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ABSTRACT
Progress made in European defence-industrial integration has been subjected to the hardest test with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has had profound implications for European defence industries across the board and spurred on massive investment into the sector. Based on extensive analysis of procurements, adopted policies, and shifts in discourse, we argue that the practical steps undertaken by Central and Eastern European (CEE) defence industries in the wake of the conflict are disintegrational. This is contrary to many discernible indicators which align with European integrational initiatives in defence. Moreover, the paper argues that the pattern of decisions taken by Central and Eastern European countries reinforces structural barriers to potential future European defence-industrial integration. The findings are significant to EU-wide, regional, and bilateral defence-industrial co-operation as well as national defence industrial strategies in reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine.
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Notes
1 By CEE defence industries we include those countries that have relevant defence production in the region and are members of the European Union. Namely alphabetically: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
2 Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976).
3 Inter alia: Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Alice Pannier, ‘An “Improbable Paris-Berlin-Commission Triangle”: Usages of Europe and the Revival of EU Defence Co-operation after 2016’, Journal of European Integration 43, no. 3 (2021): 295–310; Niklas Helwig, ed., ‘Strategic Autonomy and the Transformation of the EU’, FIIA Report 67 (April 2021).
4 Christos Kollias and Panayiotis Tzeremes, ‘In the EDTIB We Trust(?)’, European Security 31, no. 1 (2022): 58–75; Raluca Csernatoni, The EU’s Defence Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Complex, Carnegie Europe (December 2021).
5 European Defence Agency, 2022 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence Report (November 2022).
6 European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2020–2021 Key findings and analysis (December 2022).
7 Ester Sabatino, ‘The European Defence Fund: A Step Towards a Single Market for Defence?’ Journal of European Integration 44, no. 1 (2022): 133–148.
8 Simon Sweeney and Neil Winn, ’EU Security and Defence Co-operation in Times of Dissent: Analysing PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in the Shadow of Brexit’, Defence Studies 20, no. 3 (2020): 224–249.
9 Tobias Bunde, ‘Defending European Integration By (Symbolically) Integrating European Defence? Germany and Its Ambivalent Role in European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of European Integration 43, no. 2 (2021): 243–259.
10 Antonio Calcara, ‘Co-operation and Conflict in the European Defence-industrial Field: The Role of Relative Gains’, Defence Studies 18, no. 4 (2018): 474–497.
11 Michael Kluth, ‘European Defence Industry Consolidation and Domestic Procurement Bias’, Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 (2017): 158–173.
12 The following monographs serve as excellent recent reviews of the plethora of obstacles: Bence Nemeth, How to Achieve Defence Co-operation in Europe? A Sub-regional Approach (Bristol University Press, 2022); Antonio Calcara, European Defence Decision-making. Dilemmas of Collaborative Arms Procurement (Routledge, 2020).
13 Dan Jenkins et al., Executive Summary. Central and Eastern European Countries: Measures to Enhance Balanced Defence Industry in Europe and to Address Barriers to Defence Co-operation Across Europe’ (RAND Europe 2016); Jaroslav Dvorak and Bohuslav Pernica, ‘To Free or Not to Free (Ride): A Comparative Analysis of the NATO Burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania – Another Insight into the Issues of Military Performance in the Central and Eastern Europe’, Defense & Security Analysis 37, no. 2 (2021): 164–176; Martin Chovančík, ‘Defence industrialization in small countries: Policies in Czechia and Slovakia’, Comparative Strategy 37, no. 4 (2018): 272–285.
14 Sophia Besch, ‘EU Defence and the War in Ukraine’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/21/eu-defence-and-war-in-ukraine-pub-88680; Sylvia Pfeifer and Henry Foy, ‘Europe’s Defence Sector: Will War in Ukraine Transform its Fortunes?’, Financial Times, July 18, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/0a917386-7a62-4e4a-9b89-123933f750a6.
15 As an example, Eurofighter orders continue throughout 2022 despite F35 purchases and modest progress is being made even on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). More importantly supply-chains integrated across WE borders are indispensable in filling even many national champion products currently in high demand.
16 Samuel B. H. Faure and Andy Smith, ‘Differentiated Integrations Lessons from Political Economies of European Defence’, European Review of International Studies 6, no. 2 (2019): 3–17.; Catherine Hoeffler, ‘Differentiated Integration in CSDP Through Defence Market Integration’, European Review of International Studies 6, no. 2 (2019): 43–70; With relevant examples in the remainder of the journal’s special issue. Then more broadly: Tobias C. Hofelich, ‘De Facto Differentiation in the European Union. Circumventing Rules, Law, and Rule of Law’, in The Routledge Handbook of Differentiation in the European Union, ed. Benjamin Leruth (London: Routledge, 2022), 66–80; Benjamin Leruth et al., ‘Differentiated Integration and Disintegration in the EU after Brexit: Risks versus opportunities’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 57, no. 6 (2019): 1383–1394.
17 “Differentiated disintegration” may also be a fitting perspective for this sectoral process. See Hans Vollard, ‘Explaining European Disintegration’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 5 (2014): 1142–1159; Frank Schmimmelfennig, ‘(Post-)Brexit. Negotiating Differentiated Disintegration in the European Union’, in The Routledge Handbook of Differentiation in the European Union, ed. Benjamin Leruth (London: Routledge, 2022), 619–632.
18 Erik Jones, ‘Towards a Theory of Disintegration’, Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 3 (2018): 440–451.
19 Comparative studies on the region include Yudit Kiss, Arms Industry Transformation and Integration: The Choices of East Central Europe (Oxford University Press, 2014); Eugene Kogan, The State of Eastern European Defence Industries. RUSI Defence Systems (2008); or studies by the European Defence Agency such as Dan Jenkins et al., Central and Eastern European Countries: Measures to Enhance Balanced Defence Industry in Europe and to Address Barriers to Defence Co-operation across Europe, RAND Europe (2016).
20 Data are compiled from Annual Reports on Arms Exports published by the European External Action Service and accessible via the COARM 2.0 database.
21 Marcin Terlikowski, ‘PESCO – The Polish Perspective’, ARES Policy paper (October 2018); Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall, ’The Defence Industry in Poland: An Offset-based Revival?’, in Arms Trade and Economic Development, eds. Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne (London: Routledge, 2004), 171–185.
22 Dan Jenkins et al., p. 10; Justyna Gotkowska and Olaf Osica, Closing the Gap? Military Co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea (Warsaw: OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 2012).
24 Martin Chovančík, ‘Defence Industrialization in Small Countries: Policies in Czechia and Slovakia’, Comparative Strategy 37, no. 4 (2018): 272–285.
25 European Commission, ‘European Defence Fund 2021 Calls for Proposals – Results’, July 2022, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-grants/calls-proposals/european-defence-fund-2021-calls-proposals-results_en#summary-of-edf-2021-selected-projects---factsheet.
26 Alexandra Brzozowski, ‘EU Arms Fund Faces Reimbursement Issues Amid Increased Ukrainian Needs’, EURACTIV, October 14, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-arms-fund-faces-reimbursement-issues-amid-increased-ukrainian-needs/.
27 Alice Tidey and Sándor Zsíros, ‘Hungary is Blocking Release of €500 Million in EU Military Aid to Ukraine’, EURONEWS, January 1, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/01/20/hungary-blocking-release-of-500-million-in-eu-military-aid-to-ukraine.
28 Lara Seligman, ‘Pentagon Will Pay to Upgrade Dozens of Soviet-era Tanks for Ukraine’, Politico, April 11, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/04/pentagon-will-pay-to-upgrade-dozens-of-soviet-era-tanks-for-ukraine-00065203.
29 Christina Mackenzie, ‘With Slovakian Deal, Germany Expands Three-way ‘Ringtausch’ Dance to Arm Ukraine’, Breaking Defence, November 17, 2022, https://breakingdefence.com/2022/11/with-slovakian-deal-germany-expands-three-way-ringtausch-dance-to-arm-ukraine/.
30 Keith Hartley, The Economics of arms (Agenda Publishing, 2017); Daniel Fiott, ‘Defence Industrial Co-operation’, in The European Union: The State, the Firm and Europe (London: Routledge, 2019).
31 Jaroslav Dvorak and Bohuslav Pernica, ‘To Free or not to Free (ride): A Comparative Analysis of the NATO Burden-sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania – another Insight into the Issues of Military Performance in the Central and Eastern Europe’, Defense & Security Analysis 37, no. 2 (2021): 164–176.
32 Robbie Gramer, Amy Mackinnon, and Jack Detsch, ‘Eastern Europe Wants NATO to Beef Up Defence Spending’, Foreign Policy, February 2, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/02/eastern-europe-nato-defence-spending-ukraine-russia-poland-estonia/.
33 Thomas-Durell Young, ‘What are Governments in Central and Eastern Europe not Buying with their Defence Budgets? The Readiness Clue’, The RUSI Journal 164, no. 2 (2019): 36–55.
34 Marcin Terlikowski, Defence Innovation: New Models and Procurement Implications: The Polish Case, ARES Policy Paper #73, March 2022.
35 Nicholas Fiorenza, ‘Czech Republic and Slovakia Co-operate on CV90 MkIV IFV Procurement’, JANES, September 1, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/czech-republic-and-slovakia-co-operate-on-cv90-mkiv-ifv-procurement.
36 Council of Ministers, ‘Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2032’, February 11, 2021, https://www.mod.bg/en/doc/co-operation/20210427_Program_2032.pdf.
37 Alexander Andreev, ‘How Bulgaria Secretly Armed Ukraine’, DW, January 21, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/how-bulgaria-secretly-armed-ukraine-with-nato-weapons-deliveries/a-64478423.
38 Christopher Nehring, ‘Bulgaria Finds Middle Ground on Weapon Delivery to Ukraine’, DW, October 5, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/bulgaria-ukraine-weapons-exports/a-61750049.
39 George Visan, The Known Unknowns of Romania’s Defence Modernization Plans, Romania Energy Center, Speicla report July 3, 2019, https://www.roec.biz/project/the-known-unknowns-of-romanias-defence-modernization-plans/.
40 Tamás Csiki Varga, ‘A Reluctant Supporter: The Hungarian Perspective on European Strategic Autonomy’, in European Strategic Autonomy and Small States' Security: In the Shadow of Power, eds. Giedrius Česnakas and Justinas Juozaitis (Routledge, 2022).
41 Patrik Galavits, ‘How Viktor Orbán Decided to Arm Hungary’, TELEX, January 11, 2023, https://telex.hu/direkt36/2023/01/11/how-viktor-orban-decided-to-arm-hungary.
42 European Commission, ‘Defence Industry: EU to Reinforce the European Defence Industry through Common Procurement with a €500 Million Instrument’, July 19, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4491.
43 Michelangelo Freyrie, ‘European Defence Short: The Challenges of Military aid to Ukraine’, IAI, September 19, 2022, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/difesa-europea-a-corto-le-sfide-degli-aiuti-militari-allucraina/.
44 Laurens Bynens et al., Solving the European Defence Market Puzzle (Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2018), 26.
45 Interviews with defence firm representatives from Poland and Slovakia, EUROSATORY 2022, Paris, June 16, 2022.
46 Major Romanian naval procurements from French Naval Group are still on hold.
47 Marcin Haber, ‘Polska zbrojeniówka korzysta na wojnie w Ukrainie. Szef PGZ przedstawił prognozy’, Wprost Biznes, November 24, 2022, https://biznes.wprost.pl/gospodarka/przemysl/10973830/polska-zbrojeniowka-korzysta-na-wojnie-w-ukrainie-szef-pgz-przedstawil-prognozy.html.
48 Maciej Miłosz, ‘Wojna w Ukrainie sprawiła, że polska zbrojeniówka ma swoje pięć minut’, Forsal, July 9, 2022, https://forsal.pl/swiat/bezpieczenstwo/artykuly/8487952,krab-wojna-w-ukrainie-polska-zbrojeniowka-ma-swoje-piec-minut.html.
49 Maciej Miłosz, ‘Trzy filary polskiej zbrojeniówki. Nowe szanse i stare zagrożenia’, Gazeta Prawna, November 13, 2022, https://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/8586190,jelcz-podwozie-wyrzutnie-krab-piorun-warmate-polska-zbrojeniowka-himars.html.
50 Maciej Miłosz, ‘Wojna w Ukrainie sprawiła, że polska zbrojeniówka ma swoje pięć minut’, Forsal, July 9, 2022, https://forsal.pl/swiat/bezpieczenstwo/artykuly/8487952,krab-wojna-w-ukrainie-polska-zbrojeniowka-ma-swoje-piec-minut.html; Michael Kahn, Anna Koper, and Robert Muller, ‘Weapons Industry Booms as Eastern Europe Arms Ukraine’, Reuters, November 24 (2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/weapons-industry-booms-eastern-europe-arms-ukraine-2022-11-24/?fbclid=IwAR0txxA091adKtcDY4NYd6h0klMEgDxdPBdKXwmM9ysqx_78rPIMR6Jfxeg.
51 Katelyn Bushnell, André Frank, Lukas Franz, Ivan Kharitonov, Bharath Kumar, and Christoph Trebesch, ‘A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine’, The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.
52 Ministry of Defence of Czech Republic, ‘Jednání ministryně s českými zbrojaři. Oceňují podporu exportu i českých zakázek’, Army.cz, October 5, 2022, https://mocr.army.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/jednani-ministryne-s-ceskymi-zbrojari--ocenuji-podporu-exportu-i-ceskych-zakazek-239387/#:~:text=Oce%C5%88uj%C3%AD%20podporu%20exportu%20i%20%C4%8Desk%C3%BDch%20zak%C3%A1zek,-Autor%3A%20redakce%20(ob&text=Poprv%C3%A9%20se%20ministryn%C4%9B%20obrany%20se%C5%A1la,s%20resortem%20obrany%20jako%20takov%C3%A1.
53 Jan Hrbáček, ‘Co posílí bezpečnost České republiky? Partnerství státu a soukromého obranného průmyslu. Navíc to bude injekce pro ekonomiku’, Ekonomický deník, August 17, 2022, https://ekonomickydenik.cz/co-posili-bezpecnost-ceske-republiky-partnerstvi-statu-a-soukromeho-obranneho-prumyslu-navic-to-bude-injekce-pro-ekonomiku/.
54 Michael Kahn, Anna Koper, and Robert Muller, ‘Weapons Industry Booms as Eastern Europe Arms Ukraine’, Reuters, November 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/weapons-industry-booms-eastern-europe-arms-ukraine-2022-11-24/?fbclid=IwAR0txxA091adKtcDY4NYd6h0klMEgDxdPBdKXwmM9ysqx_78rPIMR6Jfxeg.
55 George Visan, ‘The Known Unknowns of Romania’s Defence Modernization Plans’, Romania Energy Center, July 3, 2019, https://www.roec.biz/project/the-known-unknowns-of-romanias-defence-modernization-plans/; Reuters, ‘Romania to Overhaul State Defence Firms to Boost Production-minister’, December 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-overhaul-state-defence-firms-boost-production-minister-2022-12-14/; Alexander Andreev, ‘How Bulgaria secretly armed Ukraine’, DW, January 21, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/how-bulgaria-secretly-armed-ukraine-with-nato-weapons-deliveries/a-64478423.
56 Defence News, ‘Bulgarian Modernization of T-72 Tanks and Crew Training Being Carried Out’, September 27, 2022, https://www.armyrecognition.com/defence_news_september_2022_global_security_army_industry/bulgarian_modernization_of_t-72_tanks_and_crew_training_being_carried_out_successfully.html.
57 Radu Dumitrescu, ‘Romanian Govt. Pledges Investments in Advanced Weapons Production Despite History of Inefficiency’, Romania Insider, May 17, 2022, https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-wants-produce-military-aicraft.
58 Patrik Galavits, ‘How Viktor Orbán Decided to Arm Hungary’, TELEX, January 11, 2023, https://telex.hu/direkt36/2023/01/11/how-viktor-orban-decided-to-arm-hungary; David Herszenhron, Jacopo Barigazzi, Barbara Moens and Hans von der Burchard, ‘Germany Loses EU Sway as Eastern Europe Turns Away over Russia’, Politico, June 1, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-loses-eu-sway-as-eastern-europe-turns-away-over-russia/; Lukas Schmelter, ‘How Germany Lost the Trust of Eastern Europe’, Internationale Politik Quarterly, January 4, 2023, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/how-germany-lost-trust-eastern-europe; Anna Koper and Michel Rose, ‘Nobody Negotiated with Hitler, Polish PM Says, Berating France's Macron over Putin talks’, Reuters, April 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nobody-negotiated-with-hitler-polish-pm-says-berating-frances-macron-over-putin-2022-04-04/; Frank Hofmann, ‘Germany's Losing Credibility’, DW, July 7, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-germany-loses-credibility-by-not-delivering-tanks/a-62616378.
59 Compare to: Z. Kříž, S. Brajerčíková, and J. Urbanovská, ‘Defence Co-Operation Between Germany and the Visegrad Countries’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 3 (2018): 354–371.
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Martin Chovančík
Martin Chovančík is assistant professor and researcher at the International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. His field, research projects, and publications focus on European and Central and Eastern European defence industries, arms trade, and participation in European security frameworks, sanctions regimes, and minilateral and multilateral co-operation within these segments.
Oldřich Krpec
Oldrich Krpec is an associate professor in the International Relations department at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. His field is economic history and international political economy. He focuses on economic policies in semi-peripheries and on projection of power into trade and development policies. Besides the economic dimension of foreign policy of central European countries, he currently works on projects dealing with structural obstacles to defence industrial co-operation in the region. He believes that economic, social and political developments of Central and Eastern Europe in the last three decades is a fascinating field of study, which has much to offer to contemporary academic discussions.