Mitigating Security Risks and Potential Threats of Emerging Rendezvous and Proximity Operations

ABSTRACT

Space actors will increasingly conduct rendezvous and proximity operations in space as the associated technologies advance and diffuse. As this occurs, multiple-use of such capabilities will present inherent security risks and potential threats to existing peaceful space activities. The United States must develop and promote a comprehensive operational and dissuasive construct in advance to mitigate these security risks and threats to stability in space. The inherent multiple-use attributes of rendezvous and proximity operations capabilities mean that the regulatory efforts must focus on regulating behavior and registration practices. In addition, improving space situational awareness alone insufficiently addresses the challenges of verifying compliance with the regulatory framework. There must be thoughtful approaches to expanding the space situational awareness network to partners, declassifying data to increase transparency, and improving communication practices to share data and resolve ambiguity. In addition, a space assurance strategy that includes credible deterrence options to deter those who would seek to undermine the regulatory framework is important.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. Rebecca Reesman and James R. Wilson, “The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy (Washington D.C.: The Aerospace Corporation, October 2020), 9.

^2. Ibid.

^3. Ibid., 8.

^4. Jason Rainbow, “MEV-2 Servicer Successfully Docks to Live Intelsat Satellite,” Space News, April 12, 2021, https://spacenews.com/mev-2-servicer-successfully-docks-to-live-intelsat-satellite/.

^5. Joshua P. Davis, John P. Mayberry, and Jay P. Penn, “On-Orbit Servicing: Inspection, Repair, Refuel, Upgrade, and Assembly of Satellites in Space” (Aerospace Corporation, April 2019), 2, 5–6, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Davis-Mayberry-Penn_OOS_04242019.pdf.

^6. Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment” (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, April 2021), 3–4.

^7. Ibid., 1–5.

^8. “Astroscale's ELSA-d Successfully Demonstrates Repeated Magnetic Capture,” Astroscale, August 26, 2021, https://astroscale.com/astroscales-elsa-d-successfully-demonstrates-repeated-magnetic-capture/.

^9. Theresa Hitchens, “China's SJ-21 ‘Tugs’ Dead Satellite Out of GEO Belt: Trackers,” Breaking Defense, January 26, 2022, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2022/01/chinas-sj-21-tugs-dead-satellite-out-of-geo-belt-trackers/.

^10. See: James Alver, Andrew Garza, and Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies” (Secure World Foundation, May 2019); and Brian G. Chow and Brandon W. Kelley, “Peace in the Era of Weaponized Space,” SpaceNews, July 28, 2021, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-peace-in-the-era-of-weaponized-space/.

^11. “CFR Title 15, Volume 2, Section 730, Subchapter C – Export Administration Regulations” (U.S. Government, 2001), 185–86, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2001-title15-vol2/pdf/CFR-2001-title15-vol2-sec730-3.pdf.

^12. Scott Pace, “American Space Strategy: Choose to Steer, Not Drift,” The Diplomat, March 28, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/03/american-space-strategy-choose-to-steer-not-drift/.

^13. Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate Space (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 81; and Joan Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2017), 42.

^14. Neil deGrasse Tyson and Avis Lang, Accessory to War: The Unspoken Alliance Between Astrophysics and the Military (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), 237.

^15. Roger Handberg, “Dual-Use as Unintended Policy Driver: The American Bubble,” in Societal Impact of Spaceflight, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 359.

^16. Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, 39–41.

^17. Ibid., 42.

^18. Dana J. Johnson and Ariel E. Levite, “Toward Fusion of Air and Space: Surveying Developments and Assessing Choices for Small and Middle Powers,” RAND – Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, 2001, 56–58.

^19. “Military-Civil Fusion and the People's Republic of China” (U.S. Department of State, May 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/What-is-MCF-One-Pager.pdf.

^20. Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, 42.

^21. Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 14–15; and James P. Finch and Shawn Steene, “Finding Space in Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 2011, 11.

^22. John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 31; and John J. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space (New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 79.

^23. Todd Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2020), 54.

^24. Alver, Garza, and May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies.” The authors suggest optimistically that OOS and ADR capabilities are benign and would not be employed as weapons.

^25. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, 2–2, 2–3.

^26. Ibid., 3–3.

^27. Ibid., 1–3, 2-6-2–10.

^28. Todd Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2021” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2021), 13–14; and Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, 2–2, 2–9, 2–10.

^29. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, 2–2, 2–7; and Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment” (Washington D.C.: Secure World Foundation, April 2020), xii.

^30. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 22.

^31. Reesman and Wilson, “The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements,” 11.

^32. “Defense Space Strategy Summary” (Department of Defense, June 2020), 3, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF.

^33. Reesman and Wilson, “The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements,” 10.

^34. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 23; Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, 2–9.

^35. John Raymond, “Russia Conducts Space-Based Anti-Satellite Weapons Test,” United States Space Command, July 23, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2285098/russia-conducts-space-based-anti-satellite-weapons-test/; and James Dickinson, “Russia Tests Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile,” United States Space Command, December 16, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2,448,334/Russia-tests-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/#:~:text=James%20Dickinson%2C%20U.S.%20Space%20Command,space%20systems%20are%20rapidly%20advancing.&text=We%20stand%20ready%20and%20committed,from%20hostile%20acts%20in%20space.%E2%80%9D.

^36. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2021,” 14; Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, 2–9; Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 22.

^37. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, xvi, 1-5-1–11. This entire report highlights in much more detail the publicly available information on Russian and Chinese RPO related activities.

^38. Ibid., xix.

^39. Rainbow, “MEV-2 Servicer Successfully Docks to Live Intelsat Satellite.”

^40. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 3–5.

^41. Reesman and Wilson, “The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements,” 10.

^42. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 84–85.

^43. Deganit Paikowsky, “Russia Wants to Show Its Space Weapons Capability Before It's Too Late,” Foreign Policy, December 26, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/26/putin-Russia-tested-space-asat-satellite-weapon/.

^44. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 85.

^45. Ibid., 86–87.

^46. Dean Cheng, “Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: What the United States Must Understand about China and Space,” Heritage, May 29, 2018, 2, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/evolving-chinese-thinking-about-deterrence-what-the-united-states-must.

^47. S. Pete Worden et al., “How to Work in the New Space Security Environment,” Federation of American Scientists, Winter 2011, 5, https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-SpaceSecurity.pdf.

^48. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 101.

^49. Ibid., 101–2.

^50. Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment” (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, April 2019), 3-2-3–6.

^51. Ibid., 3-5-3–6.

^52. Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (Columbia University Press, 2007), 240; Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 83–88.

^53. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 226.

^54. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 10.

^55. Johnson-Freese, Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens, 39–43.

^56. Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda, “China's Pursuit of Advanced Dual-Use Technologies,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 18, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/12/emerging-technology-dominance.

^57. Michael J. Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence” (RAND Corporation, 2018), 4–5, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf.

^58. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 81.

^59. Eligar Sadeh, “Towards a National Space Strategy,” Astropolitics 8, no. 2–3 (2010): 96–97.

^60. Victoria Samson, “Insight – UN Resolution 75/36: How Changing the Question May Change the Results | Secure World,” Secure World Foundation, May 5, 2021, https://swfound.org/news/all-news/2021/05/insight-un-resolution-7536-how-changing-the-question-may-change-the-results.

^61. Barry D. Watts, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment” (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001), 21.

^62. Christina B. Rocca, “Conference on Disarmament/1847: Analysis of A Draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of The Placement of Weapons In Outer Space, or the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects’” (United Nations Conference on Disarmament, August 26, 2008), 4, 6, 8, https://undocs.org/CD/1847; U.S. Delegation, “Conference on Disarmament/1998: Analysis of the 2014 Russian-Chinese Draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (United Nations Conference on Disarmament, September 3, 2014), 2–5.

^63. Harrison et al., “Space Threat Assessment 2020,” 3–5.

^64. Rocca, “Conference on Disarmament/1847: Analysis of A Draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of The Placement of Weapons In Outer Space, or the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,’” 8.

^65. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, 226.

^66. Chris Johnson, “Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities Fact Sheet” (Secure World Foundation, February 2014), https://swfound.org/media/166384/swf_draft_international_code_of_conduct_for_outer_space_activities_fact_sheet_february_2014.pdf.

^67. Ibid.

^68. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security,” The Diplomat, December 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/assessing-the-british-proposal-on-space-security/.

^69. Michael E. O'Hanlon, “Chapter 21: Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space,” in Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, ed. Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays (National Defense University: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2011), 416.

^70. In some sense, this is identical to what GEO already performs given its orbital slotting regime. However, these orbital slots are not protected from proximity operations as long as no interference occurs and as will be discussed next, lack any de-escalatory communication measures. It should be noted that, to some degree, GEO has a semi-keep-out zone concept given its orbital slotting regime. However, there is a desire to increase the number of orbital positions which would then make those zones smaller. In addition, there is an apparent lack of enforcement for other activities in proximity of, or within, these zones, particularly as long as they do not interfere.

^71. International Maritime Organization, “COLREG: Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972.,” 2003.

^72. U.S. Department of State, “Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas,” U.S. Department of State, May 1972, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm#treaty.

^73. Wade Boese, “Russia Halts Missile Launch Notices,” March 2008, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/RussiaHalts.

^74. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” in International Space Law: United Nations Instruments, vol. 610, Treaty Series 8843 (Vienna: United Nations, 2017), Articles VI and IX.

^75. Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani, and Jonathan C. McDowell, “Critical Issues Related to Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities,” Acta Astronautica 143 (2018): 413.

^76. Ibid., 408, 410–12.

^77. Ibid., 410.

^78. Ibid., 411–12.

^79. Joseph W. Gangestad, “Orbital Slots for Everyone” (Washington, D.C.: The Aerospace Corporation, 2017), 4.

^80. Peter Martinez, “The UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities” (Washington, D.C.: Secure World Foundation, November 2019), 3–4, https://swfound.org/media/206891/swf_un_copuos_lts_guidelines_fact_sheet_november-2019-1.pdf.

^81. “Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,” in Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-Second Session (UN General Assembly A/74/20, 2019), 57–58, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0.html.

^82. Ibid., 59–60, 64.

^83. Johnson and Levite, “Toward Fusion of Air and Space: Surveying Developments and Assessing Choices for Small and Middle Powers,” 65.

^84. Victoria Samson et al., “Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space” (Secure World Foundation, April 15, 2021).

^85. Colin Clark, “What About JMS? Air Force Reanimates ‘Old Clunker’ Space Tracking System,” Breaking Defense, April 8, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/04/what-about-jms-air-force-reanimates-old-clunker-space-tracking-system/.

^86. Ibid.

^87. Sandra Erwin, “Space Force's Troubled Space-Tracking System Is Officially Shut Down,” SpaceNews, January 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-forces-troubled-space-tracking-system-is-officially-shut-down/.

^88. Benjamin Staats, “Op-Ed | Don't Wait for a Disaster: Industry-Led Space Traffic Management,” SpaceNews, December 15, 2021, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-dont-wait-for-a-disaster-industry-led-space-traffic-management/.

^89. Karen Singer, “100th Space Sharing Agreement Signed, Romania Space Agency Joins,” U.S. Strategic Command, April 26, 2019, https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1825882/100th-space-sharing-agreement-signed-Romania-space-agency-joins/. This was originally a U.S. Strategic Command program but shifted to U.S. Space Command.

^90. John J. Klein, “Towards a Better U.S. Space Strategy: Addressing the Strategy Mismatch,” The Strategy Bridge, September 9, 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/9/9/towards-a-better-us-space-strategy-addressing-the-strategy-mismatch.

^91. Weeden and Samson, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment,” April 2021, xvi.

^92. Ibid.

^93. Stacey Solomone, China's Strategy in Space (New York, NY: Springer Books, 2013), 39.

^94. Aaron Mehta, “‘Unbelievably Ridiculous’: Four-Star General Seeks to Clean up Pentagon's Classification Process,” Defense News, January 29, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/01/29/unbelievably-ridiculous-four-star-general-seeks-to-clean-up-pentagons-classification-process/.

^95. Christopher M. Stone, Reversing the Tao: A Framework for Credible Space Deterrence, 2016, 56–57. He does not specifically argue for RPO capabilities but offensive capabilities in general.

^96. General John Raymond, “Chief of Space Operations’ Planning Guidance” (U.S. Space Force, November 2020), 3, 8.

^97. Michael P. Gleason and Peter L. Hays, “Getting the Most Deterrent Value from U.S. Space Forces” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Space Policy and Strategy, Aerospace Corporation, October 2020), 5–6.

^98. To be fair, the United States has also violated international law, and therefore, the proposed construct includes a parallel pursuit of TCBMs and greater verification efforts to illustrate the benign intent of the United States to maintain peace and security in outer space.

^99. Steven Pifer, “Crimea: Six Years After Illegal Annexation,” Brookings Institute, March 17, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/.

^100. Sarah Lohschelder, “Chinese Domestic Law in the South China Sea,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, CSIS, no. 12 (Summer 2017).

^101. “National Space Policy of the United States” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 9, 2020), 2–3.

^102. M.V. Smith, “Security and Spacepower,” Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Selected Essays, March 7, 2011, 333.

^103. Daniel Fried, John E. Herbst, and Alexander Vershbow, “How to Deter Russia Now,” Atlantic Council, November 23, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-to-deter-Russia-now/.

^104. Klein, “Towards a Better U.S. Space Strategy: Addressing the Strategy Mismatch,” 84.

^105. Ibid., 98, 104.

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Benjamin Staats

Benjamin Staats is a graduate student at the Space Policy Institute, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He is also an Army Space Operations Officer and a Schriever Space Scholar graduate from the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or positions of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.