The formation of military intelligence in the United Arab Emirates: 1965–1974

ABSTRACT

There are few comprehensive histories of Arab military intelligence services, and almost nothing on those in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. This paper begins to fill this gap by providing a detailed history of the early years of military intelligence within what is today probably the most capable Arab military – the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It describes military intelligence developments between 1965 and 1974 within the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, which was the direct predecessor of the present-day UAE Armed Forces. It concludes with the formation of the entity which is now known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The paper is based on archival documents and interviews with those who served in Abu Dhabi’s military intelligence.

KEYWORDS:

• UAE Armed Forces
• United Arab Emirates
• military intelligence
• intelligence studies

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ This assessment is based on its ability to undertake effective joint, sustained and expeditionary operations both independently and with partners. A. Yates, The Evolution of the UAE Armed Forces (Solihull: Helion & Co, 2020).

² Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’,” The Washington Post, 9 November 2014.

³ A. Yates, and C. Lord, The Military and Polices Forces of the Gulf States: Trucial States & United Arab Emirates, 1951–1980 (Solihull: Helion & Co, 2019), 52–53. A. Rossiter, “Strength in Unity: The Road to the Integrated UAE Armed Forces,” Liwa: Journal of the National Archives 7, no. 13 (2015).

⁴ At the time of the merger, the ADDF had a strength of 16,000 plus a large air force with supersonic jets, and a navy. The next largest was the Union Defence Force (UDF) with a strength of 4,600, followed by the Dubai Defence Force with 2,600. Both had small air wings equipped with a few transport and liaison helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. TNA, FCO 8/2897, Col T.N. Bromage, UK Defence Attaché, ‘Annual Report for 1976 on the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces’, 30 January 1977.

⁵ E. Kahana and M. Suwaed, The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), p. xiii.

⁶ Dale Eickelman and M.G. Dennison, “Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 7, no. 1 (1994): 6.

⁷ Examples are Clive Jones, “Military Intelligence, Tribes, and Britain’s War in Dhofar, 1970–1976,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011); Clive Jones, “Military Intelligence and the War in Dhofar: An Appraisal,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 3 (2014); and Geraint Hughes, “A ‘Model Campaign’ Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965–1975,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 2 (2009).

⁸ O.L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009 (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.

⁹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia and the 1948 Palestine War: Beyond Official History,” in The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, ed. E.L. Rogan and A. Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹¹ On Britain’s role in the development of local militaries in the Gulf, see A. Rossiter, Security in the Gulf: Local Militaries before British Withdrawal (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2020).

¹² In February 1964, the TOS had an establishment strength of 1,235. FCO 371/74718, M04 UK, War Office, handwritten note, 26 February 1964, 1964.

¹³ TNA, CAB 163/116, Maj Gen J.H. Gibbon, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Directive for the Commander, British Forces Gulf’, 20 November 1967.

¹⁴ P. Clayton, Two Alpha Lima: The First Ten Years of the Trucial Oman Levies and Trucial Oman Scouts (1950 to 1960) (London: Janus Publishing Company, 1999), 142.

¹⁵ The attack resulting in the largest loss of life was in 1961 when the rebels planted an improvised explosive device on the MV Dara. The device detonated after the vessel had left Dubai. Over 200 died in this attack.

¹⁶ M.M. Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 204.

¹⁷ Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, ‘Agreement of the delimitation of boundaries (with exchange of letters and map.) Signed at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 21 August 1974.’, 1974.

¹⁸ In addition to the TOS’ IOs, intelligence was provided by another group of field-based intelligence officers known as Desert Intelligence Officers. These were British Army Officers who had been specially recruited and trained to provide intelligence on threats to British Government policy in the region, and reported directly to the British Political Representatives in the Trucial States, but also submitted reports to the TOS where appropriate. For details on the two groups of IOs, see A. Yates and A. Rossiter, “Intelligence Collection in Arabia: Britain’s Roaming Information-Gatherersin the Trucial States, 1956–1971,”Intelligence and National Security(April 2020).

¹⁹ M. Mann, The Trucial Oman Scouts: The Story of a Bedouin Force (Michael Russell, 1994), 160.

²⁰ TNA, FCO 371/179929, J.E.H. Boustead, Political Agent Abu Dhabi to Sir William Luce, PRPG, 27 March 1965.

²¹ Ibid. MoD Sheikh Sultan bin Shakhbut to Maj Gen E.S. Lindsay, 8 March 1965.

²² A. Burdett, ed. Records of the Emirates 1961–1965: 1965 (Slough: Archive Editions, 1997), Letter from J.E.H. Boustead, Abu Dhabi to Sir William Luce, Bahrain, 17 June 1964, 212.

²³ Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony’s College, Oxford, Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Induction booklet for new British officers with an introduction by Col E.B. Wilson’, 1968.

²⁴ TNA, FO 371/185551, A.T. Lamb, Political Agent Abu Dhabi to P. Gent FO, 7 June 1966.

²⁵ TNA, FO 1016/736, Brig I.R.R. Hollyer, HQ Land Forces Persian Gulf, ‘Future Organisation and Administration of the Trucial Oman Scouts’, 1 September 1966, 1966.

²⁶ Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Induction booklet for new British officers with an introduction by Col E.B. Wilson’, 5.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ UAE Armed Forces, The UAE Armed Forces History and Missions (Abu Dhabi: Museum and Military History Center, 2011), 13.

²⁹ Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Induction booklet for new British officers with an introduction by Col E.B. Wilson’, 5.

³⁰ This was the beginning of the secondment of British officers to the ADDF , something which has continued to the present. For the history of British seconded and contract officers in Emirati militaries, see A. Yates, “Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964–2015,” Journal of Arabian Studies 6, no. 2 (2016) and “The Use of British Seconded and Contracted Military Personnel to Advance Britain’s Interests: A Case Study from the United Arab Emirates from 1965–2010,” in Defense Engagement since 1900: Global Lessons in Soft Power, ed. G. Kennedy (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2020).

³¹ Colonel Wilson’s Archives, Vol. 5 (Abu Dhabi: Centre for Documentation and Research, n.d.), Lt Colonel EB Wilson, Commander ADDF to Colonel K.C.P. Ives, Commander TOS, “‘I’ Sums on Patrol Reports’, 24 April 1967, 281.

³² Patrolling technically started in late 1966 but this remained quite limited for many months. This was because there were few trained men and a limited supply of vehicles and communication equipment. Up until mid-1967, all patrolling was done out of the ADDF’s one base on Abu Dhabi Island. An additional base, Al Hamra, became operational in mid-1967 but as the Rifle Squadron formed there was filled by recently passed-out recruits, priority was on continuation training. The Commander ADDF reported that a regular patrol system had been established by early 1967. Ibid.. Patrolling appears to have been limited to at least May 1968, which was when the Commander ADDF issued a Directive which included the line that “I require at least two patrols per squadron per month.” This implies that less than this was likely then being done. Ibid., 8: ‘ADDF Directive No 1 of 1968ʹ, May 68, 187–88.

³³ Colonel Wilson’s Archives, 5, Lt Colonel E.B. Wilson, Commander ADDF to Major T.N. Bromage, Ministry of Defence, 16 October 1967, 70. The limited level of patrolling is likely to have significantly approved following the May 1968 appointment of a GSO3 (Int) with one of his roles being to coordinate patrols with the GSO2 (Ops) ibid., 8: ‘ADDF Directive No 1 of 1968ʹ, May 68, 187–88.

³⁴ TNA, CAB 163/116, Gulf Intelligence Centre, ‘Terms of Reference for Local Intelligence Committees Dubai and Abu Dhabi’, 5 August 1966.

³⁵ Colonel Wilson’s Archives, 5, Lt Colonel E.B. Wilson, Commander ADDF to Colonel K.C.P. Ives, Commander TOS, “‘I’ Sums on Patrol Reports’, 24 April 1967, 281.

³⁶ These were Das Island, Tarif and Buraimi. Ibid., 2: Lt Col E.B. Wilson to A.T. Lamb, G.1004, 1 December 1966, 24.

³⁷ Ibid., Lt Col E.B. Wilson to A.T. Lamb, G.1004, 1 December 1966, 24.

³⁸ Ibid., 5: Lt Colonel E.B. Wilson, Commander ADDF to Major T.N. Bromage, Ministry of Defence, ‘G1005’, 6 November 1967, 32.

³⁹ TNA, FO 371/185575, A.T. Lamb, Political Agent Abu Dhabi to Sir William Luce, Bahrain, ‘1695/66 G’, 22 June 1966.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Another sign of Wontner’s importance to the British was recorded in letter by the Deputy British Political Resident in Bahrain around 1966. He stated that if “Wontner left there might be difficulties over liaison with our intelligence set-up proper”, and it might be difficult to get funding to support a replacement IO “although I understand that our friends [meaning MI6] might help on an ad hoc basis.” Ibid. H.G. Balfour-Paul, PRPG, ‘untitled’, 1966?

⁴¹ TNA, DEFE 68/397, G.G. Arthur, Political Residency, Bahrain, to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘The Trucial Oman Scouts’, Diplomatic Report No 115/72, 21 January 1972, 1972.

⁴² Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, ‘South Arabia: problems of preparing for independence’, CAB 148/31 IPD (67) 19, memorandum, in W.R. Louis and S.R. Ashton, East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971 (London: HM Stationery Office, 2004), 214.

⁴³ The British economy in 1967 and 1968 experienced a series of shocks, include a 14% devaluation of the pound, which led to defence expenditure being cut. Reducing government expenditure was a rationale for the announcement on 16 January 1968 to withdraw from the Gulf.

⁴⁴ Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Induction booklet for new British officers with an introduction by Col E.B. Wilson’, 5.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ TNA, FCO 8/1255, Defence Intelligence Staff UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Intelligence Briefing Memorandum-Trucial States’, 3 December 1968, 1968.

⁴⁷ Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Induction booklet for new British officers with an introduction by Col E.B. Wilson’, 5.

⁴⁸ Collection of Athol Yates, Abu Dhabi, Tim Dickerson files, Records Office Force Headquarters Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘A Statistical Survey of Records Office Information Covering the Period 1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969ʹ, 1969.

⁵⁰ Definitions provided by D. Magennis, and L. Wilson, Museum of Australian Military Intelligence, email, August 2019.

⁵¹ There was such a post at HQ RAF Persian Gulf in Bahrain. He was a member of the Local Intelligence Committee (LIC Gulf) and his role was to contribute intelligence derived from aerial photographs and other RAF material.

⁵² The person who filled the post initially, British Army Major R.E. (Ron) Fisher. He had no intelligence or aerial photography background, and no details are known of his actual work.

⁵³ This list was extracted rom a review of the functions for the entire ADDF carried out in early 1969. Colonel Wilson’s Archives, 7, Chief of Staff, “Report by a Study Group on the Formation of the Department of Defence,” 3 May 1968, 123–31.

⁵⁴ Clayton, Two Alpha Lima: The First Ten Years of the Trucial Oman Levies and Trucial Oman Scouts (1950 to 1960), 142.

⁵⁵ Colonel Wilson’s Archives, 8, ‘ADDF Directive No 1 of 1968ʹ, May 68, 187–88.

⁵⁶ Captain B. McCombe, GSO3 (Ops, Trg, Air), July 1971- Jan 1973, email, 15 August 2019.

⁵⁷ Captain G.P. Gowlett, TOS DIO West, 1966–69 & ADDF FIO West, 1970–74, phone interview, 24 August 2015.

⁵⁸ Collection of Athol Yates, Abu Dhabi, Gowlett files, Abu Dhabi Defence Force, ‘Tribes of Abu Dhabi’, 1970.

⁵⁹ Captain T. Dickerson, ADDF GSO3 (Int), 1971–79, interview, London, 10 August 2015.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ McCombe.

⁶² Dickerson.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ While the Military Survey Department was primarily a military technical unit responsible for fulfilling mapping and surveying needs of the UAE military, it was also responsible for coordinating, processing and disseminating topographic, aeronautical and nautical information over the whole UAE territory. Military Survey Department UAE Armed Forces, United Arab Emirates National Report – Ropme Sea Area Hydrographic Commission (2015), 5.

⁶⁵ Dickerson.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ TNA, FCO 8/1238, C.J. Treadwell, Political Agent, Abu Dhabi to MS Weir, PRPG, ‘Aircraft for A.D.D.F.’, 17 February 1969.

⁶⁹ Abu Dhabi Emiri Decree No 8 of 1969 on the ‘Establishment of a department of defense to be responsible of Abu Dhabi Defense Force matters at the borders’, (1 February).

⁷⁰ Sheikh Faisal was the son of adeposed Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah and resigned from the TOS. By mid-1968 he was acting as secretary to Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed. TNA, FCO 8/900, A. Reeve, Assistant Political Agent, Abu Dhabi, ‘Minutes of the Abu Dhabi LIC meeting held on thursday, 11 July 1968ʹ, 15 July 1968.

⁷¹ Colonel Wilson’s Archives, 7, Chief of Staff, “Report by a Study Group on the Formation of the Department of Defence,” 3 May 1968, 123–31.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ These were the GSO2 (Int) post occupied by British seconded officer Major D.J. (Desmond) Cosgrove, the GSO2 (Sy) occupied by Sudanese seconded officer, Captain Muhammad Nasr Al Din, and one IO post occupied by an Emirati, Lt Juma Al Muhairy.

⁷⁵ TNA, FCO 8/1935, Lt Col W.M.L. Alder, Arabian Department FCO to C.J. Treadwell, British Embassy, Abu Dhabi, ‘Major DJ Cosgrove’, 26 January 1972.

⁷⁶ The two readers were to be locally recruited, which probably meant Arab expatriates.

⁷⁷ Agar, “Intelligence Report No 3.”

⁷⁹ Ibid., Annex A to DA/INT/51.

⁸⁰ TNA, FCO 8/2371, ‘Annual Report for 1973 by Defence Attaché United Arab Emirates’, January 1974, 1974.

⁸¹ ‘Intelligence Report No 3ʹ. An alternative explanation is that these appointments were that the request was just to fill already planned positions.

⁸² ‘Intelligence Report No 10ʹ, Annex A to DA/INT/51 Dated 4 April 1974, General Headquarters Abu Dhabi Defence Forces.

⁸³ Operational security measures at the bases which were the responsibility of base commanders. Dickerson. As an aside, between 1971 to 1979 there was no serious subversive activity within the military, and certainly not against Sheikh Zayed. What clandestine organisation that did occur was not sophisticated. “For example, a group of people who wanted change would meet under the pretence of a soccer club,” he said. Ibid.

⁸⁴ By the time the UAE Armed Forces were formed in May 1967, the Intelligence Section was known as the Directorate of Military Intelligence in the UAE Armed Forces. TNA, FCO 8/2897, Col T.N. Bromage, UK Defence Attaché, ‘Order of Battle United Arab Emirates Armed Forces’, Appendix 1 to Annex D to DA/INT/28, 30 January 1977.

⁸⁵ The most valued such information appears to have been on Saudi Arabia’s intension as it was the main military threat facing the UAE in the 1970s. This threat was particularly pronounced before the signing of the 1974 Treaty of Jeddah. Dickerson.

⁸⁶ For example from the late 1970s was Britain’s provision of estimates of when the Soviets would invade Afghanistan. Ibid.

⁸⁷ Agar, “Intelligence Report No 3.” ibid. A. Ibbott, UK Embassy Abu Dhabi, to A.E. Sauders, Dubai, ‘Pakistan Influence in MoD (AD)/ADDF’, 17 April.

Additional information

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Athol Yates

Athol Yates works at the Institute for International and Civil Security, Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, teaching on civil security, security technology, and disaster management. His research focuses on the UAE Armed Forces, UAE security organisations, and UAE national security arrangements.