Notes
1 Hereafter, for simplicity and because they are the focus of Fritz’s paper, “appeals (or claims) to conscience” will refer to those that concern abortion.
2 When it comes to abortion, he is more focused on the mental health of abortion patients than on their autonomy, as though it was not enough that these patients autonomously choose abortion; their mental health must be at stake as well. (To be clear, it should be enough that they give their informed consent for an abortion. For a view about medical practice that coheres with this claim, see McLeod 2017.)
3 The term “conscientious commitment” originates with Dickens and Cook.
4 He should do so for the reason I’ve given but also because his use of the term “conscientious objection” doesn’t clearly fit with the way it has been used historically, particularly in military contexts.
5 The claims I make are moral rather than legal in nature, although I do think a legal fiduciary argument could be made for why conscientious refusals should be severely restricted.
6 He does that when discussing their justification because he ignores the fact that the negative appeals often constitute a misuse or abuse of power, which is not true of the positive appeals.