Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania: Making or Delaying Peace in New Caledonia and Bougainville

Abstract

Secessionist conflicts present challenges for peacemaking. Separatists’ and states’ irreconcilable demands frequently prevent negotiated settlement. One peacemaking model for territorial conflict is temporary autonomy followed by a referendum on independence. Both sides have an opportunity to persuade voters of their positions while de-escalating conflict prior to a polarizing vote. This article examines the application of this model in two cases: the French territory of New Caledonia and the Papua New Guinean province of Bougainville, and argues that the model succeeds in temporary stabilization but may fail to alter the irreconcilable territorial claims of states and breakaway regions, risking conflict relapse.

Acknowledgements

I am thankful for support from the Brookings Institution. Thanks also to Chuck Call, Ray Kennedy, Boaz Atzili, Terrence Lyons, the editors and thoughtful reviewers for their helpful comments and support.

ORCID

Katherine Collin http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8148-7628

Notes

1 PNG had a number of secessionist groups in the 1960s and 1970s. The most serious was the Melanesian Independence Front, active in Bougainville. France also has secessionist movements. French Polynesia and Guadeloupe independence movements have agitated for independence and greater autonomy in response to events in New Caledonia.

2 Polling has shown a more or less stable minority of the Kanak population, 20%–30%, that would support the status quo (Tanham, 1990).

3 France used referendums extensively for decolonization and conflict management. For instance, the 1958 referendums on the Gaullist constitution of the Fifth Republic, which sparked controversy and unrest in New Caledonia. Peacemaking in Algeria was conducted through referendums. Referendums were held at the outset of negotiations, to ratify the Evian Accord, and for Algerian independence.

4 The term ‘Kanak’ is a reclamation of a Hawaiian word used for any person of Oceanian descent, which was applied pejoratively by the French in New Caledonia, canaque. Melanesian Kanaks are internally very diverse (Chappell 1999).

5 New Caledonia’s electoral system requires a five percent threshold for any party to win seats in a provincial assembly.

6 Kanak voters disapproved of the FCCI’s alliance with the RCPR. In 2004 it won only a single seat in the territorial Congress.

7 Casualty estimates vary widely, from one to 20 thousand. A Bougainvillean official recently cited 20,000 at a conference on referendum preparations. Braithwait et al. (2010) estimate 1–2 thousand killed in the conflicts. Woodbury notes 10,000 deaths as a consequence of both the conflict and the blockade (2015, p. 6). Displacement was massive. Of a population of just under 200,000, an estimated 60,000 were internally displaced, and thousands more were refugees (Woodbury, 2015).

8 An element of Bougainville’s joint negotiating position with PNG included considerations of the strength of a majority’s vote for independence. It put forward a validity threshold of 66% (similar to the threshold applied in South Sudan 2011) and went on that if such a majority was not reached for either option, that an optional future referendum should be included in the peace agreement. New Caledonia was cited as an example for this future referendum, but these elements were rejected during negotiations.

9 Downer had recently been instrumental in Australia’s policy shifts that contributed to the East Timor referendum in 1999 and had negotiated for the entry of Australian forces to stabilize East Timor following the vote. Australia modified its policy toward Bougainville in early 2000. It would accept whatever outcome the parties arrived at, including independence.

10 Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly had a similar power in East Timor’s popular consultation and was formally required to rescind the 1976 decree incorporating East Timor into Indonesia. It did so in October 1999 following a vote in favor of independence, mass post-referendum violence, and the deployment of an Australian-led multinational stabilization force.

11 In so doing, Rio Tinto claims that it has no further responsibility for any environmental remediation in Bougainville.