The multiple accountabilities of the European Banking Authority

Abstract

The paper investigates the features, and relative strengths of the various accountability structures which exist around the European Banking Authority (EBA), studying how its hybrid nature makes for a set of complex and overlapping relationships. Drawing on interviews with EBA staff and industry practitioners, the paper exposes the tensions between these various channels of accountability, and comments on how they undermine the agency’s efficacy. It concludes with some suggestions for reforms to this arrangement, with the aim of improving the agency’s ability to operate.

Keywords:

• accountability
• banking union
• EU Regulatory Governance
• European Banking Authority

Notes

1. Although they are often said to exist “in the shadow of hierarchy” – see Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2007).

2. This is, naturally, rather idealised. There are many situations in which slippage can occur, and this has long been studied – and problematised – by the principal-agent literature (see, for instance, Coen and Thatcher 2005; Thatcher and Sweet 2002). Likewise, in the EU context the principal is not a monolithic state (in the “nation-state” sense) but the complex of political and judicial institutions.

3. Fourth Capital Requirements Directive: 2013/36/EU.

4. Capital Requirements Regulation: 575/2013.

5. Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive: 2014/59/EU.

6. Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive: 2014/49/EU.

7. Founding regulation, Article 21.

8. Founding regulation, Articles 18–19.

9. 1093/2010/EC – henceforth the “founding regulation.”

10. Founding regulation, Article 54–55.

11. https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/jc_cp_2014_05_consultation_paper_on_cross_selling.pdf

12. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507446/IPOL-ECON_ET(2013)507446_EN.pdf

13. SV Capital vs. EBA, Frankfurt, 24 June 2013 and 14 July 2014.