Searching for character and the role of schools

ABSTRACT

Despite a resurgence of interest in character education, just what ‘character’ means is contested. Two strands, while overlapping, diverge on several questions: Is character centrally about moral qualities or more inclusive? Does it consist of one or multiple traits? Does it regard virtue as independently or instrumentally good? Is character a set of dispositions or behaviors? Is it a matter of reflection and reason or habits and skills? Those aligned with the first part of each dichotomy I label purists, the second reformists. In Parts I and II the two perspectives are detailed. While some advocate merging the two camps, as reviewed in Part III, I objection to this proposal. Such a marriage blurs key distinctions and obscures the centrality of morality to character. It also questionably enlarges the role of schools. The conclusion reached is that the role of schools in teaching character is limited.

KEYWORDS:

• Character
• schools
• moral
• education
• values

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Reformist is to be understood as a re-formation of the purist view; that is a shift in meaning and not qualitatively more advanced. It also expresses the understanding of character favored by many of the educational reformers in Charter Management Organizations from which illustrations are drawn.

2. For purposes of this paper, character does not mean a person’s distinctive trait, idiosyncratic style, peculiarities, or vividness as in ‘he is a funny character.’ It does not refer to a dramatic role, temperament or personality trait – angry, selfish, shy, charming, cheerful, kind, sympathetic – although some of these pop up on virtue lists. Here character is an evaluative term: good character is affirmed; bad character deplored (Doris 2002; Fleeson et al. 2014; Peters 1981). Morality narrowly means acting in the collective interest; in Emile Durkheim’s famous dictum,’ [T]he domain of the moral begins where the domain of social begins’ Durkheim [1925]1961, xi). Dewey, often at odds with Durkheim, agrees that morality ‘is as much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment as walking is an interaction of legs with a physical environment’ (1922). Similarly the contemporary moral philosopher Appiah states simply morality addresses ‘how we should and should not treat other people’ (2008, 37) and Adams, ‘moral goodness is essentially altruistic, a matter of respect and care for the rights and the good of other persons’ (2006, 11).

3. The morality sought by purists is, in any case, not achieved during the k-12 years. As summarized by Amy Gutmann, incorporating the moral development theories of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Rawls, few adolescents achieve a morality based on principles (as opposed to earlier stages based on a morality of authority – following the dictates of adults – and a morality of association – following the dictates of groups to which the child belongs) ‘and there is no evidence to credit schools with this rare accomplishment. Although it is possible that there is a way that school can teach autonomy, nobody has come even close to finding it’ (1987, 60).