Presidency of the Government 2004, 10).

9. Speech “The transformation of the Armed Forces” (22 February 2011). Some ideas were already present in her inaugural speech, including Spanish integration into defence organisations, professionalisation, military education reform, weapons modernisation, incorporation of women into the military, participation in international operations, respect for the environment, and the culture of national defence.

10. Her willingness to create a “pacifist army” (Delafon 2008), the purchase of the LMV Lince vehicle justified for humanitarian reasons, or the refusal to consider Afghanistan as war (Cruz 2009) might support this claim.

11. Most of the objectives identified in the minister’s first appearance before the Defence Committee had already been implemented in the previous legislature. In addition, the chapter on “innovation” listed all the major weapons programmes of the 1996–2008 cycle, plus the acquisition of vehicles (Lince, RG-31 and Piranha III) already undertaken in previous years. Other allegedly transformational objectives were professionalisation, military career reforms, the incorporation of women into the military, the culture of national defence, and respect for the environment. However, they cannot be classed as such.

12. However, at that time, the Secretary of State for Defence (SEDEF) warned of the financial unsustainability of the 1996–2008 modernisation cycle and tried to streamline the programmes and audit their costs. Paradoxically, he was also responsible for not meeting the 2010 and 2011 annual payment commitments (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2016).

13. The CHOD’s profile– critic of NATO and supporter of European defence initiatives and the reorientation of armed forces towards peacekeeping operations (González, 2018) – seemed to be in line with the minister’s security-based concept of defence. Later, general José Julio Rodríguez, joined the far-left party Podemos.

14. They were chosen to promote transformation, consolidate jointness, and improve the abilities of the military to conduct peacekeeping support operations (Sarrión 2008). However, it seems the profiles of JEMAD José Julio Rodríguez and JEMACON José Luís Lopez were not the best suited for these roles. Looking at their curriculums, they had no experience in strategic affairs, joint environments, doctrine development, or defence planning, and no academic or public records that could suggest they were interested in innovation or familiar with transformation and capable of understanding its implications. Although the minister underlined the technical profile of the CHOD (before his appointment he led the National Armaments Directorate), it seems they were managers rather than leaders. Those issues related to politico-military relations should be scrutinised in further research.

15. Although the joint doctrine was approved in 2009, institutional inertia might explain this outcome, since the preliminary works started years before.

16. Paradoxically, the Army presented its Visión 2025, a specific roadmap to guide its transformation. This might be an attempt at innovation through interservice competition within a framework of limited resources on account of the economic crisis.

17. The development of transformation might be explained by the confluence of certain key actors: a minister willing to rationalise the defence industry; a CHOD determined to withdraw weapons systems, immobilise materials and deactivate units to maintain force readiness; and the presence of José María Terán and Enrique Fojón (JEMACON and head of UTRAFAS when transformation was launched) as ministerial advisors. If validated in future works, this hypothesis could explain the relevance of leadership and the role of mavericks in explaining Spain’s military transformation.

18. This force was unveiled in Royal Decree 872/2014. This regulation also created a Joint Action Support Command, reporting to the CHOD, to provide support to the operational structure in those issues. Defence Order 166/2015 would develop this regulation by bringing under its command the operational medicine and communications and information systems authorities, the Spanish verification unit, and the national C-IED cell.

19. The Joint Force is the sum of all the active forces. Its core is composed of 27,000 troops (15,000 for immediate contingencies and 12,000 for permanent missions). In addition, there are 40,000 troops in various stages of enlistment and 53,000 support staff. Combined, they reach the 120,000 troops, which is the current strength of the Spanish military, out of a maximum of 130,000 troops set by the Military Career Law 39/2007. Although the minister of defence declared she would increase the volume by 7,000 troops, the post-COVID-19 economic scenario will likely prevent this increase (appearance of Margarita Robles before the Defence Committee of the Congress, 20 February 2020).

20. The JDCD was originally part of the Centre for Higher National Defence Studies. However, the Defence Order 710/2020 integrates it in the new Force Development Division of the Defence Staff. In addition, the Army, through its Office 2035, and the Navy, through its Innovation Office, are also conducting these tasks.

21. Information taken from the JCDC website: https://www.defensa.gob.es/ceseden/ccdc/index.html [Accessed: 28 August 2020].

22. The Spanish approach comprises all the elements – materiel, infrastructure, human resources, training, doctrine, organisation and interoperability (MIRADO-I) – proposed by NATO except for “leadership and education”.

23. Both the definition and the aim of adaptation (guidance of long-term defence planning and more related to innovation or emulation) clash with the academically accepted definition, which tends to relate adaptation to a change in tactics, techniques and procedures – sometimes during war – because of new operational imperatives (Farrell et al. 2013; Murray 2011; Farrell & Terriff 20022002). Perhaps this is due to a misinterpretation of the original concept, an attempt to emphasise strategic imperative or organisational agility, or a manoeuvre to displace the concept of transformation.

24. The NDD is issued by the president of the Government and broadly outlines the defence policy for the legislature. It enables the minister of Defence to draft the Defence Policy Directive (DPD), which contains precise instructions for defence planning. Prior to MO60/2015, the approval of a DPD was a necessary step to begin the planning process. Currently, they can begin with no specific political guidance, using the context provided by the existing NDD and DPD, such as the 2016 planning cycle. However, the issuance of the 2020 NDD entailed drafting a new DPD and the start of a new planning cycle.

25. Given that the redefinition of transformation as adaptation occurred between 2015 and 2019 and affected two ministers and two CHODs, this continuity might be explained by the work carried out by the last chief of UTRAFAS and the first head of the JCDC. This officer might be another maverick who sought to promote change in the military by taking advantage of growing political impermanence.

26. Now, it begins with the Concept of Employment of the Armed Forces (CEAF). Prepared by the CHOD based on the NDD in force, it defines the strategic-military environment, the military’s stance or the force’s characteristics. Its release marks the beginning of the planning cycle. However, the 2020–26 cycle might follow a more traditional approach: the 2020 NDD providing the broad political guidelines, the DPD containing the precise instructions for planning, and the CEAF formally opening it.

27. It should also guide the MoD technological innovation policy to prevent industrial interests from constraining the definition or development of capabilities. In this sense, the next Technology and Innovation Strategy for Defence should prioritise the R&D/Innovation of technologies identified in the OE2035 ([EMAD] 2019, 91).

28. This might be indicative of the limited number of civilian experts in military affairs and its effects on the lack of debate, agenda setting and evaluation of public policies. Regarding the scarcity of experts and its impact on research agendas, see Bueno (2019).

29. Paradoxically, in 2018, the Army presented the Future Land Operating Environment 2035 without attending to these documents. This suggests the lack of coherence affecting national defence planning and the services’ corporativism against jointness.

30. This document was based on the Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040 and intended to chart the characteristics of the future operating environment, extract its strategic implications, and inform the development of new military capabilities (Ministry of Defence 2015).

31. OE2035 is to be reviewed every three years to synchronise its publication with the start of the planning cycles to reinforce its connection with defence planning ([EMAD] 2019, 17). Although the 2016 cycle should have ended in 2022, its termination in 2019 means that the 2020–26 cycle will be based on the current document.

32. In addition to the drivers seen in other studies of a similar nature – erosion of Western military power, global instability, hybrid tactics and grey zones, A2/AD strategies, or new operational domains – the OE2035 also points out other conditioning factors. Spain’s geographical location, energy dependence, demographics, territorial cohesion, or the limited resources allocated to technological-military innovation might put the country’s autonomy at risk and compromise its interoperability with its allies ([EMAD] 2019, 19–42).

33. The broadness of these contexts and its reliance on norms would appear to be due to the lack of a politico-strategic guide to determine defence priorities. In fact, the National Security Strategy fails to establish clear ends, ways and means, and there is no National Defence Strategy capable of translating them into the defence domain. In addition, the CEAF acts as a military strategy, but it is also compromised by a lack of political guidance. However, the “General guidelines and objectives of the defence policy” set out in the 2020 NDD seem to assume these contexts, also found in the definition of “national security” of the 2017 National Security Strategy.

34. In the absence of a policy document clearly defining these areas – the National Security Strategy argues that Spain has global aspirations and does not prioritise any region (Presidency of the Government 2017, 37–53) while de facto prioritising Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic – the OE2035 maintains a calculated ambiguity, although one can assume they span the area from the Western Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea. The 2020 NDD has defined the European neighbourhood, Mediterranean, Western Sahel and the Atlantic Ocean as priority areas for its deployments (Presidency of the Government 2020, 10). However, the DPD – whose content is confidential – might focus on the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel (Fernández 2020, 12). Nonetheless, Spain might maintain its “flag approach” (Pedersen & Reykers, 2020) to NATO and EU operations to demonstrate its commitment but without any other rationale than showing the flag.

35. State action was originally identified in the SDR, enshrined in Organic Law 5/2005, and defines a capability area due to the impact of those daily missions on defence planning.

36. The OE2035 does not determine capabilities. Consequently, these characteristics might be integrated into existing capability areas (preparation, command and control, combat power, situation awareness, projection, sustainability, survivability and protection, and contribution to State action). These derive from the characteristics of the SDR’s future armed forces model (Colom-Piella 2016).

37. The definition of transformation included in PDC-01(A) is the same.

38. Although the current strategy should remain in force until 2022, the government decided to revise it, arguing that the existing document did not consider the effects of COVID-19 (González 2020). On 30 October 2019, the procedure for the development of the new 2021 strategy was approved by the government. The 2020 NDD can also provide limited insights given the inherent constraints of this political document.

39. The optimum scenario would be the development of a new SDR capable of orienting Spain’s defence and military policies for the next decade and framing the OE2035. However, there are no plans to do so.

40. Emulation of the U.S. agenda to modernise the military while bridging the capability gap between Washington and the European allies was one of the factors conditioning transformation (). In this sense, the OE2035 makes several references to the U.S. third offset strategy, the military modernisation of other allies, and the capability gap that could arise between them (EMAD 2019, 81–82).

41. There is another possibility: the desire to use NATO as a reference in capability development. Spain’s official stance considers complementarity between NATO and European security initiatives, but the different administrations tend to prioritise one or the other. The current government, which took office in 2018, is one of the main supporters of EU defence initiatives while putting NATO in a secondary role. In fact, the 2020 NDD states that “The progress of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU is our main axis for the promotion of our interests and values.” (Presidency of the Government 2020, 9). That entails active participation in the main EU defence instruments, such as missions and operations, permanent structured cooperation, or technological, industrial, and financial cooperation.

42. The first planning cycle under MO60/2015 used the political guidelines from the 2012 NDD and began in the absence of a stable economic framework to cover the outstanding SAP payments, the launch of a new investment cycle, and expenditure commitments (1.53% or 2% of GDP) that were impossible to meet (Colom-Piella 2017). The 2016–22 cycle ended abruptly when the new ministerial authorities refused to sign the Objective of Military Capabilities. This situation – perhaps due to the status of the incumbent minister who took office in June 2018 as an acting minister only at the time, the impossibility of approving 2019 budgets, and the call for elections in April 2019 – prevented the execution of this cycle, which was flawed from the outset.

43. There was a lack of trust between the CHOD (appointed by minister María Dolores de Cospedal in 2017) and minister Robles. He publicly warned of the operational and capability problems facing the armed forces (appearance of general Alejandre before the Defence Committee of the Congress, 29 January 2019). Months later, the minister did not sign the Objective of Military Capabilities presented by the CHOD, ending the planning cycle. There is also the possibility that the general bypassed the minister to present the document Military Requirements 2019–24 to the king and the president of the Government (Rodríguez 2020). General Alejandre was finally dismissed in January 2020. Although the preliminary works for the OE2035 had already begun before, could this document be seen as a tool to drive the agenda of adaptation as an imperative?

44. For example, she initially advocated a reduction in defence spending in favour of health and education (EFE 2019) and asserted that the main threats looming over Spain were international terrorism, organised crime and cyberattacks (Robles 2020). Signed by the president, the 2020 NDD also stresses the risks related to climate change, disinformation, pandemics, and the economic crisis. In fact, some of its general guidelines and objectives contribute to this security or public safety-based approach (to increase trust in institutions and foster societal resilience, participation in the 2030 Agenda and support for safe schools and women, peace and security initiatives, and the use of empathy in solving conflicts).

45. More specifically, it seemed to be related to the investment cycle that began in 2018, the support of EU defence initiatives, and the promotion of military R&D (Appearance of Margarita Robles before the Defence Committee of the Congress, 20 February 2020). The 2020 NDD supports those objectives and emphasises Spanish participation in EU defence mechanisms, but it does not establish such relationships.

46. However, this does not mean that the MoD has accepted the idea or understood the concept. The preamble states that “ … the Armed Forces must be capable of undertaking a constant adaptation and transformation to allow them to tackle multiple and changing threats and challenges” (Presidency of the Government 2020, 1). However, on the next page, it states that one of its requirements is the full integration of women into the armed forces, and one of its objectives is to attain the sustainable development goals of the 2030 Agenda.

47. See the minister’s appearances before the Congress of Deputies of 27 June 2018 and 20 February 2020 and “General guidelines and objectives of the defence policy” of the NDD.

48. Those are the development of the necessary defence capabilities to ensure the security of Spain and its citizens (DPD objectives 1 and 5). The rest of the objectives are effective multilateralism, contribution to stability, and progress in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Sahel, development of a defence diplomacy plan, consolidation of collaboration mechanisms with other public administrations, equal professional opportunities for women, environmental conservation, and the promotion of confidence-building measures in defence and arms control (Fernández 2020, 12–13).

49. For example, the Joint Staff will integrate the Joint Action Support Command units and transform the Joint Cyberdefence Command into a Joint Cyberspace Command.

50. Institutional references to the development of a 21^st Century military have increased since the enactment of the 2020 NDD. However, they seem more related to the minister’s soft-security approach to defence or weapons modernisation than adaptation itself.

51. In addition to these SAPs, twenty-four PC-21 trainers, 600–700 light vehicles and a BAM-IS underwater intervention ship have been approved.

52. These commitments were approved on 27 July, 7 September, and 14 December 2018.

53. Along with other commitments, this purchase is part of a plan to minimise job losses and promote the defence sector after Airbus announced major redundancies in Spain. This might also be partly compensation to Airbus for the appointment of the Spanish company Indra – which the government intends to turn into a national champion – as the national coordinator of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) (Comunicado Conjunto Airbus-Gobierno de España, 30 July 2020).

54. However, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force raised the possibility of purchasing a 5^th generation fighter in addition to the Typhoon LTE (Infodefensa 2020).

55. There are other short-term intentions ranging from rocket launchers, infantry fighting vehicles, a replacement for the ageing Harriers and fire-support vehicles for the Marines, to the modernisation of tanks, artillery and ASW helicopters.

56. Both the OE2035 and the 2020 NDD stress the relevance of multinational capability development and the strengthening of the national industrial base. However, the country’s participation in EU defence initiatives might be explained more by political and industrial reasons than military factors. In this sense, Spain not only belongs to the leading nations by fully supporting PESCO, participating in thirty projects and leading two. It has also joined the FCAS and the European Patrol Corvette (theoretically for the design and sale of the product abroad), and entry into the Main Ground Combat System is under discussion. Despite their military-industrial relevance (specifically the FCAS, considered by the minister to be a “state project” in her appearance of 20 February 2020 because of its implications and financial cost), it is hard to find any governmental, parliamentary, or military document justifying their strategic relevance.

57. In fact, the S-80 and the Dragon still support the SDR’s future model of armed forces.

58. In addition, these spending commitments allow the payments for systems already delivered to be rescheduled (Council of Ministers, 7 September 2018). If approved, other planned acquisitions could extend the payment term or increase the annual instalments. An outstanding analysis of Spain’s budgetary projections that might justify the necessity of the choices to be made in thinking about the future force can be found in Fonfría (2018).

59. The initial schedule of repayments for the 1996–2008 cycle also assumed a decade (Fonfría 2015), but it will take until at least 2031.

Additional information

Funding

This article has received funding from the “Grupo de análisis politico” (SEJ 618).

Notes on contributors

Guillem Colom-Piella

Guillem Colom-Piella is a professor of political science at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain and Associate Researcher at the Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Chile. His research interests include military innovation and Spanish defence and military policies. Prior to taking up his university roles, he worked in the Armed Forces Transformation Unit in the Spanish Defence Staff. He holds a PhD in International Security.