How quality reporting reduces accountability deficit and overload

ABSTRACT

A critical issue in public accountability is how to reduce chances for dysfunctionalities. This research addresses it by examining both theoretically and empirically how quality reporting may reduce accountability deficit and overload in a multi-principal setting. Analyses of data from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) during the Bush Administration show that programs exhibiting higher reporting quality attained higher performance ratings, which, in turn, led to larger budgetary recommendations. Higher reporting quality also helped reduce the differences between presidential and congressional budgetary decisions. This article contributes to developing a contingent, process-based theory of public accountability.

KEYWORDS:

• Accountability
• reporting quality
• performance management
• decision-making
• conflict management

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. We used data provided by George Mason University Mercatus Center to identify which programs are discretionary or mandatory.

2. A unified government during the 108th Congress (2003–4) and 109th Congress (2005–6), but a divided government during the 110th Congress (2007–8): https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm

3. The presidential archives of Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) initiated during the George W. Bush administration are still available online (https://georgewbush whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/performance/index.html).

4. We also measured institutional conflicts between accountability sources in other ways, and the findings remained robust. For instance, we measured the conflicts as (Presidential Budget FY 2008-Congressional Budget FY 2008) ×100 ÷ (actual funding FY 2007). This analysis produced the same findings.

5. The US Freedom of Information Act stipulates some exceptions for government information releases, including provisions for keeping secret information in the interest of national defence or foreign policy.

6. Extreme cases include programs for which actual funding was zero in 2007 because it reflected an unlimited budget change (ratio) between 2007 and 2008 if a budget was allocated for 2008 year (e.g. Dairy Price Support Program).

7. In particular, 12 programs recorded zero actual funding in 2007 year, 84 programs received zero presidential appropriation in 2008 year, and 24 programs received zero congressional appropriation, which significantly produced extreme budget changes.

8. PROCESS is a macro for statistical programs (a modelling tool) that conducts observed-variable OLS and logistic regression path analysis using bootstrapping (see its details: http://www.processmacro.org/index.html).

9. The direct relationships between reporting quality and resource allocations were not hypothesized in this study because this article’s focus is to test the stepwise three-step accountability process.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2018S1A3A2075609].

Notes on contributors

Yousueng Han

Yousueng Han is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Global Public Administration at Yonsei University. He received a Ph.D. in Public Affairs from the Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University-Bloomington. His research and teaching interests include public management, citizen participation, and governance.

Shui Yan Tang

Shui Yan Tang is a Professor in the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern California. His research and teaching focus on institutional analysis and design, collaborative governance, local and community-based governance, common-pool resource governance, and environmental politics and policy.