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ABSTRACT
This article explores the effects of the recent discursive re-articulation of terrorism into one of violent extremism. To do that, we examine the conditions for the emergence of the “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE) strategy as a solution to diagnoses of failure in the war on terror. More specifically, we historicise the architecture of counterterrorism in the U.S., revealing the formation of an inside/outside division between agencies engaged with counterterrorism. The two subsequent sections dissect the main discursive pillars of the problematisation of “violent extremism” abroad and inside the U.S. and discuss their main effects on dissidence, stretching from de-legitimation of political agendas to criminalisation of specific social conducts while in protest. The second section exposes how “Islamic radicalism” is at the core of initiatives undertaken abroad through the CVE strategy, and the third section analyses the domestic appropriation of “violent extremism” towards antiracist movements in the U.S. Finally, we show that agencies working either inside or outside the U.S. operate with the same problematisation of “violent extremism” and advance similar practices. We argue that the transnational circulation of such discourse is one of the main veins through which dissidence has been managed both inside and outside the U.S.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful for the insightful suggestions made by the three anonymous reviewers and for the editors’ support throughout the process. Also, we want to thank Paulinho Chamon and Philippe Bonditti for their valuable provocations to preliminary versions of this work. Finally, we thank fellow members of the Panel “TB23: Resistance, Protests and State Responses” held at the 2019 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), in Toronto, Canada. Their comments to a draft version of this article were extremely important to keep us on the move.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. For instance, WAEVER and BUZAN (1998), as well as BUZAN (Citation2006) developed their understanding of “securitisation” based on speech-act theory. Calling attention to the continuities amongst the ruptures of social construction processes, HUYSMANS (Citation2006) and BIGO (Citation2002, 2008) read the framing of social phenomena as a security problem as the result of disputes between security professionals. BONDITTI (Citation2017) and BONDITTI and OLSSON (2017) provide a similar rendering of “securitisation” to the one previously mentioned, but with a more persistent dialogue between political theory and power-knowledge relations of power.
2. It is not before the Clinton administration that a move towards enhancing the coordination across the national and international counterterrorism efforts was undertaken. However, Presidential Decision Directive No. 62 (PDD 62) defines the FBI as the lead agency in antiterrorism efforts and creates the position of the national coordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counterterrorism within the NSC (THE WHITE HOUSE Citation1998, 13). In early 2000s, the GAO insisted that the formulae used by previous administrations in order to tackle the issue of coordination ended up concentrating this function within a specific agency – as in the case of the Clinton administration, within the FBI. According to a GAO report published in 2001, “Based upon years of evaluations, (…) our analysis indicates there needs to be a single focal point with responsibility for all critical functions to lead and coordinate these programs. Furthermore, the focal point should be in the Executive Office of the President and be independent of any existing federal agency. Such a position would allow the focal point to be outside the interests of any individual agency. (…) In addition, creating a new agency to combine functions currently in several agencies – such as the proposed National Homeland Security Agency – still would not contain all the government agencies and functions needed to combat terrorism” (U.S. GAO 2001, 39–40).
3. Although this document was one of the first to mobilise CVE as a jargon emerging from a series of diagnoses on how to improve the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UK government are often mentioned as the first to have issued preventive counterterrorism programmes in the early 2000s, after the attacks in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005 respectively (FRAZER and NÜNLIST Citation2015, 2). One of the main elements connecting these initiatives is the emphasis laid on addressing the root causes of terrorism.
4. According to the project Costs of War, created in 2010 and gathering 50 scholars, experts and practitioners on terrorism, from 2003 to 2018, the war on terror has resulted in 480,000–507,000 deaths among military and police personnel and civilians. See: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2018/Human%20Costs%2C%20Nov%208%202018%20CoW.pdf. Access on: 4 October 2020.
5. In 2015, for instance, the former president Barack Obama hosted a summit of governmental and non-governmental leaders from more than 60 countries. Likewise, John Kerry called for an increased engagement of the private sector with CVE initiatives during his participation in the 2015 World Economic Forum (WEF) (see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Citation2016).
6. This is the case of the Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network, created under the umbrella of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (see https://www.resolvenet.org/. Access on: 5 October 2020).
7. Executive Order 13,721. Available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/03/17/2016-06250/developing-an-integrated-global-engagement-centre-to-support-government-wide-counterterrorism. Access on: 5 October 2020.
8. See: https://www.hedayahcenter.org/about/our-story/and https://www.facebook.com/SawabCenterEN/. Access on: 7 October 2020.
9. See: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/20/do-counter-narratives-actually-reduce-violent-extremism/. Access on: 7 October 2020. In the same line, the statement issued as the result of the multilateral White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism Ministerial Meeting, held in September 2015, emphasises “the importance of identifying and amplifying credible and authentic voices, expanding religious and other education that promotes tolerance, peace, and achieving justice through non-violence, and supporting the role of victims of terrorism in highlighting the human cost of violent extremism and ‘formers’ in providing a convincing alternative to violent extremist narratives”. Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/cvesummit/releases/237673.htm. Access on: 7 October 2020.
10. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html?searchResultPosition=1&fbclid=IwAR29rlSBRbqg2Ix-Ddf2tCa-O1HQ9iL_RtZcN63islHA4-hR3mIhB8DHJkI. Access on: 7 October 2020.
11. See: https://muslimmatters.org/2016/09/23/to-cve-or-not-to-cve-that-is-the-question/. Access on: 7 October 2020.
12. See, for instance: https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com/. Acces on: 19 October 2020.
13. See: https://theintercept.com/2020/06/26/blueleaks-minneapolis-police-protest-fears/. Access on: 16 October 2020.
14. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8cUAb3df0M. Access on: 10 October 2020.
15. After the “Unite the Right” rally held in Charlottesville (Virginia), resulting in one death and several injured among “counter-protesters” claiming for black lives, the DoJ and the DHS issued a “Joint Intelligence Bulletin” highlighting the persistent threat of white extremism in terms of lethal violence (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2017, n/d; see also https://abcnews.go.com/US/happen-charlottesville-protest-anniversary-weekend/story?id=57107500. Access on: 14 October 2020).
16. For example, the FBI associated Martin Luther King Jr. with communism, as an attempt to discredit his social campaigns against racism (BLOOM and MARTIN JR 2016, 200). According to ANDREWS (2018, 275), Hoover considered the BPP’s free breakfast program as particularly problematic on the grounds of its mobilising power.
17. Among the tactics employed by the U.S. intelligence to produce evidence against BPP leaders was the use of informants. The FBI also used to send false letters to the BPP highest leaders inciting an ideological-split between the Party’s members (KEHINDE 2018, 274). Importantly, the issue of radicalisation was and still is the object of intense debates also among black movements themselves. According to HENRY (Citation2001), for instance, Martin Luther King Jr.’s attempt to raise economic rights as the priority of civil rights movements resulted in divergences among black groups in the U.S. as regards framing black political agendas in terms of a “class problem”, instead of a race one.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Manuela Trindade Viana
Manuela Trindade Viana is a Adjunct Professor in the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI-PUC Rio), Brazil. Since 2006, she is a Research Collaborator in the Center for Research in International Relations at the University of São Paulo (NUPRI-USP), Brazil; and, since 2013, in the Global South Unit for Mediation (GSUM) at the BRICS Policy Center. Also, since 2017, she is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS), Stellenbosch, South Africa.
Pedro Paulo dos Santos da Silva
Pedro Paulo dos Santos da Silva is a Graduate student in the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI-PUC Rio), Brazil. Since 2018, he is a Researcher in the Citizenship and Security Studies Center (CESeC), Brazil. This study was partially funded by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) and by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.