Identity matters: Hunza and the hidden text of Britain and China

ABSTRACT

How do stateless people embody identity when that identity is fixed to changing sites of knowledge? Such is the case for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan who reside in a territory that legally belongs to no nation-state. In particular, many people of Gilgit are aware of their ambiguous political situation but not of a stalemate between British India and China that predates the Kashmir Dispute. The matter hinges on an unremarkable issue: Britain’s colonial Gilgit Agency was in itself a legal governing instrument of British India but did not operate on British sovereign territory. The stalemate challenges the reductive view that the Kashmir Dispute rests solely on Pakistan’s and India’s perceived inheritance to British India.

A question raised here is whether after so many years a suppressed history, like the one here, can make any difference to Gilgitis living in the twenty-first century; or if matters have shifted so much under the guise of the Kashmir Dispute that an alternative colonial history of political deception is inconsequential? The paper is constructed as a metaphor comprising three parts: the first and third parts focus on post-partition state identity. Studied between them – anachronistic and discordant – is a little known hidden text.

KEYWORDS:

• Hunza
• Kashmir
• British India
• China
• Gilgit

Acknowledgements

I am indebted foremost to the late Barry Bloomfield, SOAS Deputy Librarian, and Yoshiko Yasumura, SOAS Art and Music Librarian, who started me on this journey. I am grateful to Elena Bashir and David Gilmartin for their vision and encouragement and to the gifted talents of (the late) Mirzaida Shah Khan, Ejaz Ullah Baig, Sherbaz Ali Bircha, Hisamullah Beg, Iftikhar Hussain, and Didar Ali of Hunza. I benefitted from an American Institute of Pakistan Studies Senior Fellowship (2012–2013) and from readings by Livia Holden, Ruth Hirai, James Peacock, Yasmin Saikia, and John Mock, and insights from Chad Haines, Cabeiri Robinson, Farid and Jacqui Shahsawary, Chris Maton, Margaret Gordon, Robert Lasker, Lal Bano and to reviewers who made harsh but invaluable critiques.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics.

2. Not all UN documents are public. ‘–/R’ (Restricted) applies to ‘Gilgit Agency S-0692–0003-11; and S-0694–0002-14’. See Summary of AG-046.

3. Ezdi, “Gilgit-Baltistan Bungle.” Reference to UNSC is unconfirmed.

4. See Instrument of Accession. Based on the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir Act of 1988, India designates 24 of its 111 Legislative Assembly seats to the territorial constituencies occupied by Pakistan in 1947. See “Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly.” Hereafter, I use the terms ‘Maharaja’ and ‘Kashmir’ to refer to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and to that state’s government.

5. Subbiah argues that Kashmir’s accession was legally provisional and Pakistan’s UN plebiscite was without obligation (unenforceable) (Subbiah, “Security Council Mediation,” 180).

6. China’s ‘Agreement’ discussed later.

7. Recent conceptualizations of state emphasize the heterogeneity of power, structure and practices. Cp. Renan, “What Is a Nation”; Geertz, “What Is a State”; Hansen and Stepputat, Sovereign Bodies; and Rezwani, Surpassing the Sovereign State.

8. Frembgen first used Southall’s concept of the segmentary state in his analysis of Zentrale Gewalt in Nager [Nagar] (Karakoram). See Müller-Stellrecht, “Passage to Hunza,” 194 ff. 7. For consistency, Nagar includes spelling variations – Nagir, Nager.

9. Winichakul, Siam Mapped; and Lin, “Tributary System.”

10. Trouillot, Anthropology and Modern World, 81.

11. In 1920, Mir Nazim (r. 1892–1938) discussed topics in Burushaski with Nagari Akhon Aman Ali Shah of Sumayar Village. Qudratullah Beg of Hunza scribed them in Persian. Later Gushpur (prince) Muhammad Jamal Khan translated the manuscript to Urdu (n.d.) and Khan Bahadur Muhammad Masih Pal later translated it to English (n.d.). Captain Barkley typed the document into English (1931, 1349 Hijiri). I am grateful to Mr Ejaz Ullah Baig, Curator of the Baltit Museum, Hunza, for this information. See Beg, History of Ancient Era, 17–18.

12. Ali, “Poetry, Power, Protest,” 17; and “Poetic Reflection and Activism”, 280.

13. See Sökefeld, “Colonialism to Postcolonial Colonialism,” 950. Bangesh follows Sökefeld.

14. Both Britain and China focused on the Burusho, the politically dominant ethnicity that spoke Burushaski. Colonel John Biddulph sourced information while Resident, Gilgit, (1877–1881).

15. Qing dynasty produced Xinjiang (Sinkiang) from Dzungaria and Altishahr. “This reform should not be confused with ‘annexation,’ which happened in the mid-eighteenth century, albeit under a form of administration unlike that in China proper” Millward and Tursun, “Political History,” 65.

16. A different explanation appears in Haines, “Colonial Routes.”

17. Gilgit scholar, Mr Sherbaz Ali Bircha, recounted that Haji Ghullam Rasool, a junior forestry officer in the 1940s, witnessed colonial staff burning Government documents at Chenabagh, Gilgit Town, and discharging their ashes into the Gilgit River. According to John Mock, India Office Library documents used by G. J. Alder have also gone missing.

18. Britain used Russia to disguise its expansionist policies, Yapp, “British Perceptions,” 647.

19. I.O.R. P/L&S/18 A.83: 2–3. Elias visited Hunza in 1886 en route from Sarikol (Sarikul, Sariqul), a polity above the Hunza valley system. The Chinese officer was likely Jangdarin. Mir, Autobiography, 28.

20. Before Britain mapped the valley as Hunza, Hunzo/ Hunzu was used in a strict geographical sense for a limited area occupied by Burushaski speakers adjacent to Nagar. See Lorimer, Burushaski III, 429.

21. I.O.R. P/L&S/18 A.82: 23.

22. Total force – two thousand troops. Knight, Three Empires, 382–83.

23. I.O.R. P/L&S/18:A.83, 4.

24. Feudatories (early nineteenth century) referred to a ‘pre-modern’ evolutionary stage of political organization. See E. Brown, ‘Tyranny of a Construct,’ and Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals.

25. I.O.R. P/L&S/18 A.83.

26. Newby identifies karun (Mongolian) kalun (Mandarin) as a guard post, outpost. See Newby, Empire and Khanate, 31–32. Cp. Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 75–7.

27. Mir, Autobiogrpahy, 40–41.

28. As no Nagar-Khakhan tribute relation existed, Uzr Khan had no right to asylum. See Mir, Autobiography, 42; Müller-Stellrecht, “Passage to Hunza,” 198–199.

29. Mir, Autobiography, 50. Prior to the Mir’s installation, Chinese officers Jangdarin and Yangchidarin stayed a month at Gilgit Town. Compare Mir, Autobiography, 51; and Lin, “Tributary System,” 498–500. Hereafter, I use Mir Nazim.

30. IOR, File No 27-C/1894, 5; IOR, P/L&S/18 A.82. Compare to Lin, “Tributary System,” 499.

31. I corroborated entries in the Mir’s Autobiography and in British Political Agents’ diaries with Hunza residents for China-Hunza’s resumed tribute practice in 1894 and for Britain’s withdrawal of official personnel in 1896.

32. Stein, Sand-Buried Ruins, 30–31.

33. Rose, “Chinese Frontiers,” 211.

34. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, 1893. In 1891, Britain was more concerned by Russia’s claims that they had annexed the whole of the Pamirs (Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 226–28).

35. The roads maintained by the Mir of Hunza were rudimentary, nothing like the technological wonder of the Gilgit Transport Road (GTR) from Srinagar to Gilgit Town.

36. See I.O.R.L. P/L&S/924.

37. The distinction of de facto possession (practice that is not necessarily ordained by law) and de jure possession (legal rule that secures practice) assumes the presence of an agreement at some point between those involved in a struggle for control, which never happened.

38. In a strict sense, the Gilgit Agency included the Gilgit Wazarat, but the Wazarat did not include the Agency. See Frontier and Overseas.

39. Tehsil had fiscal and administrative power over villages and municipalities within its jurisdiction.

40. Following the Chitral fortress siege (1895), Britain transferred Chitral to their Malakand Agency and kept its satellites in the Gilgit Agency.

41. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties, 9. On the Maharaja’s resignation see Crane Area Handbook, 61; Huttenback, Kashmir and British Raj, 69–70; Anand, Development of Constitution, 25–26; and, Leitner, Languages and Races, 100. For position of British Agent see IOR, File 97-C, 1889–1927.

42. I.O.R. File 97-C, 1889–1927, Appendix I, 5.

43. Ibid.

44. As used here, sovereignty implies independent supreme rule; suzerainty identifies a dependent state and authority over a subject population.

45. I.O.R. File 97-C, 1927, Appendix I, 1, 3, 4, and 7.

46. I.O.R. File 97-C, 1927, Letter No. 1800-F, dated 24 July 1901, Appendix I: 7.

47. See Chohan, Gilgit Agency 1877–1935. Cp. M. Malik, “China Factor”; Rai Hindu Rulers; Sahni and Cherian, “Laws of Occupation”; Stobdan and Chandran, Last Colony; and, Shekhawat “Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan”.

48. Anand, Development of Constitution, 17–18. Provincial Governors operated through the Revenue Department and functioned under the Revenue Member of the Council. The Chief Judicial authority, vested in the provincial Chief Judges, was under the Judicial Member of the Council. They had no rights over the Political Districts, i.e. Gilgit Agency.

49. Ibid., 18–9. There were 25 courts in the State of Kashmir and Jammu of which 14 were Wazarat courts based on the State Civil Procedure Code published in 1873. Under Maharaja Pratap Singh, the number of courts was increased to 90. None had judiciary authority in Gilgit Agency.

50. I.O.R. File 97-C, 1889–1927.

51. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties.

52. Professor Dr Kreutzmann emailed me that a Kashmiri delegation of guests attended the investitures of Mir Ghazan Khan (1938) and Mir Jamal Khan (1945). India Office Library, London, holds archives of Agency guests.

53. Scouts, men drawn by quota from agency polities, were also known as Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs).

54. Article One continues, “but not withstanding anything in this agreement the said territory [i.e. the Wazarat] shall continue to be included within the dominions of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir,” Dani, History of Northern Areas, 299. Signing occurred on 26 March and the government privately acknowledged that an unsatisfactory system of dual control over the Wazarat [not Agency] would be brought to an end (I.O.R. L/P&S/18/C/217).

55. Treaty of Amritsar 1846.

56. Italics in text added. Chohan, Gilgit Agency, 220.

57. 7. Assembly enacted 22 April 1934. Anand, Development of the Constitution, 38.

58. 8. It was not lawful for Praja Sabha ‘to consider or deal with any matter or enact any law relating to or affecting:’… ‘(c) matters of Frontier policy including those relating to Ladakh [Baltistan] and Gilgit’. Anand, Development of the Constitution, 50. See “Inaugural Address.”

59. According to this interpretation, Sökefeld’s assertion of a British-Kashmir diarchy is mistaken.

60. China never sanctioned Britain securing de jure or de facto control over Hunza.

61. Lin, “Tribal Diplomacy,” 28. See also Müller-Stellrecht, Hunza und China.

62. Mrs Ruth Hirai drew my attention to the distinction of Kuomintang in the Wade-Giles Romanization (Ma.) and Guomindang in Pinyin Romanization that signify the Chinese Nationalist Party. I use KMT and Nanjing to refer to Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party. Lin uses Guomindang.

63. Ibid., 33. Lin refers to “the last batch of British Indian troops,” which is likely a mistake as Britain used Scouts not Indian troops in Hunza.

64. Ibid., 34. Italics in text added. Mir Jamal saw Kashmir as a separate polity.

65. See Brown’s posthumous account and his telegram to Khan Abdul Qayum Khan Premier N.W.F. Province. W. A. Brown, Gilgit Rebellion, 155.

66. Lin “Tribal Diplomacy,” 35. General Zhang imagined ‘a geopolitical domino effect, [as] other Kashmiri tribal groups such as the Ladakh, Baltistan and Nagar would also be reabsorbed into Xinjiang’s administrative orbit’ ibid., 33.

67. Ibid., 35–8. The envoys’ method of approval is not identified. Britain controlled all telephone–telegram communication.

68. Ibid., 37.

69. Pan Guangfu and later General Lu Gongwei went to Hunza, Ibid., 39, 40.

70. Sir Mir Nazim, received British honorific titles (Mir, K.C.I.E), took subsidies from Britain and Kashmir, held a jagir (land) in the Wazarat from Maharaja Pratap, and enjoyed entitlements in British India. He also enjoyed titles (Ichen of Kanjut), subsidies, land (in Yarkand), and privileges in Xinjiang from China. See Mirzaida, Gilgit Scouts; cp. Lin, “Tributary System,” 494–95.

71. Lin “Tribal Diplomacy,” 41.

72. Ibid., 38.

73. “People’s Republic of China–Pakistan,” 716.

74. Ibid., 713.

75. Dobell, “China–Pakistan Border,” 288.

76. China already occupied Aksai Chin.

77. See B. N. Malik, “Case of Gilgit-Baltistan”; and, Pakistan’s Citizenship Act, 1951.

78. The seat number was based on the 1941–1951 Census. See “Northern Areas.”

79. See Mr Hisamullah Beg’s blog, http://hisamullahbeg.blogspot.com.

80. ‘When China started issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir a couple of years ago, Indian alarm bells started chiming,’ Lakshman, “China Wants to be Part.” paragraph 7; and, Kreutzmann, “Boundaries and Space.”

81. From 1 January 1949 until the 1965 Indo-Pak War, a simple rahdari permit system allowed divided family members to cross the LoC. Since 2005, India and Pakistan intermittently pursued trade and allowed travel within what was pre-1947 Kashmir, including the ‘Northern Areas’. Following the Mumbai attack, efforts stalled then re-started. In 2016, India and Pakistan initiated a commercial banking system. See Noorani, “Cross LoC Trade”; Sengupta, et al., “Cross Line of Control”; Akhtar, “Expanding Cross-LoC.”

82. As far as I know travel by Gilgit-Baltistan residents to IaK is not common, but increasing numbers of people from Azad Kashmir live in Gilgit Town.

83. China’s bureaucratic structure extends beyond national-provincial limits. In 1980 the bureau of the Urumqi Military Region (UMR) included parts of Tibet and Indian-claimed Aksai Chin of Ladakh and an infantry division along the Kashgar-Gilgit Road. See McMillen, China’s West, 705, 711, 718.

84. Also signatory in the President’s House 22 May 2013 were Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. CPEC originated with the Karakoram Highway in the 1950s, CPEC, paragraph 5.

85. CPEC in theory allows China to reach the Arabian Sea by land in 48 hours.

86. Rahman and Hameed say that Pakistani scholars trust China and believe its reason for staying out of the Kashmir Dispute is honourable. Rahman and Hameed, “Sino-Pak Relations”, 45.

87. Haines focuses on Britain’s mapping project but adds that the ‘mapping [of] the Gilgit Agency as a territory in British India was subjective and never fixed’. See Haines, “Colonial Routes,” 551.

88. ‘General Zhao Xiguang, as well as their 50,000-odd Nationalist forces stationed in Chinese Central Asia, eventually shifted their political allegiance to Mao Zedong after 1949’ Lin, (2009a) 41.

89. See Four Point Principle in text. The term ‘autonomous’ occurs with Xinjiang and Azad Kashmir but with incongruent subtexts.

90. General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani possibly signed the lease in January of 2012; and China’s Interest in Gilgit Baltistan.