US–Iran, 2020

Abstract

Narratives provide the storylines of conflict and in doing so become an arena of conflict themselves. When states mount information campaigns against each other, they are trying to change the narrative. The digital platforms of the new information environment have been identified by various analysts as a significant factor in contemporary strategy and crisis management. But while social media is noisier and more chaotic than traditional media, and unprecedented in its immediacy and accessibility, has it thus far been a game changer in strategic affairs?

In this Adelphi book, Sir Lawrence Freedman and Heather Williams examine the impact of state-led digital information - or disinformation - campaigns in four contexts: the India-Pakistan crisis over Kashmir in 2019; the heightened tensions between the United States and Iran following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020; China's messaging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020–22; and the Russia-Ukraine crisis from 2013–23. While noting the meaningful consequences of digital information campaigns, in each case the authors call for a sense of perspective. Such campaigns are only one aspect of wider political struggles. They are also difficult for their initiators to control, and less likely to influence foreign audiences than domestic ones. Overall, the authors argue, there is little evidence so far to suggest such campaigns will have as much influence over contemporary crises as the classical instruments of military and economic power.

Notes

1 Samia Nakhoul, ‘U.S. Killing of Iran’s Second Most Powerful Man Risks Regional Conflagration’, Reuters, 3 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-soleimani-analysi/u-s-killing-of-irans-second-most-powerful-man-risks-regional-conflagration-idUSKBN1Z21TJ.

2 Abbas Milani, ‘The Great Satan Myth’, New Republic, 8 December 2009, https://newrepublic.com/article/71731/the-great-satan-myth.

3 Javad Zarif (@JZarif), tweet, 28 March 2015, https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/581847308167462912.

4 Constance Duncombe, ‘Twitter and Transformative Diplomacy: Social Media and Iran–US Relations’, International Affairs, vol. 93, no. 10, 17 March 2017, pp. 545–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix048.

5 Wendy Sherman, Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power and Persistence (New York: Public Affairs, 2018).

6 To be precise, Trump opted not to continue the sanctions waivers that were part of the agreement.

7 White House Briefing Statement, ‘President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal’, 8 May 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/.

8 See, for example, ‘Talking Foreign Policy: The U.S.–Iran Crisis’, International Journal of Ethical Leadership, TFP Radio Broadcast, vol. 7, 20 January 2020, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/12/.

9 Jim Garamone, ‘Iran Shoots Down U.S. Global Hawk Operating in International Airspace’, US Department of Defense, 20 June 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1882497/iran-shoots-down-us-global-hawk-operating-in-international-airspace/.

10 Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi, ‘Tehran Fumes as Britain Seizes Iranian Oil Tanker over Syria Sanctions’, Reuters, 4 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker/tehran-fumes-as-britain-seizes-iranian-oil-tanker-over-syria-sanctions-idUSKCN1TZ0GN.

11 ‘Iran Seizes British Tanker in Strait of Hormuz’, BBC News, 20 July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49053383.

12 Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell, ‘Iran Says Missiles Strike Its Oil Tanker Off Saudi Arabia’, AP News, 11 October 2019, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-middle-east-ap-top-news-iran-saudi-arabia-55f68b50763c40eeb25ee19027573d86.

13 Patrick Kingsley et al., ‘Israel’s Shadow War with Iran Moves Out to Sea’, New York Times, 26 March 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/world/middleeast/israel-iran-shadow-war.html.

14 Ibid.

15 Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour, Iranian Digital Influence Efforts: Guerrilla Broadcasting for the Twenty-first Century (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 1 January 2020), p. 10; and ‘Special Report: Iran’s Leader Ordered Crackdown on Unrest – “Do Whatever It Takes to End It”’, Reuters, 23 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport-idUSKBN1YR0QR.

16 Ariane M. Tabatabai, ‘Escalation with Iran: Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Interests and Regional Stability’, Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, 28 January 2020, pp. 1–2.

17 Brooking and Kianpour, Iranian Digital Influence Efforts, p. 13.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 4.

22 Barbara Starr, ‘US Civilian Contractor Killed in Rocket Attack in Iraq’, CNN, 27 December 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/27/politics/iraq-rocket-attack-contractor-killed/index.html.

23 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), tweet, 29 December 2019, https://www.thetrumparchive.com.

24 Lindsey Graham (@LindseyGrahamSC), tweet, 31 December 2019, https://twitter.com/LindseyGrahamSC/status/1212006170732515328?s=20.

25 Imam Sayyid Ali Khamenei (@khamenei_ir ), tweet, 1 January 2020, https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/1212307890524053504.

26 Helen Cooper et al., ‘As Tensions with Iran Escalated, Trump Opted for Most Extreme Measure’, New York Times, 4 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/politics/trump-suleimani.html.

27 Ibid.

28 Maysam Behravesh, ‘Soleimani Was More Valuable in Politics’, Foreign Affairs, January 2020, pp. 1–10.

29 Cooper et al., ‘As Tensions with Iran Escalated, Trump Opted for Most Extreme Measure’.

30 Alissa J. Rubin et al., ‘Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and Iran to the Brink of War’, New York Times, 11 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-trump.html.

31 Thomas Stephens, ‘How “Messenger” Switzerland Deals with the US and Iran’, Swissinfo.ch, 7 January 2020, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/good-offices_how--messenger--switzerland-deals-with-the-us-and-iran/45474578.

32 Matthew Petti, ‘Donald Trump Told Iran Through Switzerland Not to Attack After Suleimani Killing’, National Interest, 14 January 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/donald-trump-told-iran-through-switzerland-not-attack-after-suleimani-killing-164767.

33 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), tweet, 3 January 2020, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213096352072294401?s=20.

34 Javad Zarif (@Jzarif), tweet, 2 January 2020, https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1212946202280579073.

35 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), tweet, 4 January 2020, https://www.thetrumparchive.com.

36 Drew Hinshaw, Joe Parkinson and Benoit Faucon, ‘Swiss Back Channel Helped Defuse U.S.–Iran Crisis’, Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss-back-channel-helped-defuse-u-s-iran-crisis-11578702290.

37 Hugh Hewitt (@hughhewitt), tweet, 5 January 2020, https://twitter.com/hughhewitt/status/1213921905327009792.

38 Mike Pompeo (@SecPompeo), tweet, 7 January 2020, https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1214590219435069443.

39 See, for example, Mike Pompeo (@SecPompeo), tweet, 7 January 2020, https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1214631686819995650.

40 ‘Omani Minister in Iran Says U.S. Wants to Reduce Tensions – IRNA’, Reuters, 7 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-security-iraq-oman-idUKKBN1Z60VZ.

41 Robin Wright, ‘Iran Attacks U.S. Forces, Then Both Sides Stand Down’, New Yorker, 8 January 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/iran-attacks-us-forces-then-both-sides-stand-down.

42 Javad Zarif (@JZarif), tweet, 7 January 2020, https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1214736614217469953.

43 For the English-language version of the post, see Ismaeel Naar and Yaghoub Fazeli, ‘Iran’s Khamenei Posts Mock Photo Showing Trump “Slap in the Face”’, Al Arabiya News, 9 January 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/media/digital/2020/01/09/Iran-s-Khamenei-posts-mock-photo-showing-Trump-slap-in-the-face-.

44 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), tweet, 7 January 2020, https://www.thetrumparchive.com.

45 Rubin et al., ‘Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and Iran to the Brink of War’.

46 When the crisis took place, the time difference between Washington and Tehran was eight and a half hours.

47 Javad Zarif (@JZarif), tweet, 10 January 2020, https://twitter.com/search?q=A%20sad%20day.%20Preliminary%20conclusions%20of%20internal%20investigation%20by%20Armed%20Forces&src=typed_query.

48 Ariane Tabatabai, ‘How Will Iran React to Another High-profile Assassination?’, Foreign Policy, 30 November 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/30/how-will-iran-react-to-another-high-profile-assassination/.

49 Ronen Bergman and Farnaz Fassihi, ‘The Scientist and the A.I.-assisted, Remote-control Killing Machine’, New York Times, 18 September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-fakhrizadeh-assassination-israel.html?searchResultPosition=1; and Ronna McDaniel (@GOPChairwoman), tweet, 6 January 2020, https://twitter.com/GOPChairwoman/status/1214320404820582400.

50 Elise Labott, ‘John Kerry: Some Sanctions Relief Money for Iran Will Go to Terrorism’, CNN, 21 January 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/politics/john-kerry-money-iran-sanctions-terrorism/index.html.

51 Lindsey Graham (@LindseyGrahamSC), tweet, 31 December 2019, https://twitter.com/LindseyGrahamSC/status/1212006172628262913; and Marco Rubio (@marcorubio), tweet, 8 January 2020, https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/1215022043059695616.

52 The Instagram image is no longer available, but it can be seen at ‘Tensions Escalate on Social Media Platforms After Soleimani’s Death’, Medium, 4 January 2020: https://medium.com/dfrlab/tensions-escalate-on-social-media-platforms-after-soleimanis-death-48f295ecec5e.

53 Mark Dubowitz and Saeed Ghasseminejad, ‘Iran’s COVID-19 Disinformation Campaign’, CTC Sentinel, vol. 13, no. 6, June 2020, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/irans-covid-19-disinformation-campaign/.

54 Hinshaw, Parkinson and Faucon, ‘Swiss Back Channel Helped Defuse U.S.–Iran Crisis’.