Coercive China, deterrent China

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine confirmed that revived great-power competition has heightened the prospect of global conflict, while restoring the concept of deterrence to centre stage. The stakes in a conflict in East Asia, however, would be even higher than those in Ukraine. A war over Taiwan could bring the United States and China, the world’s two greatest powers, into a direct military conflict which would represent a contest for regional or global leadership and would be likely to draw other powers into the fight. Such a war – in which the nuclear question would be ever-present – can currently be described as ‘possible, avoidable, but potentially catastrophic’.

In this Adelphi book, Bill Emmott evaluates the diplomatic and deterrence strategies that countries in and outside the Indo-Pacific region are using to try to reduce the risk of that conflict occurring. This book examines these strategies in the light of the lessons of the Ukraine war and identifies yardsticks with which to gauge their potential effectiveness and sustainability. Our goal, Emmott argues, must be for all sides to regard such a US–China conflict as ‘inevitably catastrophic and therefore inconceivable’.

Notes

1 Simina Mistreanu, ‘China Releases TV Documentary Showcasing Army’s Ability to Attack Taiwan’, Associated Press, 7 August 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-documentary-attack-invasion-chasing-dreams-4105d5f0bde59337d90f1e67d149b32c; and ‘CCTV Reveals Unprecedented Footage of Shandong Aircraft Carrier in Taiwan Strait amid Rising Tensions’, China Arms, 2 August 2023, https://www.china-arms.com/2023/08/unprecedented-footage-of-shandong-aircraft-carrier-in-taiwan-strait/.

2 US Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress 2023’, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. This is often referred to as the ‘China Military Power Report’.

3 See Richard C. Bush, ‘Taiwan Should Exercise Restraint in Reacting to China’s Anti-Secession Law’, Brookings Institution, 24 March 2005, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwan-should-exercise-restraint-in-reacting-to-the-challenge-of-chinas-anti-secession-law/. For the Republic of China’s official response, see Republic of China (Taiwan), Mainland Affairs Council, ‘The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the People’s Republic of China’s Anti-Secession Law’, 29 March 2005, https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE1BCE87E0E&s=D1B0D66D5788F2DE.

4 For a review of Chinese war plans, capabilities and scenarios, see William S. Murray and Ian Easton, ‘The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia’, Naval War College Review, vol. 72, no. 1, Winter 2019, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7877&context=nwc-review.

5 ‘China Releases White Paper on Taiwan Question, Reunification in New Era’, Xinhua, 10 August 2022, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html.

6 Cherry Hitkari, ‘China’s Taiwan Policy in the “New Era”’, Lowy Institute, 16 August 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-taiwan-policy-new-era.

7 See, for example, Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian and Eric Heginbotham, ‘The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 January 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan.

8 For how the PLA Rocket Force would find it considerably harder to hit an intervention force – multiple moving targets – than fixed bases, see Veerle Nouwens et al., ‘Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific’, IISS, January 2024, https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the--asia-pacific-implications-for-regional-stability/.

9 Henry Boyd, Meia Nouwens and Veerle Nouwens, ‘PLA Sharpens Nuclear and Conventional Capabilities but Still Has Work to Do, US Says’, IISS Military Balance blog, 1 November 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/10/pla-sharpens-nuclear-and-conventional-capabilities-but-still-has-work-to-do-us-says/.

10 US Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress 2023’.

11 David Vergun, US Department of Defense, ‘Russia Reportedly Supplying Enriched Uranium to China’, DOD News, 8 March 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3323381/russia-reportedly-supplying-enriched-uranium-to-china/.

12 Fiona S. Cunningham, ‘The Unknowns about China’s Nuclear Modernization Program’, Arms Control Association, June 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-06/features/unknowns-about-chinas-nuclear-modernization-program.

13 Roy D. Kamphausen (ed.), Modernizing Deterrence: How China Coerces, Compels, and Deters (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2023), https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/modernizing-deterrence_feb2023.pdf.

14 Brandon J. Babin, ‘Xi Jinping’s Strangelove: The Need for a Deterrence-based Offset Strategy’, in Kamphausen (ed.), Modernizing Deterrence, p. 82.

15 Ibid., p. 81.

16 Stuart Lau, ‘China’s Xi Warns Putin Not to Use Nuclear Arms in Ukraine’, Politico, 4 November 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-warns-vladimir-putin-not-to-use-nuclear-arms-in-ukraine-olaf-scholz-germany-peace-talks/.

17 Private remarks to an unnamed senator, reported by Josh Rogin in Chaos under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2021), p. 44.

18 See, for example, Jennifer Lind, ‘South China Sea as a Chinese Lake’, New York Times, 23 August 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/08/23/is-playing-tough-in-chinas-interest/south-china-sea-as-a-chinese-lake.

19 ‘Rising International Support for Taiwan’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 35, December 2021.

20 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, ‘The US Is Quietly Arming Taiwan to the Teeth’, BBC News, 6 November 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67282107.

21 On international judicial rulings, see notably the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on a dispute brought by the Philippines – see Euan Graham, ‘The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-burning Influence?’, Council of Councils, 18 August 2016, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/hague-tribunals-south-china-sea-ruling-empty-provocation-or-slow-burning-influence. On a maritime code of conduct, see Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘What’s Behind the New China–ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct Talk Guidelines?’, Asia Dispatches blog, Wilson Centre, 25 July 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/whats-behind-new-china-asean-south-china-sea-code-conduct-talk-guidelines.