Collective Action, Foreign Fighting, and the Global Struggle for the Islamic State

ABSTRACT

This project examines the global “foreign fighter” phenomenon, in which individuals fight in a foreign conflict. We explore the question – “Why do ordinary people travel abroad to fight and potentially die for a foreign cause?” – by analyzing a dataset of 27,223 foreign fighters from 75 countries who fought for the Islamic State. The statistical results demonstrate that one must draw on three different bodies of collective action theory to provide a robust explanation. The Islamic State’s foreign fighters come from countries that are predominantly Muslim (social network theory), that have greater levels of educational attainment (grievance theory), and that are experiencing elevated levels of domestic political instability (political opportunity theory). These findings have theoretical implications for understanding the international dimension of collection action, most notably regarding international democracy promotion. Whereas a country’s degree of democracy or authoritarianism does not affect the numbers of foreign fighters from that country, the democratization process and democratic transition foster domestic political instability that in turn favors higher numbers of foreign fighters.

KEYWORDS:

• Foreign fighters
• collective action
• Islamic State
• ISIS

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

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5. The 194 figure includes 193 United Nations-recognized countries plus Palestine. A total of 34 countries drop out of the analysis due to missing data. We also do not include Iraq and Syria as the targets of travel for Islamic State foreign fighters.

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Additional information

Funding

Research for this project was partially funded by a State Department grant, State Department Linkage Grant # S-4480T-11-GR-055.