‘Regionalism’ and its contestations: changing political discourse in contemporary Assam

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to understand the socio-political dimension of the political changes in Assam vis-a-vis “regionalism” and its contestations. The Changing contours of regionalism in Assam reflect its distinct character marked by the simultaneous articulation of regional, sub-regional and national identity in a complex socio-ethnic and historical context. The recent political trajectory of Assam bears testimony to the dual challenges facing the forces of regionalism; the presence of sub-regional ethnic identity articulation and the appropriation of regional space and issues by the national parties. Further, the shifting allegiance of ethnic identity-based parties to the national parties is critical to understand the dynamics of regionalism in Assam. Socio-political developments subsequent to the rise of BJP post-2014 provide an interesting landscape to comprehend the complexities inherent in understanding regionalism in contemporary Assam. On a contextual note, the paper also locates the question of regionalism in the ongoing debates of NRC and CAA.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. National Register of Citizens (NRC) is a register that contains the names of Indian citizens. (For details, visit http://nrcassam.nic.in/what-nrc.html).

^2. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 grants citizenship to religious minorities i.e. Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhist, Persian and Christian of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who had to leave their country due to religious persecution before December, 2014.

^3. M. O’Brien, “Regionalism,” in The New Encyclopaedia of Southern Culture, ed. C. R. Wilson, (Chapter Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 155–58.

^4. S. Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” in Oxford Companion to Politics in India, ed. N. G. Jayal and P. B. Mehta (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 181–91.

^5. M. N. Karna, “Language, Region and National Identity,” Sociological Bulletin 48, no. 1/2(1999): 75–96.

^6. Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 184.

^7. Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 185.

^8. Karna, “Language, Region, and National Identity,” 90.

^9. M. Chakrabarty, A. K. Dutta and J. Roy, “Regionalism: A Colonial Legacy of the British,” The Indian Journal of Political Science, 70, no. 3 (2009): 693–704.

^10. L. P. Fickett Jr, “The Politics of Regionalism in India,” Pacific Affairs 44, no. 2 (1971): 193–210.

^11. C. A. Perumal, “Regionalism and Political Development,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (1987): 1–11.

^12. H. Bhattacharyya, “Federalism and Regionalism in India: Institutional Strategies and Political Accommodation of Identity,” Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, (Working Paper no. 27, 2005).

^13. M. P. Dube, “Regionalism in India: Some Critical Observations with Special Reference to Uttarakhand Movement,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 1/4(1995): 85–97.

^14. ‘Reorganisation of states, provision for the devolution of power to these states, constitutional safeguard for different “special” regions (Sixth Schedule of the Constitution), the greater degree of administrative, political and financial autonomy to the units, and so forth are some of the institutional demands that guided the regional demands in India and help the assimilation of regional political elites into the Indian State. The economic dimension of regionalism is based on the under-development of regions in the periphery emanating from unequal development; and the articulation of cultural dimension is fostered by ethnonational organizations based on cultural elements such as language, traditions, art forms, images, etc. See, Karna, “Language, Region and National Identity,” 92–93.

^15. S. A. Sattar, “Regionalism: A Great Threat to National Unity of India,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 72, no. 3 (2011): 759–64.

^16. S. C. Hazary, “Politics of Regionalism: Implications for Political Development in India,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (1991): 208–24.

^17. I. Narain, “A Conceptual Analysis in the Indian Context,”Regionalism: Developmental Tensions in India, ed. A. Majeed (New Delhi: Cosmo Publication, 1984), 21–43.

^18. Chakrabarty, Dutta, and Roy, “Regionalism: A Colonial Legacy of the British,” 695.

^19. Bhattacharyya, “Federalism and Regionalism in India” 2.

^20. Bernard S. Cohn, An Anthropologist Among Historians and Other Essays (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1987), 100–35.

^21. Sudha Pai, “Introduction” in Handbook of Politics in Indian States: Regions, Parties and Economic Reforms, ed. Sudha Pai (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–19.

^22. While explaining the idea of “Politics of Regionalism” in India, Lewis P. Fickett Jr. (1971) documents the emergence of dominant regional political parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazagham in Tamil Nadu, Akali Dal in Punjab, Bangla Congress in West Bengal, Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) in Uttar Pradesh, Muslim League in Kerala, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra. See Fickett Jr., “The Politics of Regionalism in India.”

^23. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India,” in Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and beyond, ed. Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri and Yogendra Yadav (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 46–63.

^24. P. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 18–19; Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 186.

^25. Guha, “Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in a Historical Perspective,” 42–65.

^26. While assessing the success of India’s Democracy vis-à-vis the management of power conflict, Kohli (2001) argues the Indian State has resorted to a process of maintaining balance between forces of centralization and decentralization. He argues while the Indian State has been viewed as relatively centralized, it is being seen acquiring certain decentralized traits in recent times, primarily reflected in the practices of federalism, expanding bases of local governments and the evolving constitutional design. For details, see A. Kohli, “Introduction,” in The Success of India’s Democracy, ed. A. Kohli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–19.

^27. Bhattacharyya, “Federalism and Regionalism in India,” 1–28.

^28. D. Ludden. “Where is Assam? Using Geographical History to Locate Current Social Realities,” CENISEAS Paper 1 (Guwahati: OKD Institute of Social Change and Development, 2003), 10.

^29. A. Guha, Medieval and Early Colonial Assam: Society, Polity and Economy (Guwahati: Anwesha Publications, 2015), 22.

^30. M. Hussain, The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity (Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt. Ltd. in Association with Har- Anand Publications, 1993), 22.

^31. S. Goswami, Assam Politics in Post-Congress Era: 1985 and Beyond (New Delhi: Sage, 2020), 13

^32. Goswami, Assam Politics in Post-Congress Era : 1985 and Beyond

^33. Barbora Sanjay, “Autonomous Districts and/or Ethnic Homelands: An Ethnographic Account of the Genesis of Political Violence in Assam (North-East India) Against the Normative Frame of the Indian Constitution,” International Journal on Minority and Group Right 15 (2008): 313–34.

^34. Goswami, “Assam Politics in Post-Congress Era: 1985 and Beyond,” 2.

^35. Goswami, “Assam Politics in Post-Congress Era: 1985 and Beyond,” 2.

^36. Chandan Kumar Sharma, “The Immigration Issue in Assam and Conflicts Around it, in Asian Ethnicity 13, no. 3(2012): 287–309.

^37. The imagination of Northeast India as a “region” is drawn from two perspectives: the macro perspective focuses on the imagination of the entire Northeast as a singular region against the micro perspective that looks into the diverse internal regions within Northeast India. The partition of the country in 1947 and the subsequent reorganization of the international border created the relatively new idea of the Northeast as a singular region and this idea got reinforced with the official policy of development of the region through the formation of the North Eastern Council (NEC) and the Ministry of the Development of North East Region (MDONER) (in 1971 and 2001 respectively). See, S. K. Das, “Whither Regionalism in India’s Northeast? in India Review 13, no. 4(2014): 399–416. The geopolitical development at the international level produced the Northeast as a singular region with the substantial role of the State. See, S.K. Chaube, S. Munsi, and A. Guha, “Regional Development and National Question in North-East India,” in Social Scientist 4, no.1(1975): 40–66. Such understanding of Northeast India is contested by regional and sub-regional assertions by various ethnic groups since the colonial period who argues that there are genuine grievances that kept them backward. See, G. Phukon, Politics of Regionalism in Northeast India (Guwahati and Delhi: Spectrum Publications, 1996), 11.

^38. See note 25 above.

^39. Guha, “ Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in a Historical Perspective,” 53.

^40. The economic processes are marked by “relative growth of trade, artisan crafts and money circulation, an expansion of plough and wet rice cultivation at the cost of jhuming.” See Guha, “Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in a Historical Perspective,” 54.

^41. Guha, “ Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in a Historical Perspective,” 60.

^42. The historical understanding of Northeast India shows that the reorganization of states in the area marked an important element of regional articulation in the region. Most states of Northeast India, i.e. Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, were part of Assam in 1949, and the Arunachal Pradesh was administered by the Governor of Assam, thereby shaping the idea that Northeast constituted a singular region which is contested by the process of reorganization of states in the region during the period 1963 to 1987, because of demands of “homeland” by different ethnic groups. See, Das, “Whither Regionalism in India’s Northeast?” 405. Such demands for homeland can also be attributed to the process of uneven economic development of different ethnic communities who felt deprived and exploited not only at the national level but also by the regionally dominant groups, which calls for complete restructuring of the economy by elimination of capitalist model of development. See, Phukon, “Politics of Regionalism in Northeast India,” 11–12.

^43. Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 187.

^44. S. Baruah, India Against Itself: Politics of Nationality in Assam (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 91–115.

^45. Guha, “Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in a Historical Perspective,” 61.

^46. S. Gogoi, and P. J. Saikia, “Sharing and Exchanging: Understanding Common Grounds in Northeast India,” in Asian Ethnicity 21, no.1 (2020): 22–38.

^47. U. Goswami, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam (New Delhi: Routledge, 2013), 84.

^48. The demand of “homeland” is a complex and contested terrain of Northeast India. Such articulations are generally based on a specific geographical region as the original place of a particular community, hence having undeniable rights over the same.

^49. The increasing significance of regional political parties in national politics can be termed as “regionalization”

^50. The demand for cultural autonomy or articulating grievances against the central State or government is termed as “regionalist.” For details see Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 187.

^51. Back in 2016, Mehta (2016) suggested the emergence of a “BJP Dominant System” in Indian politics in the wake of poll outcomes in the states of Assam, West Bengal, Tamilnadu, and Kerala. Mehta believed that BJP’s “extraordinary capacity to think politically rather than merely ideologically” has helped the party rise to power even in electorally extreme territories like Kashmir and Assam. See, P.B. Mehta, “A BJP-Dominant System,” in The Indian Express. A BJP-dominant system | The Indian Express (May 20, 2016). Later on, calling BJP’s rise the “moment of second-dominant party system,” Palshikar (2017) credits the party’s successful conflation of the discourses of Hindutva, nationalism, and development as central to its creation of a new hegemony in Indian politics. See, S. Palshikar, “India’s Second Dominant Party System,” in Economic and Political Weekly 52, no. 12 (2017): 12–15.While referring to the recent political changes, Chibber & Verma (2018) identify the emergence of the “fourth party system” in India, fortified by a “BJP-led dominant party system.” See, P. Chibber, and R. Verma, Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018).

^52. Assam movement was a six-year-long movement (1979–85) against the “illegal migrant” entering Assam that ended with signing the “Assam Accord” on August 15, 1985.

^53. Dhruba Pratim Sharma, Tarun Gogoi and Vikas Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Understanding the BJP’s Rise in Assam,” in Politics and Religion in India, ed. Narendra Kumar (London and New York: Routledge), 64–83.

^54. U. Misra, “Assertion of Regional Identity,” in Economic and Political Weekly 21, no. 1 (1986): 13–14.

^55. Sharma, Gogoi, and Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Understanding the BJP’s Rise in Assam,” 66.

^56. M. S. Prabhakara, “Northeastern Challenges,” in Frontline 21, no. 8 (2004): 10–23.

^57. Baruah, “Regionalism and Secessionism,” 188.

^58. Misra, “Assertion of Regional Identity,” 14.

^59. U. Misra, “North-East Regional Parties: High Hopes and Hard Realities,” in Economic and Political Weekly 22, no. 24 (1987): 922–923.

^60. Sharma, Gogoi, and Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Understanding the BJP’s Rise in Assam,” 66.

^61. Sharma, Gogoi, and Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics.”

^62. N. G. Mahanta, Citizenship Debate over NRC and CAA: Assam and the Politics of History (New Delhi: Sage, 2021), 295.

^63. S. Goswami, and V. Tripathi, “Understanding the Political Shift in Assam: Withering Congress Dominance,” in Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 39 (2015): 67–71.

^64. Goswami and Tripathi, “Understanding the Political Shift in Assam.”

^65. Sharma, Gogoi, and Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Understanding the BJP’s Rise in Assam,” 70.

^66. For further understanding of BJP’s use of local cults and cultural symbols in the electoral context of Assam, see M. Bhattacharjee, “Tracing the Emergence and Consolidation of Hindutva in Assam,” in Economic and Political Weekly 51, no. 16 (2016): 80–87.

^67. V. Tripathi, T. Das, and S. Goswami, “National Narrative and Regional Subtext: Understanding the Rise of BJP in Assam, in Studies in Indian Politics 6, no. 1 (2018): 60–70.

^68. D. P. Sharma, and V. Tripathi, “Assam 2019: NDA Deepens its Dominance,” in Economic and Political Weekly 54, no. 34 (2019): 23–25.

^69. A. R. Dutta, “BJP’S Electoral Victory in Assam, 2016: Co-Opting the Khilonjiyas,” in Social Change, 47, no. 1 (2017): 108–124.

^70. Sharma, Gogoi, and Tripathi, “Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Understanding the BJP’s Rise in Assam,” 71.

^71. NEDA is a political coalition under the banner of a BJP led federal coalition that includes more than ten regional parties of Northeast India. The coalition was formed in Guwahati through the “Guwahati Declaration,” a day after the oath-taking ceremony of the first BJP-led coalition government in Assam on May 23, 2016. For further reference, see T. Gogoi, “North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) and Political Change in Northeast India,” Dialogue Quarterly 20, no. 4, (2019): 114–124.

^72. Gogoi, “North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) and Political Change in Northeast India,” 117.

^73. The Citizen’s (Amendment) Bill 2016 was initially introduced on 19 July, 2016 by the Modi government, creating tension and triggering protest in different parts of Assam. The Bill was then sent to a Joint Parliamentary committee which submitted its report on 7 January 2019. Though the Bill got approval of the Lok Sabha the very next day, it failed to get the nod of the Rajya Sabha. As the term of the 16^th Lok Sabha also came to an end, the CAB − 2016 eventually lapsed. In their run-up to the parliamentary poll 2019, one of the fundamental polls promises of the BJP was to bring the CAB once they emerge victorious. On the contrary, certain segments of the civil society organizations, student groups as well as opposition parties vehemently opposed the BJP’s agenda. Nevertheless, consequent upon the victory of NDA in the 2019 general election, the Bill was reintroduced and after due approval of the parliament it was turned in to the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 that triggered fresh tension and mass protest, in Assam as well as other parts of the country.

^74. Sharma and Tripathi, “Assam 2019: NDA Deepens its Dominance,” 23–24.

^75. A.R. Dutta, “Assam Polls, the Hindutva Wave,” in India’s 2019 Elections: The Hindutva Wave and Indian Nationalism, ed. Paul Wallace (New Delhi: Sage, 2020), 352.

^76. The six communities from Assam including Koch-Rajbongshi, chutia, Moran, Motok, Tai-Ahom, and Adivasis (working in the tea sector) have been demanding ST status based on their ethno-cultural distinctiveness and underdevelopment. The first among them to raise the demand was the Koch-Rajbongshi in 1968. Interestingly, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order (Amendment) Bill to include Koch-Rajbongshi in the ST list was introduced in Lok Sabha, on July 2, 1996, which was also referred to a 15 member Select committee chaired by Amar Roy Pradhan. Then, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order (Amendment) Ordinance 9 of 1996 was promulgated to give effect to the scheduling of the Koch-Rajbongshi community in the ST list of Assam. To that end, the Assam Legislative Assembly also adopted resolution pleading the Indian Government to include all these six communities in the ST (Plains) list. Nevertheless, the issue was not addressed and the successive governments have merely kept the issue alive by making it one of the top listed items of election manifesto and a bargaining point for electoral victory. See Jayanta K. Sharma and J. Hazarika, “Politics of Schedule Tribe Status in Assam,” in Economic and Political Weekly 55, no. 14(2020): 18–20. Conferring ST status to these six communities was one of the poll-promises of the BJP in Assam during 2014 parliamentary election as well as the successive elections in the state. As such, on January 8^th, 2019, the Union cabinet approved ST status to the six communities and a bill was also introduced in the Rajya Sabha, however, the same was not put to vote and eventually it lapsed. In the meanwhile, the Assam legislative assembly enacted three legislations in 2020 establishing Autonomous councils for the Koch-Rajbongshis, the Morans and the Mataks. However, in view of the inaction of the ruling regime on the demands of ST status, the six communities have recently launched joint actions including protest and agitation against the government.

^77. S. Palshikar, M. Rana, D.P. Sharma, and V. Tripathi, “Assam Assembly Elections: Hindu Consolidation pays off for BJP (The Hindu CSDS-Lokniti Post-Poll),” in The Hindu (May 7, 2021).

^78. S. Goswami, “Assam Politics in Post-Congress Era: 1985 and Beyond,” 22.

^79. A. Kumar, “Moving Beyond Nation-State: Framing State-Level Politics in India,” in India Review 16, no. 3 (2017): 277–303.

^80. Kumar, “Moving Beyond Nation-State,” 293.

^81. Tripathi, Das, and Goswami, “National Narrative and Regional Subtext: Understanding the Rise of BJP in Assam,” 62.

^82. While the Rabha, Mising, and Tiwas got autonomous council in 1995, new autonomous councils were formed for Deori, Sonowal Kachari, and Thengal Kachari in 2005. For details, see M. Amarjeet Singh, “Ethnic Diversity, Autonomy, and Territoriality in Northeast India: A Case of Tribal Autonomy in Assam,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 6 (2008): 1101–1114. Assam Legislative Assembly passed bills for three more autonomous councils for the Moran, Matak, and Koch-Rajbongshi communities in 2020.

^83. See note 81 above.

^84. It was only when the Bengali origin Muslims shifted their loyalty to AIUDF, and the other two to BJP, the Congress was found struggling in elections.

^85. U. Misra, “Victory for Identity Politics, not Hindutva in Assam,” in Economic and Political Weekly 51, no. 22 (2016): 20–23.

^86. A. R. Dutta, Hindutva Regime in Assam: Saffron in the Rainbow (New Delhi: Sage, 2021).

^87. Dutta, Hindutva Regime in Assam, 22.

^88. S. Gogoi, and P. J. Saikia, “Sharing and Exchanging: Understanding Common Grounds in Northeast India,” 25.

^89. C. Sharma, “Citizenship Amendment Bill 2016: Continuities and Contestations with Special Reference to Politics in Assam, India,” in Asian Ethnicity 20, no. 4 (2019): 522–40.

^90. S. Talukdar, “CAA Protests: Winds of Change in Assam,” in Frontline (January 17 2020). https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30544563.ece (Accessed May 11, 2020).

^91. Sharma, “Citizenship Amendment Bill 2016: Continuities and Contestations with Special Reference to Politics in Assam, India,” 523.

^92. It is true that Barak Valley dominated mostly by immigrants from East Bengal was never part of the regional movement in Assam. It is not surprising that the valley (the Bengali Hindus) would oppose anti- CAA movement in the Brahmaputra valley. On the other hand, the immigrant Muslim population in both the valleys opposed CAA as the act posed to discriminate them on the ground of the religion. Despite this, no common regional forum (anti-BJP) between them and the Assamese and other indigenous groups (Khilanjia) came into being.

^93. S. Saikia, “BJP Managed to Nullify Regionalism, Negate Citizenship Fears Among Bengali Hindus by Pitting CAB Against NRC in Assam. (May 28, 2019) https://www.firstpost.com/politics/bjp-managed-to-nullify-regionalism-negate-citizenship-fears-among-bengali-hindus-by-pitting-cab-against-nrc-in-assam/6711711.html (Accessed May 10, 2020).

^94. Saikia, “BJP Managed to Nullify Regionalism, Negate Citizenship Fears Among Bengali Hindus by Pitting CAB Against NRC in Assam.”

^95. This refers to the democratic protest of civil society groups, student organization and opposition parties against the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) 2016 before the 2019 parliamentary election which was different from the mass protest toward the end of 2019 against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA)-2019.

^96. Dutta, “Hindutva Regime in Assam: Saffron in the Rainbow,” 259.

^97. Dutta, “Hindutva Regime in Assam,” 68.

^98. R. Jenkins, “Appearances and Reality in Indian Politics: Making Sense of the 1999 General Election,” in Government and Opposition 35, no. 1 (2000): 49–66.