When Diplomats Lead to a War: The Role of the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy in the Military Intervention in Cyprus

ABSTRACT

The Cyprus dispute has preoccupied the agenda of the Turkish diplomacy for almost seventy years. From the mid-1950s onwards, the Cyprus issue in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been upgraded from a desk to its busiest department. Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy had been so much wrapped up in the Cyprus issue that a generation of Turkish diplomats were trained at this diplomatic battlefield. Consequently, they developed a specific policy formulation, which would in time transform Turkey’s position towards a more aggressive line. In this regard, this study scrutinizes the role of Turkish diplomats during the most decisive moment of the Cyprus dispute, namely the Turkish military campaign of July 1974.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

[1] As a valuable exception, Çuhadar-Gürkaynak & Özkeçeci-Taner’s piece on the decision-making process of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus highlights the role of the Turkish MFA and its certain officials during the crisis of July 1974. See Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak & Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, ‘Decision Making Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases’, Turkish Studies, 5, 2007, p. 53.

[2] Researchers of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, including this study, are deprived of facilitating the Turkish diplomatic archives. Indeed, the archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not ‘officially’ closed. However, efforts to access documents remain inconclusive in many cases since it requires a very complicated confirmation process. Until recently, the ministry digitalized certain items of its archives and opened them to researchers. These documents, however, include information notably incapable of presenting insight about critical issues of the Turkish diplomatic history. For some criticisms on writing Turkish diplomatic history without access to diplomatic archives, see Cemil Koçak, Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir, İstanbul, İletişim, 2009, p. 432. Corry Guttstadt, Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost, İstanbul, İletişim, 2012, p. 326. Dilek Barlas, Serhat Güvenç, Türkiye’nin Akdeniz Siyaseti (1923–1939): Orta Büyüklükte Devlet Diplomasisi ve Deniz Gücünün Sınırları, Istanbul, Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014, p. 16.

[3] Iver B. Neumann, At Home with Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2012, p. 5.

[4] Abba Eban, The New Diplomacy, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983, p. 384.

[5] Costas M. Constantinou, ‘Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge’, International Studies Review, 15, 2013, p. 143.

[6] Paul Sharp, ‘For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations’, International Studies Review, 1, 1997, p. 33.

[7] For a reevaluation of the late Ottoman diplomatic history, see Houssine Alloul and Darina Martykanova, ‘Introduction: Charting New Ground in the Study of Ottoman Foreign Relations’, The International History Review, 43, 2021, pp. 1018–1040.

[8] Ann E. Towns recalled the gendered nature of diplomacy. See Ann E. Towns, “Diplomacy is a Feminine Art’: Feminised Figurations of the Diplomat’, Review of International Studies, 46, 2020, pp. 1–21.

[9] As an institutional effort, the Diplomatica journal, in cooperation with the New Diplomatic History (NDH) Network, is focused on articles with an emphasis on the new approaches in the study of diplomatic history. For example, see Alessandro Tripepi, ‘Jesuit Diplomacy towards Japan. The Tenshō Embassy, the Dialogue with Hideyoshi, and the Emergence of a ‘Global Model’ (1582–90)’, Diplomatica, 3, 2021, pp. 116–136. Brigit Tremml-Werner, Lisa Hellman and Guido van Meersbergen, ‘Introduction. Gift and Tribute in Early Modern Diplomacy: Afro-Eurasian Perspectives’, Diplomatica, 2, 2020, pp. 185–200.

[10] Barry H. Steiner, ‘Diplomacy and International Theory’, Review of International Studies, 30, 2004, p. 499.

[11] Sasson Sofer, ‘Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited’, Review of International Studies, 14, 1988, p. 196.

[12] John Hoffmann, ‘Reconstructing Diplomacy’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 5, 2003, p. 532.

[13] Ibid., p. 525.

O. Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Introduction’, in Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann, (eds), Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 17.

[14] For the role of diplomacy and diplomats in the decision-making processes of wars, see Francis Neilson, How Diplomats Make War, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1940.

[15] Melih Esenbel, Ayağa Kalkan Adam: Kıbrıs 1, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınaevi, 1993, p. 14.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ali Rıza Özcoşkun, Cumhuriyetin Kuruluşundan Bugüne Dışişleri Teşkilat Bakanlığı Yapısı, Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2018, pp. 28–43.

[18] Kamuran Gürün, Bükreş, Paris, Atina: Büyükelçilik Anıları, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1994, p. 175.

[19] Haluk Afra, Hariciyeciler Dedikoduyu Sever, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınaevi, 1999, p. 47.

[20] Ercüment Yavuzalp, Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik (1967–1970), İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınaevi, 1993, p. 243. The exact number of the employees at the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia is not clear but Ambassador Yavuzalp worked with twelve career officers throughout his three years in office. The workload of the embassy was so heavy that Nevzat Dora, the administrative attaché, suffered a heart attack during the crises of Geçitkale and Boğazköy in 1967. Ibid. p. 244.

[21] Signed by the US President Lyndon B. Johnson, the letter unkindly recalled Turkey that the NATO and the United States may not defend Turkey in case a Turkish military operation would have confronted the latter with the Soviet Union. The letter, moreover, was underlying that the American arms support to Turkey was granted for defensive purposes and they could not be used in Cyprus. Even George Ball, the Deputy Secretary of the State, labelled the letter as the most cruel diplomatic message ever. Haluk Şahin, Johnson Mektubu, İstanbul, Kırmızı Kedi, 2019, pp. 14–15. Throughout the course of the Cyprus dispute, the US government aimed not only to prevent Turkey, but also Greece to exercise its power on the island. As an explanatory example, President Johnson also urged Alexander Matsas, the Greek ambassador to the United States, ‘America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked good’. William Blum, US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, London, Zed Books, 2003, p. 216.

[22] Erdem Erner, Davulun Sesi: Dışişlerinde 44 Yıl, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınaevi, 1993, p. 105.

[23] Yalım Eralp, Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2017, p. 23.

[24] Niyazi Kızılyürek, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, İstanbul, İletişim, 2002, p 277.

[25] Ecmel Barutçu, Hariciye Koridoru, Ankara, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1999, p. 43. All the block quotes were translated by the author.

[26] Gül İnanç, Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970–1991), İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007, pp. 7–8. A Greek word literally mening union, Enosis is a political movement among Greek expatriates who seek to integrate the Greek inhabited regions to the Greek mainland. Unification of Cyprus with Greece, is perhaps the most widely known element of the Enosis movement which was terminated by the Turkish offensives in July and August 1974.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Terry L. Deibel, ‘Teaching Foreign Policy with Memoirs’, International Studies Perspectives, 3, 2002, p. 132.

[29] Mehmet Ali Birand, 30 Sıcak Gün, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1985, p. 52.

[30] Ibid., p. 28–29.

[31] Ibid., pp. 40 & 63.

[32] Bülent Ecevit, Dış Politika ve Kıbrıs Dosyası, İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2011, pp. 64–65.

[33] Haluk Bayülken, a veteran Turkish diplomat known for his close relations with the military bureaucracy, worked as the Foreign Minister between December 1971 and January 1974. Exact date of the establishment of the 3K committee, however, is unknown.

[34] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 46. Established in 1961, the National Security Council is a constitutional body to address and implement the national security policies of Turkey. Even though consisting of both civilian and military members, the Council served as a catalyst for the influence of the military wing in Turkish politics.

[35] Ibid. Barutçu’s clarification in his memoirs are somewhat an objection to the above-quoted words of Birand.

[36] Yalım Eralp, Interview by the author, Istanbul, January 15, 2017.

[37] Birand, op.cit., p. 31.

[38] Sharon Weiner, Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue: A Comparative Analysis of Three Crises, PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1980, p. 317.

[39] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 47.

[40] Ercüment Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınaevi, 1996, p. 159.

[41] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 49. Yavuzalp, op.cit., p. 50.

[42] Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: From the Ottomans to Kissinger, New York, The Noonday Press Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989, pp. 96–97.

[43] İsmail Müftüoğlu, Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı ve Perde Arkası, İstanbul, Alioğlu Yayınaevi, 2009, p. 131.

[44] Barutçu, op.cit., pp. 47–48.

[45] Yavuzalp, op.cit., p. 160.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Barutçu, op.cit., pp. 48–49.

[49] Birand, op.cit., p. 30.

[50] İsmail Hakkı Birler, İsmail Hakkı Birler’in Anılarında CHP’li Yıllar, İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2010, p. 554.

[51] Birand, op.cit., p. 30.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 53.

[54] Ibid. p. 55.

[55] ‘Ecevit’in Açıklaması’, [Statement of Ecevit] Cumhuriyet, July 17, 1974, p. 7.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Müftüoğlu, op.cit., p. 141., Birand, op.cit., p. 76.

[58] Birand, op.cit., p. 68.

[59] Yavuzalp, op.cit., p. 62.

[60] Birand, op.cit., pp. 67–68.

[61] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 56.

[62] Ömer Altuğ, Hatırımda Kalanlar: Bir Diplomatın Ege’den Baltıklar’a Uzanan Öyküsü, Ankara, Boyut, 2004, p. 57.

[63] Yavuzalp, op.cit., p. 164.

[64] İnanç, op.cit., p. 28.

[65] Ekrem Güvendiren, Hayat Yollarında: Londra’dan Prag’a, Washington’dan Tel-Aviv’e Uzanan Diplomatik Yolculuk, Istanbul, Som Kitap, 2013, p. 143.

[66] Kamuran Gürün, Bükreş, Paris, Atina: Büyükelçilik Yılları, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınları, 1994, p. 317.

[67] Altuğ, op.cit., p. 86.

[68] Murat Bilhan, Interview by the author, Istanbul, February 2, 2016.

[69] Gürün, op.cit., pp. 317–318.

[70] İnanç, op.cit., pp. 28–29.

[71] Yavuzalp, op.cit., p. 164–165. If Sisco had come to terms on the Greek side, this could have impaired the legitimacy of Turkey’s military intervention. This perspective, moreover, proves that the military operation would have been launched even if the Greek government had been convinced for a compromise.

[72] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 68.

[73] Deniz Bölükbaşı, Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2011, pp. 62–63.

[74] Turkish General Staff was one of the forerunners of the idea of a military intervention from the very beginning of the Cyprus dispute. When the Acheson Plan offered military bases for Turkey, Turkish Generals turned it down since it was found unsatisfactory in strategic terms. The Turkish General Staff, indeed, began to prepare for a military intervention as early as 1970. See Vassilis K. Fouskas, Constantine Karamanlis and the Cyprus Crisis of July-August 1974: A Reassesment’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2021, 23, pp.2-16.

[75] Taner Baytok, Dış Politikada Bir Nefes: Anılar, İstanbul, Remzi Kitapevi, 2005, p. 196.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid. pp. 196–197.

[78] Tülümen, İki Mülkiyeli, Ankara, Kavaklıdere Kültür Yayınları, 2002, p. 31.

[79] Eralp, op.cit., p. 41.

[80] Afra, op.cit., p. 166.

[81] Baytok, op.cit., p. 196.

[82] Hitchens, op.cit., p. 97. Ambassador Inhan insists that the second intervention was made because of the conditions emerging after the first campaign. Inhan, moreover, also confirms that the second intervention stranded Turkey’s cause in international politics although it had positive outcomes in terms of shaping the future of Cyprus.

[83] Semih Günver, Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi: Avrupalı Olabilmenin Bedeli, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1989, p. 14; Zeynep Suda Güler, ed., Salon Verir, Sokak Alırız, İstanbul, Yazılama, 2013, p. 609. The Cyprus dispute deeply influenced Turkey’s relationship with the non-aligned countries. Embassies in Kuala Lumpur, Havana, Daresselam, Doha and Mogadishu were opened due to the concern of properly explaining Turkey’s position over Cyprus to countries outside the Western Alliance. Moreover, Turkey also opened an embassy in East Berlin, one of the most critical capitals of the Communist Bloc, to promote her cause in the Cyprus dispute.

[84] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 65.

[85] Hitchens, op.cit., p. 97.

[86] Gürün, op.cit., p. 328.

[87] Erol Mütercimler, Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Yönleri, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007, p. 460.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Barutçu, op.cit., p. 85.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Even at these early and optimistic stages, the Turkish MFA was far more concerned over the rights and privileges of Turkish Cypriot community than maintaining the Republic of Cyprus. Melih Esenbel, a veteran diplomat and secretary-general of the Turkish MFA during the Zurich and London Conferences, notes that the ideal situation was ‘partition’ for them. Power and responsibilities of the deputy president, an office that would be fulfilled by a Turkish Cypriot, were among the top priorities of the Turkish delegation during negotiations. Esenbel, op.cit., pp. 115-119.

[92] Niyazi Kızılyürek, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 166.

[93] Turkey’s rejection of the Greek proposal at such a decisive point was a disappointment for the third party at the table. James Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary complained ‘At this point, I should stress the disastrous effect of the manner in which the Turkish Foreign Minister approached his task. He behaved in an erratic and irresponsible way from time to time. Mr. Günes absented himself from the Palais des Nations, at, it was said, a casino across the French border. He enjoyed the confidence neither of his staff, who complained to mine privately that he gave them no directives, nor of his government, who regularly instructed him to repudiate commitments he had already undertaken. … In particular, it led to confusion in the last hours of the second Geneva conference, when discussion was prolonged in the expectation, which ultimately proved false, that Mr. Günes’s stance would be changed by instructions from Ankara’. William Mallinson, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus: Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, p. 117.

[94] Weiner, op.cit., p. 317.

[95] Eylem Yılmaz and Pınar Bilgin, ‘Constructing Turkey’s ‘Western’ Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft’, International Journal, 61, 2005–2006, p. 42.

[96] Temel Iskit, Interview by the author, Istanbul, February 17, 2016.

[97] Ibid.

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Hüseyin Sert

Dr. Hüseyin Sert obtained his Ph.D. in Modern Turkish History from the Ataturk Institute at Boğaziçi University. His current research interests are the diplomatic history of modern Turkey, diplomatic theory, and modern Turkish and European History. Sert’s work experience includes eleven years in the local government focusing on foreign relations, the European Union, and the cultural sector.