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ABSTRACT
In the countries of East and Southeast Asia where fertility has reached ultra-low levels, there has been a flurry of developments in pro-natalist policy over the past five years or so, but its impact appears to be limited. This paper addresses the strong obstacles hindering the success of pro-natalist policies in the region, suggests key interventions that are needed, and stresses that the policies in these countries should also be considering other ways of addressing the issues. Social policy has certainly moved ahead in positive ways in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, as evidenced by parental leave policy and childcare reform, but workplace cultures have yet to follow suit. The slow changes in gender norms, along with the pressures of educating children and finding housing in the big cities where most people in the region live, are the continuing realities facing couples considering marriage and childbearing.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Population Dynamics in Sustainable Development Era: Fertility Transition and Social Policies Response, Beijing, 4–5 December 2017.
1 The United Nations Population Division in its World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, gives a TFR for China of 1.51 in the 1995–2000 period, rising gradually to 1.60 in 2010–2015.
2 In Japan, real income per capita has continued to grow over the past 25 years, with the exception of two periods, coinciding with the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 and the more recent global financial and economic crisis. Over the period from 2012 to 2015, real GDP per person in Japan grew by an annual average of 1.4 per cent, a more rapid rate of growth than in OECD countries (1.0 per cent) or EU countries (0.7 per cent).
3 If TFR continues at 1.5, after temporary age distribution bulges are ironed out, the population will diminish by one quarter each generation; at a fertility rate of 1.3, the contraction per generation will be over one third, and the population will halve in size in about 45 years. In those with a TFR of 1.6, this halving would take nearly 90 years. The fact is that the Republic of Korea and Taiwan have had TFRs below 1.3 for a decade and a half now, though after a long time below this level, the TFR in Japan has climbed above 1.4.
4 As expressed by Chang and Song (Citation2010, p. 539), in relation to South Korean women seemingly sabotaging social reproduction by delaying marriage and childbearing and engaging in divorce, ‘South Korean women’s individualisation has … taken place primarily as a matter of practicality rather than ideational change’.
5 Countries such as Japan and South Korea have strong employment protection for regular workers, blocking the employment prospects for many young workers (Brinton & Lee, Citation2016, pp. 426–427; see also Brinton, Citation2011).
6 See, for example, Kim (Citation2017).
7 The Abe government in Japan aims to increase TFR to 1.8 by 2030 – the first of such target set in Japan. In South Korea, the target is to raise TFR to 1.5 by 2020, 1.7 by 2030 and 2.06 by 2045 (Lee, Citation2017).
8 The proposed amount – 100,000 KRW a month (about USD 100) – is far below such payments in Singapore.
9 There are some particular barriers to marriage in Japan, where an increasing proportion of the unmarried are eldest or only sons and daughters with no brothers – the men and women who are most likely to co-reside with and eventually care for ageing parents. There are negative attitudes to marrying eldest sons, which complicates the spouse search process (Raymo, Citation2014, pp. 334–335).
10 At the time of writing, Hiromitsu Shimada was the Director General for Policy Coordination on Declining Birthrate and Aging Society of Japan’s Cabinet Office.