Does politicization influence senior public officials’ work attitudes? Different forms and effects of politicization in the civil service

ABSTRACT

Despite a large body of literature on the effects of politicization, relatively little is known about its relationship with the work attitudes of public employees. This study investigates how different forms of politicization relate to senior executives’ job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Using data from a large-scale executive survey conducted in Europe, we found that senior public officials exhibit negative work attitudes when there is political intervention in civil service staffing, when they have little policy influence, and when political actors interfere in their managerial activities. In particular, politicians’ disrespect for bureaucratic expertise had the largest effect on work attitudes.

KEYWORDS:

• Politicization
• job satisfaction
• organizational commitment
• senior public officials
• bureaucratic expertise

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Carl Dahlström, George A. Krause, and Kwangbin Bae for their valuable comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. Hyunjung Kim particularly thanks the members of the Quality of Government Institute in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg for their help and suggestions and the COCOPS Project Team for the data provision.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. In the United States, more than 4,000 political appointments are made by the president for jobs ranging from ‘Senate-approved, executive appointments in the Executive Office of the President and executive branch agencies to upper- and middle-management levels throughout the federal bureaucracy’ (Resh 2015, 9). The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established to ensure more political responsiveness through performance evaluation and relocation for career SES members (Resh 2015), offering a connection between appointees and rank-and-file officials.

2. In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, political appointments are not formally made, although informal appointments tend to occur (Van der Meer, Steen, and Wille 2015). Instead, scholars have noted a surge in political advisors in these countries (Christiansen, Niklasson, and Patrik 2016). However, the political appointment of top civil servants is formally approved in many southern European countries, and the use of ministerial cabinets is also common, especially in Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy (Van der Meer, Steen, and Wille 2015). In Germany, the institution of political civil servants has been formally accepted (Schröter 2004). In some eastern European countries, despite civil service laws being in place, as required for membership to the European Union, they are not fully implemented or there exist gaps not covered by the laws (Matheson et al. 2007). Matheson et al. (2007) suggested that countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia have revised the laws to exclude the top levels of the civil service, thereby increasing political appointments.

3. The public administration traditions were categorized based on Demmke and Moilanen (2010): Scandinavian (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden); Continental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands); Mediterranean/South (Italy, Portugal, and Spain); and Eastern (Hungary and Lithuania).

4. Political appointment, as a form of politicization, is not significantly associated with job satisfaction at lower levels of politicization, but the association becomes increasingly negative at higher levels. This implies that some degree of political influence on senior-level appointments might not negatively influence senior executives’ job satisfaction. However, its effect on organizational commitment is negative at all levels of politicization.

Additional information

Funding

Hyunjung Kim acknowledges that this work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2018S1A3A2075609]. Haeil Jung acknowledges that this work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2016S1A3A2924956].

Notes on contributors

Hyunjung Kim

Hyunjung Kim is a PhD candidate in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University. She is currently a researcher at the Institute of Governmental Studies at Korea University. She has participated in a visiting scholar programme at the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include administrative reform, bureaucratic politics, personnel systems from a comparative perspective, bureaucratic behaviour, and governance.

Haeil Jung

Haeil Jung is an associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University. He received his PhD in Public Policy from the University of Chicago and has worked as a consultant for the World Bank since 2012. His research field is policy analysis and programme evaluation. Specifically, his study focuses on poverty, inequality, human potential, and related policy interventions.

Sun Young Kim

Sun Young Kim is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at the University of Georgia. She received her PhD in Public Affairs from Indiana University. Her research focuses on public management, organizational behaviour, human resource management, and public service ethics.