![Sample our Geography journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5937/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Geography.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This paper considers the international political context of the UK presidency of COP26 and reflects upon past experience in which climate change discussions, despite their distinctive nature, cannot be effectively isolated from great power politics. It concludes that the deteriorating international situation threatens to make a successful outcome to the Glasgow conference much more difficult to achieve than its predecessor at Paris in 2015.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Unlike the 2015 Paris COP, which had to finalise a new Agreement, there remains only some outstanding detail to ‘complete the Paris rule-book’ notably the vexed issue of carbon trading under Art.6. Allied to this is the increasing need to ensure that developing countries stay committed to the Agreement through the provision of adequate finance for adaptation to the ravages of climate change.
2 Including withdrawal from UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, the World Health Organisation and even a threat to leave the Universal Postal Union!
3 Writing in the 1970s Keohane and Nye (Citation1977) postulated that under condition of complex interdependence overall structural power, the dominance of superpowers would not necessarily determine outcomes. Rather ‘issue structural power’ would be significant. This analysis is applied to the climate issue in Vogler (Citation2016, pp. 131–156).
4 The High Ambition Coalition in Paris brought together the EU, AOSIS and a significant number of other states including LDCs. For an account of the conference see: Brun (Citation2016).
5 This was to be a key task of the EU-China Leipzig summit scheduled for autumn 2020 under the German presidency of the EU (Gennard & Tollmann, Citation2019).
6 Proposals from London suggested a new D10 grouping adding South Korea, India and |Australia to the existing G7, The Times, 29 May 2020.
7 Brazil and China were in alignment at COP 25. arguing that there should be no strong text on post 2020 ambition and the raising of NDCs unless developed country pre 2020 pledges were fulfilled and that developed countries should make the primary moves on mitigation and provide the lion’s share of climate finance for adaptation (Timperley, Citation2019, p. 2).
8 The ‘Powering past Coal Alliance’ has 33 national members none of which figure amongst the top 5 coal producers (China, India, US, Australia and Indonesia). The Climate Ambition Alliance co-chaired with Chile has 120 members, only two of which, Canada and Mexico, figure amongst the top 15 carbon emitters.