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Abstract
The Chinese decision-making process and the role of the Chinese leaders (mainly Mao Zedong) during the Korean War remain controversial topics in international academic circles. This article argues that China's main goal in 1950-1951 was to liberate Taiwan, and once the Soviet Union and North Korea had agreed to launch a military attack on South Korea, Mao was forced to support the war. After the United States entered the war in late June 1950, Mao advocated sending Chinese troops to aid North Korea. Although the decision-making process was tortuous and the motives changed along the way, the fundamental purpose of the Chinese was to gain Stalin's trust and use the deterrence of the Sino-Soviet alliance and Soviet assistance to stabilize the nascent revolutionary regime and safeguard China's national security. The factor that influenced China's decision-making the most was the Sino-Soviet relationship.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The research and writing of the article was supported by the 2021 Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2021-OLU-2250005).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Even by the early 1990s, Western scholars still believed that Lin Biao refused to lead his troops to fight in North Korea for health reasons (See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partner: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993], 167), and that the volunteers who went abroad to fight were all Koreans who had volunteered to go to Korea (See Sakurai Hiroshi, “A Survey: Studies on the Korean War in Japan,” Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 1, no. 1 (April 1998): 90.
2 Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Book Club Associates, 1987), 155–56.
3 E.G.: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the foundation of the PRC), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1987–1989), 4 vols.; Peng Dehuai chuanji bianjiexiezu, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Writings of Peng Dehuai), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988); Mao Zedong junshi wenji (Collectionn of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers), (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe & Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 6 vols.; Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan, ed., Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Writings of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 4 vols.; Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi & Zhongyang Dang’anguan ed., Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao (Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Foundation of the PRC), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008–2018), 9 vols; Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, & Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan eds., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao (Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts since the Foundation of the PRC), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010), 2 vols.. In particular, the 2014 compilation by the Academy of Military Sciences, Kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng – Wenjian (The War of Resistance against the US and Assistance to Korea – Documents) in which nearly two-thirds (618) of the selected documents constitute previously undisclosed Chinese military archival materials, has not yet been officially published, but the author was fortunate to see the final draft.
4 Iu.N. Semina and S.N. Rubana, “Politicheskii arkhiv XX veka. Uchastie SSSR v koreiskoi voine (novye dokumenty)” (Political Archive of the 20th Century. The Participation of the USSR in the Korean War (new documents)), Voprosy istorii (Problems of History), no. 11, 3–20 (1994); no. 12 (1994), 30–45; V. N. Vartanov ed., Voina v Koree 1950–1953 gg.:Dokumenty i materialy (The War in Koree 1950–1953: Documents and materials), (Moscow, 1997); A. Volokhova “Nekotorye arkhivnye materialy o koreiskoi voine (1950–1953)” (Some archival documents about the Korean War), Problemy dal’nego vostoka (Far Eastern Affairs), no. 4 (1999): 123–31; A.M. Ledovskii “Stalin, Mao Tczedun i koreiskaia voina, 1950–1953 godov” (Stalin, Mao Zedong and the Korean War, 1950–1953), Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (Modern and Contemporary History), no. 5 (2005): 79–113.
5 Many of these documents have been translated into English and posted on the Cold War International History Project website of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the United States (https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org).
6 The works of greater historical value include: Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partner; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang – kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi (The First Contest—Recollections and Reflections on the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea) (expanded edition), (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1998); A.V. Torkunov, Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov (Mysterious War: Korean Conflict of 1950–1953), (Moscow: Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia, 2000); Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Lishi Yanjiubu, Kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzhengshi (History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea), (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2000), 3 vols.; William W. Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s, Neil Silver trans. (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng (Mao Zedong, Stalin and Korean War) (3rd ed.), (Guanzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2013).
7 The most typical of these meetings during the Korean War were the enlarged Politburo meetings on October 4/5, 13 and 18, 1950. According to the author’s understanding, there was not a single word of official records related to these three key meetings for the decision to send troops to Korea, except for the list of participants.
8 See, for example, Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr., “Beyond Collective Amnesia: A Korean War Retrospective,” International Social Science Review, vol. 76, nos. 3/4 (2001): 93. For a more detailed account, see Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 9–10, 21–24, 56–60. Of course, it is mainly mainland Chinese scholars who feel the political pressure now.
9 Due to the lack of basic historical material supporting the claims from either side, the debate that had happened before the end of the Cold War is no longer relevant, although some perspectives have influenced subsequent scholarship. This article focuses mainly on various viewpoints in international academic circles in the past thirty years.
10 For an introduction to various Cold-war-era schools and viewpoints on the origins of war during the Cold War, see Rosemary Foot, “Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,” Diplomatic History, vol. 15, no. 4 (1991): 411–31; Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Outbreak of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper, no. 8, 1993. For a comprehensive account refuting the revisionist views on the origins of war, see Kim Chull Baum, “An Inquiry into the Origins of the Korean War: A Critique of the Revisionists’ View,” East Asian Review, vol. 6, no. 2. (1994): 3–22. Only Chinese official historiography and individual Russian scholars still insist on this statement. They have intentionally or unintentionally catered to the “civil war theory,” stating that the “Korean civil war broke out” with the support of the United States. Kang Mei yuan Chao, vol. 1, pp. 23–26; Iu.V. Vanin, ed., Voina v Koree: 1950–1953 gg., Vzgliad cherez 50 let (The War in Korea: 1950–1953, An Overview 50 years later), Moscow: RRO «Pervoe Marta», 2001, 27–28; V.A. Shin, Kitai i koreiskie gosudarstva vo vtoroi polovine XX stoletiia (China and the Korean states in the second half of the 20th century), (Moscow: Izd-vo MGU, 1998), 134.
11 China’s official use of the general concept of the “War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” (starting from October 1950) is largely there to avoid discussing the responsibility for waging the war.
12 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partner, 214–15; Evgueni Bajanov, “Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/1996): 87; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), 70–75; Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War, 73–77; A.S Orlov & V.A. Gavrilov, Tainy Koreiskoi voiny (Secrets of the Korean War), (Moscow: Veche, 2003), 48–49; I.G. Drogovoz, Neobiavlennye voiny SSSR (The Undeclared Wars of the USSR), (Minsk: Kharvest, 2004), 17–23; Kathryn Weathersby, “Korean, 1949–50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5 (Spring 1995): 4; Avram Agov, “North Korea’s Alliances and the Unfinished Korean War,” The Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (fall 2013): 5–6.
13 Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partner, 139; A.M. Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tszedun i koreiskaia voina,” 96–98; A.V. Samokhin “Voenno-politicheskie plany I.V. Stalina v koreiskoi voine” (J. V. Stalin’s military and political plans in the Korean War), Vlast’ i upravlenie na Vostoke Rossii (Power and Administration in the Eastern Russia), no. 3 (2010): 103–5; Hwang Byong Moo, “The Role and Responsibilities of China and the Former Soviet Union in the Korean War,” International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 106; Kim Dong-gil, “Stalin’s Korean U-Turn: The USSR’s Evolving Security and The Origins of the Korean War,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 24, no. 1 (2011): 93.
14 One additional source: A Chinese diplomat who did not want to be named told the author that he saw the record of the conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong in December 1949 (the author judged it was the 24th) in the archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They all expressed their disapproval of Kim Il-sung's request to take the initiative to attack the South. Mao Zedong even proposed to replace Kim Il-sung with Choi Yongjian, a North Korean leader familiar to the CCP, but Stalin did not respond.
15 See Shen Zhihua, Wunai de xuanze – lengzhan yu ZhongSu tongmeng de mingyun (1945–1959) (A Helpless Choice——The Cold War and the Fate of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1959), (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 134–95; Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 47–67.
16 The Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, vol. 22, no. 551, 111–18; no. 550, 79.
17 “Secret Report from China,” January 17, 1950, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), f.100, op.43, p.315, d.142, l.53–54.
18 “Mao Zedong’s telegram to Liu Shaoqi delivered to Stalin,” July 25, 1949, Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), f.45, op.1, f.328, l.137–140.
19 “Memorandum of conversation between N.V. Roshchin and Zhou Enlai,” November 15 and December 5, 1949, AVPRF, f.07, op.22, p.36, d.220, l.57–66; AVPRF, f.100, op.36а, p.150, d.4, l.86–87.
20 “Record of conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong,” December 16, 1949, APRF, f.45, op.1, d.329, l. 9–17.
21 “Memorandum of conversation between Molotov and Mao Zedong,” January 17, 1950, AVPRF, f.07, op.23a, p.18, d.234, l.1–7.
22 Renmin ribao, January 21, 1950, 1; Shi Zhe & Li Haiwen, ed., Zai lishi juren shenbian – Shi Zhe huiyilu (Together with Historical Giants – Memoirs of Shi Zhe), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 454–56.
23 Zhonggongzhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao (Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008), vol. 2, 137–38, 149–50, 207–8, 299–300, 301–302; Zhonggongzhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, eds., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao (Mao Zedong’s military manuscript since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China), (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010), vol.1, 132.
24 Wang Dinglie chief ed., Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989, p. 78; “Letter from Luo Shunchu (Chief of Staff of the Navy) to Zhou Enlai,” January 17, April 16, 1951, author’s personal collection.
25 Other scholars have voiced the same opinion. See Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 75; Chen Jian, “In the Name of Revolution: China’s Road to the Korean War Revisited,” in William Stueck ed., The Korean War in World History (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 103–4.
26 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 76–77.
27 “CPSU Central Committee on the drafts of treaties and protocols concerning the negotiations between the Soviet Union and China,” January 22, 1950, AVPRF, f.07, op.23а, p.18, d.235, l.41–50.
28 “China draft agreement on Lüshunkou, Dalian and the Chinese Eastern Railway,” January 26, 1950, AVPRF, f..07, op.23а, p.20, d.248, l.38–42.
29 “Revised drafts of Soviet side agreements and protocols on Lüshunkou, Dalian and the Chinese Changchun Railway,” January 28, 1950, AVPRF, f.07, op.23a, p.18, d.235, l.73–84.
30 “Soviet sides revised final draft of China's Lushunkou, Dalian, and the Chinese Changchun Railway Agreements and Protocols, January 28, 1950,” AVPRF, f.07, op.23а, p.20, d.248, l.74–79.
31 During the negotiations with T.V. Soong on July 2 and 9, 1945, Stalin repeatedly emphasized the “great strategic significance” of the ice-free port and the Chinese Changchun Railway for the Soviet Union. APRF, f.45, op.1, d.322, l.3–17, 28–38. After signing the treaty of alliance with the National Government, the Soviet Union got what it wanted. Stalin sighed: the Soviet Union “has waited for forty years” for this day to come. Zhonggong Zhongyang MaEnLieSi zhuzuo bianyiju, Sidalin wenxuan, 1934–1952 (Selected Works of Stalin, 1934–1952), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1962), 438–39.
32 Subsequently, events developed as Stalin had expected. From August to September 1952, China proposed to re-sign the agreement, requiring the Soviet army to continue to stay in the Lüshun base, and there was no specific time limit. “Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai,” August 20 and September 3, 1952, APRF, f.45, op.1, d.329, l.54–72, 75–87; Renmin ribao, September 16, 1952, p. 1.
33 According to Goncharov and his co-authors, China “had reservations” about launching this war, and only “reluctantly supported it.” Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partner, 213. On this point, some Russian scholars maintain a different view. They believe that Stalin finally gave up his original position under the double pressure of Beijing and Pyongyang, but they did not present any strong evidence. See A.M. Ledovskii, “Stalin, Mao Tszedun i koreiskaia voina,” 93–94; A.V. Samokhin “Voenno-politicheskie plany I.V. Stalina,” 104.
34 “Record of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Cui Yongjian,” September 18, 1956; “Record of the conversation between Mao Zedong and A. Mikoyan, “September 23, 1956, author’s personal collection.
35 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960).
36 Later, some scholars also described the same logic, but from another direction, arguing that the decisive factor for China's participation in the war was the pressure from the Soviet Union. Gaddis, We Now Know, 78–80; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 42–46.
37 Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, 2–5, 213–220; Chen Jian, “China’s Road to the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 6–7 (Winter 1995/1996): 85.
38 The directive of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 27, 1950 stated that if the Soviet or Chinese troops appeared in North Korea, and if the Soviet Union or China issued a statement about being ready to send troops, the US military should not continue to take military actions on the ground. JCS message 92801 sent to MacArthur, September 27,1950, Harry S. Truman Papers, Staff Member and Korean War Files, Box 13, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.
39 “Record of conversation between Peng Dehuai and his staff,” February 8, 1955, cited from Wang Yazhi, “Mao Zedong juexin chubing Chaoxian qianhou de yixie qingkuang” (Some Circumstances Before and After Mao Zedong's Decision to Send Troops to North Korea), Dangde wenxian (Literature of Chinese Communist Party), 6 (1995): 87.
40 See Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng, 331–56.
41 Mao Zedong later raised this point himself several times. See “Memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Iudin,” March 31, 1956, TsKhSD (Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii) f.5, op.30, d.163, l.88–99 // Problemy dal'nego vostoka, 1994, №5, p.107; Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui, Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), vol. 2, 302.
42 Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Lishi Yanjiubu, ed., KangMei yuanChao zhanzhengshi, vol. 2: 44, 132, 188; vol. 3: 462; Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang, 47, 59–60, 67, 322.
43 “Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin,” November 14, 1951, APRF, f.45, op.1, d.342, l.16–19.
44 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 (Chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), vol.1, 258; “Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai,” September 3, 1952, APRF, f.45, op.1, d.329, l.75–87.
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Shen Zhihua
Shen Zhihua is distinguished professor of history at East China Normal University in Shanghai. He is the preeminent scholar of Cold War studies in China and has published widely in many languages on the topic of the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance, and relations among the Communist allies during the Cold War.