Radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and countering violent extremism in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus: the cases of Kosovo and Georgia

ABSTRACT

Scholarly attention is emerging on the globalisation and proliferation of initiatives and measures in the fields of counter-radicalisation and countering violent extremism (Hayes and Kundnani 2018). A multitude of international actors endeavour to provide security norms and governance standards in that respect, including international and regional organisations, donor communities, transnational/global networks as well as non-governmental actors, informal coalitions, platforms and think tanks. This article aims at mapping and analysing how such many-sided assemblages function along European peripheries, more specifically, in two under-studied countries, Kosovo and Georgia, where several international actors are involved in projects to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism. The study will contrast and compare externally driven efforts of countering violent extremism and radicalisation, and trace the interests and agendas pursued by different international actors operating in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus. Moreover, it will analyse how the concepts of radicalisation and extremism and measures to counter them have been specifically “localised” in Kosovo and Georgia, as well as grounded and embedded in their specific socio-political contexts and normative frameworks.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• counter-radicalisation
• CVE
• Kosovo
• Georgia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. In this article, by ‘donors’ we mean international actors and agencies that transfer aid and provide funding or technical assistance in the field of CVE, counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism in Kosovo and Georgia.

2. Author’s interviews with, respectively, local experts, journalists and officials working with international organisations, carried out in Pristina in September 2018.

3. Normative argumentation here means the set of discursive tools employed to define what is appropriate and legitimate to ensure security (Heller, Kahl, and Pisoiu 2012).

4. http://ct-morse.eu.

5. UNSC Resolution 1963 (2010); UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014); UNSC Resolution 2195 (2014); UNSC Resolution 2322 (2016); UNSC Resolution 2396 (2017).

6. UNSC Presidential Statement 23 (2014); United Nations Presidential Statement 6 (2016); United Nations Presidential Statement 11 (2015).

7. In 2015 the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Extremism was released, and invited national governments and regional organisations to develop national and local plans aimed at preventing violent extremism.

8. An international consensus has frequently formed over the portrayal of Georgia as a source of foreign fighters and a transit route from Russia (and Central Asia). In June 2015, during a two-day Counterterrorism Expert Conference on Countering the Incitement and Recruitment of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, organised by the OSCE in Vienna Georgia was mentioned in these terms (albeit not present).

9. During a visit to Pankisi in early January 2016, Georgian Defence Minister Tinatin Khidasheli offered local youth the option of contract-based service in the Georgian Armed Forces.

10. Most of the ethnic Azerbaijanis are Shia Muslims and represent the majority of the population in the southeastern region of Kvemo-Kartli. Ethnic Georgian Muslims in Adjara and in Samtskhe-Javakheti, and Chechen Kists in the northeast are predominantly Sunni. See: US Department of State – Office of International Religious Freedom 2020.

11. Author’s interview with Georgian officials working in national institutions as well as representatives of local NGOs, Tbilisi, May 2019.

12. Further, it is worth mentioning the under-researched process of nationalistic, right-wing radicalisation that has brought a number of Georgians joining volunteer units engaged in the combats in Ukraine on the pro-Kiev side (Dolidze et al. 2018; Stephan 2018).

13. The report was part of a broader project on “Enhancing Countries (Georgia-Azerbaijan) Capacities in Countering Violent Extremism”, whose aim “was to create a pool of trained professionals in the government media and the civil society”.

14. This statement reflects a survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers about the level of trust of Pankisi residents, the Adjaran eco-migrant community and an Avar community in Eastern Georgia, vis-à-vis local and national authorities, NGOs and international organisations.

15. There are few remarkable exceptions. Political and social exclusion of Georgian Muslim communities, discrimination on religious grounds and their possible links to radicalisation have been researched in two projects put forward by the Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center – a platform gathering together civic and human rights activists financially supported by donors such as USAID and the Embassy of the Netherlands.

16. For example, the EU, the Embassy of the Netherlands as well as the US, funded projects to support the community-oriented policing reform, improve relations between the society and the police and promote the oversight over the security sector. In one case, the mission is of reducing the risks of abuse of power in the State Security Service and, relatedly, at the same time, preventing radicalisation in the Kvemo Kartli and Pankisi regions. Even when their reference to a PVE/CVE dimension is rather weak if not absent at all, they focus on territories where religious minorities reside.

17. “Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism”, https://transparency.ge/en/blog/anatomy-georgian-neo-nazism.

18. The most disseminated studies were: ‘In the Slavery of Hate: Monitoring of Neo-Nazi Groups’ Activities in Georgia”, by the Center for Participation and Development; “Understanding the Ultra-Right Extremism and Nationalism and Fight against it in Georgia” and “Countering Ethno-Nationalist Narratives in Georgia”, both by the Democracy Research Institute; “Exposing the roots of illiberalism in Georgia”, by the Georgian Institute of Politics.

19. That is the case, for example, of OSCE’s activities on preventing hate crimes or the initiatives of the Duisi-based Center for Civic Activities as well as the Pankisi Community Radio WAY (supported by the Open Society Foundation Georgia and the East West Management Institute).

20. This wording belongs to the description of the project “Initiative for Empowering Local Communities in Georgia”, within the broader programme “Countering Violent Extremism Organizations Recruitment in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Macedonia 2018–2019”, funded by the Global Engagement Center under the US State Department, coordinated by PH International and implemented by Georgian Center for Security and Development.

21. Author’s interview with representatives of NGO, Tbilisi, May 2019.

22. https://www.osce.org/secretariat/423044.

23. Foreign fighters refer to those travelling to and participating in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. In the case of Kosovo foreign fighters, most of them have travelled to Syria and only a small part to Iraq.

24. Author’s interview with researcher 2, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, Pristina, 28 September 2018; See also Augestad Knudsen 2017.

25. Author’s interview with an investigative journalist, Pristina, 24 September 2018.

26. Author’s interview with an investigative journalist, Pristina, 24 September 2018; Author’s interview with researcher 1, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 26 September 2018; Author’s interview with researcher 2, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 28 September 2018.

27. Author’s interview with an investigative journalist, Pristina, 24 September 2018.

28. Author’s interview with an investigative journalist, Pristina, 24 September 2018; Council of the European Union 2005.

29. Law No. 05/L-002, 12 March 2015. See also Annexe 3, Azinovic e Jusic 2015.

30. Author’s interview with researcher 3, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 26 September 2018.

31. Author’s interview with researcher 1, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 26 September 2018.

32. Author’s interview with a local official working with an international organisation active in CVE, 26 September 2018.

33. Author’s interview with a local official working with an international organisation active in CVE, 26 September 2018.

34. Author’s interview with a local official working with an international organisation active in CVE, 26 September 2018.

35. This was the case of the two imams from Mitrovica, that were arrested and later released for lack of evidence to keep them in pre-detention, Enis Rama dhe Ekrem Avdiu, on September 24, 2014 https://www.oranews.tv/kosove-lirohen-imamet-enis-rama-dhe-ekrem-avdiu, last accessed 4 May 2021.

36. Author’s interview with a prominent local imam, Kosovo Islamic Council, Pristina, 26 September 2018.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Author’s interview with researcher 1, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 26 September 2018.

41. Author’s interview with an investigative journalist, Pristina, 24 September 2018; Author’s interview with researcher 1, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 26 September 2018; Author’s interview with researcher 2, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies, 28 September 2018.

42. https://www.usaid.gov/kosovo/news-information/fact-sheets/youth-activity, last accessed 5 May 2021.

43. Tricot O’Farrell and Street (2019) and Pierobon (2020) both on Kyrgyzstan.

44. See the periodic surveys “Public attitudes in Georgia” carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia (https://caucasusbarometer.org/en/datasets/).