Minority Protection and Kin-State Engagement: Karta Polaka in Comparative Perspective

ABSTRACT

In this article, the authors propose a new normative approach that recognises and responds more adequately to the quadratic political reality of kin-state—kin minorities relations. The authors’ point of departure is the dual contention that home-states have the primary duty to achieve full and effective equality between their citizens, while accommodating fairly their internal cultural and linguistic diversity; and that kin-states have a legitimate interest in their co-ethnics abroad. Building on this foundation, the authors argue that kin-state engagement should complement home-states’ domestic commitments to cultural justice, in order to foster more effective minority protection. The authors conclude by outlining a concept of shared responsibility for minority protection between kin-state and home-states.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference ‘Poland’s Kin-state Policies: Opportunities and Challenges’ (University of Warsaw, May 2019), and the workshops ‘Polish Studies: Today and Tomorrow’ (UCL SSEES, September 2019) and ‘Integration in a Transnational World: Poland, Scotland and Polish Communities Abroad’ (House for An Art Lover, Glasgow, November 2019). The authors would like to thank the participants for their comments which benefited our research. The authors’ special gratitude is reserved to Zsuzsa Csergő, Sherrill Stroschein, Karl Cordell and the anonymous reviewer for their insightful comments and advice.

Notes

1 The research for this article was partly supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) under grant number ES/L007126/1. All references to interviews found below are taken from the dataset from this ESRC project (Smith, 2020b).

2 Henrard stresses that in contrast to the UN Declaration, the framework ‘is a Convention and hence legally binding on the contracting states, but it cannot be denied that the wording of the Convention leaves considerable discretion to the states’ (2008, p. 94).

3 Bellamy and Kröger substantiate this point by showing that the acceptance of the idea of differentiated integration has substantially changed the nature of inter-state cooperation between the EU member-states. The empirical conditions that allow to apply principles of social and political justice to different forms of cooperation in the EU are: the existence of political community created by the EU citizenship policy, the increased inter-state cooperation in all sectors, and the deepening of cross-border cooperation which created the possibility to accommodate capacity and sovereignty concerns and might lead, or has already led, to institutional harmonisation (Bellamy & Kröger, 2019).

4 The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations only offer a sociological understanding of integration rather than a normative one. Integration appears to be synonymous with social cohesion. An attempt to put forth a definition of integration can be found in the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (OSCE HCNM, 2012, Introduction):

Integration is a dynamic, multi-actor process of mutual engagement that facilitates effective participation by all members of a diverse society in the economic, political, social and cultural life, and fosters a shared and inclusive sense of belonging at national and local levels.

5 The most marked instance of this can be seen in efforts by states (e.g. Russia, Romania, or Serbia) to strengthen their regional power by using their ties with co-ethnics abroad to engage in overt or hybrid intervention.

6 See Pudzianowska in this volume.

7 Interview with Mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe/ Szentgyörgy, 25 April 2016. ROM-1.1.1 in Smith (2020).

8 Interview with member of Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, Sfântu Gheorghe/ Szentgyörgy, 25 April 2016. ROM-1.1.3 in Smith (2020b).

9 Interview with member of Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 14 October 2015. ROM-1.3.2 in Smith (2020b).

10 Interview with member of Political Science Department, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 12 October 2015. ROM-2.2.3 in Smith (2020b).

11 Interview with Mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe/ Szentgyörgy, 25 April 2016. ROM-1.1.1 in Smith (2020); Interview with member of Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 13 October 2015. ROM-1.3.3 in Smith (2020b).

12 Interview with member of Hungarian National Council of Transylvania and Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda), 27 April 2016. ROM-1.2.3 in Smith (2020b).

13 Interview with President of Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 12 October 2015. ROM-1.3.5 in Smith (2020b).

14 Interview with President of Hungarian People’s Party of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 12 October 2015. ROM-1.3.5 in Smith (2020b).

15 Interview with Associate Professor, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 16 October 2015. ROM-2.2.1 in Smith (2020b).

16 Interview with researcher at the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg, 14 October 2015. ROM-2.2.2 in Smith (2020b).The implication here was that autonomy could only be achieved by local community leaders themselves, with another respondent observing that Hungary supported autonomy only ‘declaratively’ (Interview with Associate Professor, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca/ Kolozsvár/ Klausenburg), 16 October 2015. ROM-2.2.1 in Smith (2020b).

17 Interview with member of Department of Social Sciences, Sapientia University, Miercurea Ciuc/ Csíkszereda, 27 April 2016. ROM-2.1.1 in Smith (2020b).

18 For example, Article 6.2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997) states that ‘[t]he Republic of Poland shall provide assistance to Poles living abroad to maintain their links with the national cultural heritage’ (Polish Sejm, 1997). Article D of the Fundamental Law of Hungary defines its kin-state duty of care in the following way: ‘[the constitution is] motivated by the ideal of a unified Hungarian nation, Hungary shall bear a sense of responsibility for the destiny of Hungarians living outside her borders’ (National Assembly, 2011).

19 For example, the most recent report of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities [FCNM] highlights that financial support of the Romanian state allocated for the preservation and promotion of the cultures of national minorities remains limited (Advisory Committee on FCNM, 2017, Art. 5). However, this report fails to acknowledge that education and culture remain chronically underfunded in Romania, and to discuss this issue in the broader context, for example of the overall quality of primary and secondary education in Romania (see World Bank, 2007).

20 Observe, for instance, the differing interpretations of minority rights put forward by Hungary and Romania during the signing of the 1996 bilateral treaty between the two states, specifically in relation to the CoE Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation (1201/1993) for an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (Salat, 2014, p. 133).

Additional information

Funding

The work for this article was mainly supported by the project ‘Poland's kin-state policies: Opportunities and Challenges' (pomp.com.pl/en/programy-2017/polands-kin-state-policies-opportunities-and-challenges/ - administered under University of Glasgow project code 300460-01), but partly also by the project ‘National Minority Rights and Democratic Political Community' (ES/L007126/1).