Neoliberal co-optation and authoritarian renewal: social entrepreneurship networks in Jordan and Morocco

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes social entrepreneurship networks (SENs) – composed of social entrepreneurs, business and political elites, and international actors – in Jordan and Morocco and how they foster processes of authoritarian renewal through neoliberal forms of co-optation. I argue that these new neoliberal networks and pre-existing patterns of social interaction complement each other, fostering linkages between well-established elites and hand-picked social entrepreneurs as well as societal groups. The two case studies illustrate different trajectories of the development of SENs and their embeddedness in the respective political, social and economic contexts. Importantly, such trajectories indicate a similar direction of travel: social entrepreneurship, rather than acting as a driver of progressive change, has been aligned with the authoritarian regimes and cements neoliberalism as a mode of governance. This mutation of neoliberal tactics towards more inclusionary and consensual patterns seeks to ensure the survival of both neoliberalism and of authoritarian governance. Thus, the article brings to light repertoires of authoritarian neoliberalism that have hitherto been under-studied. Moreover, it offers a critical perspective on social entrepreneurship as an increasingly popular phenomenon that, in academia and beyond, has all too often been approached from an uncritical and apolitical perspective.

KEYWORDS:

• Authoritarianism
• neoliberalism
• elites
• social entrepreneurship
• Middle East
• social network analysis

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Mohammad Yaghi and the participants of the workshop ‘Networks of Dependency’ which was organized by the research network ‘Reconfigurations’ in the Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies at Phillips University Marburg in July 2015 for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Furthermore, I would like to thank Cemal Burak Tansel and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and suggestions for improvement.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Details of the complete social network analysis are available upon request. In total, 44 interviews were conducted with social entrepreneurs, representatives of international and local support organizations, business actors and experts. The names of all interview partners were anonymized. For further details, see Kreitmeyr-Koska (2016).

2. For a discussion of the literatures on democratization and authoritarian resilience with regard to the Arab uprisings, see Valbjorn (2014).

3. Ashoka and Synergos have country representatives in the MENA region; the others are based abroad and occasionally travel to the region.

4. This calculation is based on the annual reports and announcements published by Ashoka, Synergos, the Schwab Foundation and the Skoll Foundation between 2003 and 2014.

5. Among the social entrepreneurs interviewed in Jordan and Morocco, every single one reported that s/he was encouraged to apply, or was nominated, for a fellowship by an actor from inside the SEN (representatives of international/local organizations, business actors, entrepreneurs).

6. Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, representatives of local and international support organizations and business actors; see also Ashoka (2013); KAAYIA (2015); OCP Foundation (2014); Schwab Foundation (2008); Skoll Foundation (2009); Synergos (2014).

7. Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, support organizations, representatives of the private sector and experts, 2011–2013; see also the contributions in Jamali and Lanteri (2015) and Kreitmeyr (2017).

8. Bank and Schlumberger (2004) describe these actors as the ‘Generation Abdullah’ (p. 41). Examples are Fadi Ghandour (founder of Aramex and Yahoo Maktoob) and Ghassan Nuqul (Nuqul Group).

9. Personal interviews with finalists, winners and project managers of KAFD/KAAYIA, Amman, March/April 2013; see also KAAYIA (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015).

10. I thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this term.

11. Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs and representatives of international and local support organizations, 2012–2013; see also the annual reports of the KAAYIA, Ashoka and Synergos.

12. See for example the annually published sustainability reports by Aramex (2006, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), the Nuqul Group (2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) and the Arab Bank (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014); see also Bailey et al. (2011).

13. Personal interviews, Amman, March/April 2013.

14. On these elites and elite change in Jordan, see Bank and Schlumberger (2004) and Wils (2003). The Moroccan elites, by contrast, are more numerous and their lineages reach back to the nineteenth century (Waterbury, 1970; Benhaddou, 2009).

15. There are cases of entrepreneurs who do not possess these characteristics, but they tend to come from the lower middle-class and/or from smaller towns or refugee camps. They are often presented as the exceptional cases that underline that everyone can be a successful (social) entrepreneur. Personal interviews, Amman, March/April 2013; see also Abdou et al. (2010) and Jamali and Lanteri (2015).

16. In order to respect the wish for anonymity, the author calls this entrepreneur ‘Entrepreneur X’ instead of providing his/her name.

17. Personal interview with ‘Entrepreneur X’, Amman, March 2013.

18. Personal interview with ‘Entrepreneur X’, Amman, March 2013.

19. Examples are the Kettani (Wafa Bank/Attijariwafa) and the Benjelloun (Banque Marocaine de Commerce Extérieur) families as well as the technocrats Mostafa Terrab and Hassan Bouhemou, who direct the OCP and the SNI respectively.

20. The oldest recognized Moroccan social enterprises date back to the 1980s; the most famous ones are the Association Solidarité Féminine (founded 1985), l’Amicale Marocaine des Handicapés (founded 1992), and Al-Jisr (founded 1999). Although they are also well-connected in the SEN, they do not actively foster the promotion and growth of the SEN. Personal interviews, Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013.

21. Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Casablanca/Rabat, September 2013.

22. The SNI complements this approach and supports social enterprises that promote entrepreneurship and offer entrepreneurship education (e.g. Injaz, EFE, Al Jisr). It is the second major business actor in the Moroccan SEN. Personal interviews, Rabat/Casablanca, May 2012/September 2013.

23. Personal interviews with social entrepreneurs, Rabat/Casablanca, September 2013.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nadine Kreitmeyr

Notes on contributor

Nadine Kreitmeyr is Assistant Professor in Middle East and Comparative Politics in the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Tübingen, Germany. Her research focuses on the interplay of authoritarianism and neoliberalism in the Middle East and North Africa.