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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to provide a different reading of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, that situates it as an expression of Arendt’s perception of the political sphere and of the individual’s mental and moral activity within totalitarian regimes, first developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Building upon contemporary interpretations that trace a common theoretical foundation underlying both books, and through concrete examples related to both Eichmann’s character and the behavior of the Jewish leadership in the Holocaust, this article establishes the theoretical link between Eichmann and Origins, underscoring their common message and the contemporary thinking problem, which constitutes one of the hallmarks of our present time. I further argue that such analysis provides a better understanding of the new legal category of the modern mass murderer, which Arendt identified. This theoretical type – that conflates victim and victimizer – is more dangerous than all the murderers of the past, since it commits crimes out of routine motives without being aware of their radical immorality.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my academic supervisors at Ben-Gurion University, Dr. Rebecca Kook, who also supervised the MA dissertation that forms the basis of this article, and Prof. Neve Gordon, for their constructive critique, comments, and suggestions for improving earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Ayala Paz is a PhD candidate in the Politics and Government department at the Ben Gurion University, Israel. Her research focuses on contemporary political theory and the challenges posed by modernity to the subjectivity and the thinking abilities of the individual. In addition, she study the contemporary worldwide refugee phenomenon through the lens of Hannah Arendt’s political thought, while focusing on Hungary and Germany. Drawing on Arendt’s conception of human rights, she proposes that the global order rooted in nation-states, as elucidated by Arendt, explains the handling of refugees by host countries in Europe. In the last year, she published a version of her MA thesis in Hamerhav Htziburi, a leading Hebrew journal in political science. The article deals with the concept of ‘dialogue’ in Arendt’s thought. Nowadays Ayala is a Lecture at the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at the Open University in Israel.
Notes
1 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, (hereafter, Eichmann).
2 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (hereafter, Origins).
3 See, e.g. Podhoretz, “Arendt on Eichmann,” Mommsen, “Arendt’s Interpretation of the Holocaust,” Lederman, “History of a Misunderstanding.”
4 E.g. Canovan, Arendt; A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, Benhabib, “Identity, Perspective, Narrative,” McGowan, Arendt; An Introduction, Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust; Shenhav, “Beyond ‘Instrumental Rationality.’”
5 Arendt, “Answers to Questions,” 474–75.
6 The prominent exceptions are Benhabib, “Identity, Perspective, Narrative,” Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust, and Shenhav, “Beyond Instrumental Rationality.” Of these three scholars, only Shenhav engages with ‘the banality of evil’ systematically, and draws a direct link with Arendt’s radical evil, although from a different perspective, which I will discuss later on.
7 See, e.g. Abel, “The Aesthetics of Evil.” See also Bernstein, “Man Versus Totalitarianism,” and Yakira, Post-Zionism, Post-Holocaust.
8 Gershom Scholem’s accusation that Arendt lacked Ahavat Israel (love of the Jewish people), exemplifies the emotional aspects of the controversy. See Scholem, Correspondence, 202.
9 See, for example, Abel, “The Aesthetics of Evil,” 219–23. See also Robinson, The Eichmann Trial, 21–4, 46.
10 Podhoretz, “Arendt on Eichmann,” 74.
11 Simon, “Revisionist History of the Jewish Catastrophe,” 393. See also Abel, “Aesthetics of Evil,” 215–17, and Howe, Margin of Hope, 272–74.
12 Arendt, Eichmann, 125.
13 Golsan and Misemer, Trial That Never Ends, 13.
14 Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann, 346.
15 Wolin, “Demise of a Legend.”
16 Simon, “An Attempt at an Analysis,” 256. For similar charges, see Podhoretz, “Arendt on Eichmann,” 70, and Mommsen, “Arendt’s Interpretation of the Holocaust,” 225.
17 Neiman, “Banality Reconsidered,” 305. Golsan and Misemer (Trial That Never Ends, 4) also notes that despite its journalistic origins, “Eichmann was never intended to be merely a factual account, or record of the trial. Rather, it raised vital questions concerning the nature of Nazi (and human) evil, Jewish responsibility in the Holocaust, and the law’s capacity to come to terms with unprecedented crimes like those committed in the name of the Third Reich.”
18 Neiman, “Banality Reconsidered,” 305.
19 Ibid., 308–9. In Evil in Modern Thought, 271–72, Neiman explains this point:
Auschwitz embodied evil that confuted two centuries of modern assumptions about intention. Those assumptions identify evil and evil intention so thoroughly that denying the latter is normally viewed as a way of denying the former. Where evil intention is absent, we may hold agents liable for the wrongs they inflict, but we view them as matters of criminal negligence. Alternatively, anyone who denies criminal intention is present in a particular action is thought to exonerate the criminal. This is the source of the furor that still surrounds Arendt’s Eichmann.
20 Burdman, “Between Banality and Radicality.”
21 Lederman, “History of a Misunderstanding,” 178, 183.
22 See, for example, Brunner, “Eichmann, Arendt and Freud.” See also Schiff, “Varieties of Thoughtlessness,” and Conway, “Banality, Again.”
23 Stangneth, Eichmann before Jerusalem.
24 Ibid., 15.
25 Ibid., xxii.
26 Browning, Collected Memories, 3. Other examples are Cesarani, Eichmann: Life and Crimes, and Lozowick, Hitler’s Bureaucrats.
27 Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust, 132.
28 Benhabib, “Who’s On Trial.”
29 Benhabib, “Identity, Perspective, Narrative,” 45.
30 Benhabib, “Redemptive Power of Narrative,” 185.
31 Shenhav, “Beyond Instrumental Rationality,” 380.
32 Ibid., 391–94.
33 For a comprehensive review of the public controversy surrounding the book in the American and Israeli intelligentsia, see Cohen, “Breaking the Code.” See also Rabinbach, “Eichmann in New York.”
34 Arendt, Origins, 441.
35 Curthoys, “Revival of Philosophical Anthropology,” 36.
36 Arendt, Origins, 438.
37 Ibid., 455.
38 Ibid., 447.
39 Ibid., 452.
40 Bernstein, “Not History, but Politics,” 389–90.
41 Arendt, Origins, xxx.
42 Ibid., 465.
43 Gordon, “Arendt and Social Change,” 102–3. For further discussion on Arendt’s analysis of total domination and its effects on individuals, see Krause, “Undocumented Migrants.”
44 Arendt, Origins, 243–47, 375.
45 Ibid., 123.
46 Ibid., 215–21.
47 Ibid., 432.
48 Arendt, Eichmann, 135–38.
49 Ibid., 287.
50 Ibid., 48.
51 Ibid., 108–9.
52 Ibid., 137–46.
53 Stangneth, Eichmann before Jerusalem, 42.
54 Ibid., 268. Additionally, Robinson (The Eichmann Trial, 30, 46) views Eichmann’s actions in Hungary as nothing but a prime example of “Eichmann’s power, zeal, and initiative.” The way he coped with the situation in Hungary proves that he was “a fanatical anti-Semite and National Socialist.”
55 Arendt, Eichmann, 146.
56 Ibid., 148.
57 Arendt, Origins, 365.
58 Ibid., 372.
59 Ibid., 368.
60 Ibid., 382.
61 Arendt, Eichmann, 49.
62 Ibid., 52.
63 Jaspers, Philosophy.
64 Arendt, On Revolution.
65 Arendt, Kant’s Political Philosophy.
66 Arendt, The life of the Mind.
67 Benhabib, “Judgment and Moral Foundations.”
68 Arendt, The Human Condition.
69 Bilsky, “When Actor and Spectator Meet,” 139.
70 Lederman, “History of a Misunderstanding,” 178.
71 Canovan, Arendt; A Reinterpretation, 6.
72 Ibid., 7. For more examples of similar claims, see Krause, “Undocumented Migrants,” and Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust, who emphasized the broad conceptual context of Eichmann and suggested that the proper way of reading it is as part of a broad theoretical web weaved by Arendt throughout her intellectual life.
73 Arendt, Arendt/Jaspers Correspondence, 166.
74 Arendt, “Understanding and Politics,” 309.
75 Bernstein, “Not History, but Politics,” 386.
76 Arendt, Origins, 451–59, 473–79.
77 Ibid., 352.
78 Ibid., 474.
79 See, e.g. Benhabib, “Judgment and Moral Foundations.” See also Lederman, “History of a Misunderstanding,” and Biser, “Calibrating Our ‘Inner Compass.’”
80 Arendt, Origins, 473–77.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 452–59, 473–76.
83 Arendt, Eichmann, 116–32.
84 Ibid., 288.
85 Ibid., 116.
86 Bernstein, “Are Arendt’s Reflections Still Relevant?”
87 Arendt, Origins, 453–59.
88 Ibid., 117.
89 Golsan and Misemer, Trial That Never Ends, 7.
90 Muller, “Origins of Eichmann,” 242.
91 Ibid, 244–45.
92 Arendt, Eichmann, 118.
93 Zertal, “Obedience and rebellion,” 152.
94 Arendt, Origins, 436–57.
95 Ibid., 445–46.
96 Ibid., 486.
97 Ibid., 452.
98 Ibid., 452–53.
99 Neiman, “Banality Reconsidered,” 309.
100 Arendt, Eichmann, 118.
101 Ibid., 132.
102 Kastner was one of the leaders of the Budapest Aid and Rescue Committee and organized various rescue operations, including the Kastner Train that transported 1,684 Jews to safety in Switzerland, following prolonged negotiations with Eichmann, seen by many Jewish circles as collaboration with the Nazis and betrayal of the Jewish people.
103 Arendt, Eichmann, 118–19, 131–34.
104 Arendt, Origins, 440–41.
105 Arendt, Eichmann, 125–26.
106 Ibid., 126.
107 Podhoretz, “Arendt on Eichmann,” 68–9.
108 Bernstein, “Are Arendt’s Reflections Still Relevant?,” 75.
109 Jaspers, Question of German Guilt, 40.