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ABSTRACT
Why has the Somali government failed to provide public order and essential services, while Al-Shabaab has had relatively more success in its governance objectives? To explain this variation in governance success, we offer a political economy explanation of wartime order-making based on the competing bargains that governing actors create to uphold their power. We identify two key political bargains in Somalia: (1) an elite deal, forged among members of the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Federal Member States (FMS); and (2) a civilian deal, which Al-Shabaab directly establishes with the citizens under its control. Looking at these two deals, we examine how access to foreign support can affect a governing actor’s taxation impetus, and subsequently its commitment to governance. Our results reveal that not only can foreign support undermine the normal taxation-protection relationship between citizen and state, but it can also inadvertently provide jihadists with an opportunity to establish alternative forms of order.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Skjelderup, “Jihadi Governance”.
2 Marchal, “Rivals in Governance.”
3 Moore, “Revenues, State Formation”; Ross, “What Have We Learned”; Sarkar and Sarkar, “The Rebels’ Resource Curse.”
4 Based on our university research ethics protocols approved for our numerous field studies, we treat all interview material in this article as confidential. We have therefore anonymized respondent identities with one exception – the former FMS President of Southwest Somalia – who is a high level political actors and who insisted that his interview be on the record.
5 Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance”; Heritage Institute, “Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System”; Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System”; Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game.”
6 Berman, Shapiro, and Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought?”; Revkin, “Competitive Governance and Displacement Decisions.”
7 United Nations, “Aid Flows in Somalia 2021.”
8 Moore, “Political Underdevelopment”; Moore, “Revenues, State Formation.”
9 Ross, “What Have We Learned”; Sarkar and Sarkar, “The Rebels’ Resource Curse.”
10 Heritage Institute, “Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System”; Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance,” 20, 34.
11 Ahmad, “Agenda for Peace or Budget for War?”; de Waal, “Doing Harm by Doing Good?”
12 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia.
13 Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, “Extortion with Protection”; Sanchez de la Sierra, “On the Origins of the State.”
14 Moore, “Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance.”
15 Arjona, Rebelocracy; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance in Civil War; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers.
16 Bandula-Irwin et al., “Why Armed Groups Tax”; Mampilly, “Rebel Taxation.”
17 Bakonyi, “Authority and Administration”; Skjelderup, Ainashe, and Abdulle “Qare,” “Militant Islamism and Local Clan Dynamics.”
18 Laitin and Samatar, Somalia.
19 Anderson and McKnight, “Understanding Al-Shabaab”; Skjelderup, “Jihadi Governance.”
20 Ahmad, “Going Global.”
21 Author interviews, multiple respondents, Lafoole, Somalia, 2013.
22 Cunningham, Barriers to Peace in Civil War.
23 Arjona, Rebelocracy; Beardsley and McQuinn, “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations”; Mampilly, “Bandits, Warlords, Embryonic States”; Weinstein, Inside Rebellion.
24 Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy; Elias, The Civilizing Process; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”; Xu and Xu, “Taxation and State-Building.”
25 Ahmad, Jihad and Co.; Bandula-Irwin et al., “Why Armed Groups Tax”; Mampilly, “Rebel Taxation”; Revkin, “What Explains Taxation.”
26 Sarkar and Sarkar, “The Rebels’ Resource Curse.”
27 Moore, “Death without Taxes”; Moore, “Political Underdevelopment”
28 Rubin, “The Political Economy”; Yates, The Rentier State in Africa.
29 Omeje, “The Rentier State.”
30 Ross, “What Have We Learned”; Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy.”
31 Abshir, Abdirahman, and Stogdon, “Tax and the State in Somalia.”
32 Marchal, “Rivals in Governance”; Menkhaus, “State Failure, State-Building”; Villa and Souza Pimenta, “Violent Non-State Actors.”
33 Bandula-Irwin et al., “Why Armed Groups Tax”; Breslawski and Tucker, “Ideological Motives and Taxation”; Mampilly, “Rebel Taxation”; Revkin, “What Explains Taxation”; Sabates-Wheeler and Verwimp, “Extortion with Protection.”
34 Sanchez de la Sierra and Titeca, “The State as Organized Crime”; Tilly, “War Making and State Making.”
35 Tilly, “War Making and State Making,” 181.
36 Ibid, 173.
37 Abshir, Abdirahman, and Stogdon, “Tax and the State”; Ahmad, Jihad and Co.; Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game”; Marchal, “Rivals in Governance”; van den Boogaard and Santoro, “Explaining Informal Taxation.”
38 Author interview, business executive 1, 2009.
39 Author interviews, multiple business respondents, 2009 and 2013.
40 Tilly, “War Making and State Making.”
41 Author interview, business executive 2, 2009.
42 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2009 and 2013. Author direct observations of checkpoints, 2013.
43 Author interview, business executive 3, 2009.
44 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2013.
45 Author interview, small trader, 2009.
46 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2013.
47 Author direct observations and interviews with these strongmen, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2013.
48 Author direct observations, 2004, 2007, 2013.
49 Ahmad, “The Security Bazaar”; Barnes and Harun, “The Rise and Fall”; Skjelderup, Ainashe, and Abdulle “Qare,” “Militant Islamism.”
50 Hansen, Shabaab in Somalia.
51 Samatar, “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia”; Verhoeven, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy.”
52 Menkhaus, “Elite Bargains,” 23.
53 Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance”; UN Panel of Experts, "Letter Dated 5 October 2021”; United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Security Council Committee.”
54 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia; Menkhaus, “Elite Bargains.”
55 Transparency International, “2021 Corruption Perceptions Index.”
56 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia; Menkhaus, “Elite Bargains.”
57 Federal Government of Somalia, “Aid Flows in Somalia”; Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, 24; 36; The World Bank, “Net Official Development Assistance.”
58 The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization,” 8.
59 Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance,” 19.
60 Ronan, “Somalia: Overview,” 8.
61 Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance,” 20.
62 UN Panel of Experts , “Letter Dated 5 October 2021”
63 Hagmann, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia, 25–26.
64 Menkhaus, “Elite Bargains,” 3.
65 Ronan, “Somalia: Overview,” 11.
66 Author direct observations, Nairobi, February 2013.
67 Menkhaus, “Elections in the Hardest Places,” 132.
68 Ibid, 140.
69 Ibid, 141.
70 Webersik, Hansen, and Egal, “Somalia: A Political Economy Analysis.”
71 UN Panel of Experts, “Letter Dated 5 October 2021.”
72 Shire, “Dialoguing and Negotiating with Al-Shabaab,” 12; UN Panel of Experts, “Letter Dated 5 October 2021.”
73 The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia,” 2. Somalia’s 5% revenue-to-GDP ratio is significantly lower than the average of 17% in other low-income African countries. Even including Somaliland, Somalia’s ratio would still be considerably lower – at only 10%.
74 Ross, “What Have We Learned”; The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia,” 6.
75 Author interview, humanitarian doctor, 2022.
76 Ibid.
77 Watanabe and D’aoust, “Somalia: A Tale of Two Countries.”
78 Maxwell, Famine in Somalia; Maxwell and Majid, Famine in Somalia.
79 Author interview, humanitarian doctor, 2022.
80 The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia,” 2; World Bank Group, “Somalia Economic Update.”
81 The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia,” 11.
82 Leeson, “Better off Stateless”; Webersik, “Mogadishu.”
83 Author interviews with Chamber of Commerce in Mogadishu, 2013.
84 Abshir, Abdirahman, and Stogdon, “Tax and the State in Somalia,” 7; Heritage Institute, “Impediments to Good Governance,” 22.
85 Shire, “Dialoguing and Negotiating with Al-Shabaab,” 9.
86 Author interview with economics professor, 2018.
87 Ahmad, Jihad and Co.; Barnes and Harun, “The Rise and Fall”; Mwangi, “The Union of Islamic Courts.”
88 Hansen, Shabaab in Somalia, 73.
89 Ahmad, “The Long Jihad.”
90 Abshir, Abdirahman, and Stogdon, “Tax and the State.”
91 Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game.”
92 Author direct observations, 2013. Interviews with multiple respondents, 2018, 2020.
93 Ahmad, “Going Global”; Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab.
94 To clarify, zakat is a religious obligation upon Muslims who have excess wealth to give alms to the poor; in contrast, Al-Shabaab has demanded that “zakat” be paid directly to itself.
95 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Security Council Committee,” 20.
96 Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game.”
97 Hansen, Shabaab in Somalia, 85; Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game.”
98 Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game,” 8.
99 Author interview, President Hassan Sheikh Aden, 2018. This respondent is a leading political official, and insisted that the interview be public record.
100 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2018.
101 Author interviews, multiple respondents from the Mogadishu business community, 2018.
102 Author interview with official from Hiraan region, 2018.
103 United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Security Council Committee.”
104 Hiraal Institute, “Doing Business in a War Zone,” 6.
105 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2018
106 Tilly, “War Making and State Making.”
107 Author interview with political analyst, 2018.
108 Barrett, “Can Al-Shabaab Deliver?,” 363.
109 Author interview with official from Hiraan region, 2018.
110 Crouch and Ali, “Community Perspectives Towards Al-Shabaab,” 452.
111 Author interview with political analyst, 2018.
112 Ahmad, “‘We Have Captured Your Women.’”
113 Feisal Omar, “Somali Militants Kill Two Men Accused of Rape, al Shabaab Says.” Reuters, 1 May 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-alshabaab-idUSKBN17X1R6.
114 Author interviews, multiple respondents, 2009, 2013, 2018
115 Heritage Institute, “Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System.”
116 Author interview, humanitarian doctor, 2022.
117 Crouch and Ali, “Community Perspectives Towards Al-Shabaab,” 452.
118 Author interviews, humanitarian doctor, 2022.
119 BBC, “Somali Soldiers End Protest over Unpaid Salaries,” 21 June 2020. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-53127535.
120 Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System,” 1.
121 Hiraal Institute, “A Losing Game”; United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Security Council Committee.”
122 Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System,” 6
123 Crouch and Ali, “Community Perspectives Towards Al-Shabaab,” 453.
124 Jackson and Aynte, “Talking to the Other Side,” 17; UN Panel of Experts, “Letter Dated 5 October 2021.”
125 Shire, “Dialoguing and Negotiating with Al-Shabaab,” 14.
126 Author interview with official from Hiraan region, 2018.
127 Crouch and Ali, “Community Perspectives Towards Al-Shabaab,” 456.
128 World Bank Group, “Somalia Economic Update”; The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia.”
129 The World Bank, “Domestic Resource Mobilization in Somalia.”
130 Metelits, Inside Insurgency; Sarkar and Sarkar, “The Rebels’ Resource Curse”; Weinstein, Inside Rebellion.
131 Collier and Hoeffler, “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict”; Ross, “What Have We Learned”; Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy”; Yates, “The Rise and Fall.”
132 Podder, “Understanding the Legitimacy of Armed Groups”; Revkin, “ISIS’ Social Contract”; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance and Legitimacy.”
133 Cawsey, “The Success of Clan Governance”; Herring et al., “Somalia, Fragmented Hybrid Governance.”
134 Menkhaus, “Elite Bargains,” 4.
135 Shire, “Dialoguing and Negotiating with Al-Shabaab”; Skjelderup, “Jihadi Governance,” August 17, 2020.
136 The World Bank, “Somaliland’s Private Sector at a Crossroads.”
137 Ashley Jackson, “This Is What Taliban Control Looks Like in 2021.” The New York Times, 17 August 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/opinion/taliban-afghanistan.html
138 Jackson, “Life under the Taliban Shadow Government”; Jackson, Negotiating Survival.
139 Bleck and Logvinenko, “Weak States and Uneven Pluralism”; Harmon, Terror and Insurgency.