![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
How can we understand the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis in the wake of the Oslo regime and to what extent has it facilitated the realisation of Palestinian statehood? Rather than read the Oslo regime as a prelude towards peace and resolution, instead, it has been productive of failure. In understanding how this came to pass and how this state of failure persists, the article argues that ungovernance is an instructive approach, which highlights how Israeli control is achieved through a series of disruptions: severing people from the land, severing rule from responsibility and severing statehood from self-government. After discussing the shape of the Oslo regime, this article explores how ungovernance is practiced across the Palestinian territories through the misgovernance of micro practices that produce a population in disorientation and despair.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
* Many thanks to the feedback of the reviewer and the editors of this special issue as well as conference participants and Sarath Burgis-Kasthala. Mariana Matias provided wonderful research assistance.
1 Martin Carcasson, ‘Unveiling the Oslo Narrative: The Rhetorical Transformation of Israeli-Palestinian Diplomacy’ (2000) 3(2) Rhetoric and Public Affairs 211, 211.
2 Harvey Sicherman, ‘Yitzhak Rabin: An Appreciation’ (2011) 55(3) Orbis 451, 455.
3 As discussed by Zinaida Miller, ‘Perils of Parity: Palestine’s Permanent Transition’ (2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 331, 332. Cf especially see Joseph Massad, ‘Return or Permanent Exile? Palestinian refugees and the ends of Oslo’ (1999) 8(14) Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East 5; and Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process; Oslo and After (Vintage, 2001).
4 For an overview, see Noura Erakat, Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine (Stanford University Press, 2019) 144–160.
5 Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Agreements (signed13 September 1993) 32 ILM 1525 (Oslo I); Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (signed 4 May 1994) 33 ILM 622; Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (signed 28 September 1995) 36 ILM 551 (Oslo II).
6 According to Sayed, ‘although conceived as interim, [the Oslo regime] became the stable background condition for all subsequent developments and redeployments’. Hani Sayed, ‘The fictions of the illegal occupation in the West Bank and Gaza’ (2014) 16(1) Oregon Review of International Law 79, 104.
7 Irina Bokova, ‘Plenary session of the 36th session of the General Conference of UNESCO on the occasion of the agenda item concerning the admission of Palestine as UNESCO State Member’ (31 October 2011), online: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000213660.
8 UNGA Res 67/19 ‘Status of Palestine in the United Nations’ (26 November 2012) UN Doc A/Res/67/19, online at: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0080ef30efce525585256c38006eacae/181c72112f4d0e0685257ac500515c6c?OpenDocument. As I discuss in ‘Over-stating Palestine’s UN Membership Bid? An Ethnographic Study on the Narratives of Statehood’ (2014) 25(3) European Journal of International Law 677.
9 Jeff Jacoby, ‘The Oslo handshake, 25 years on’ Boston Globe (Boston, 4 September 2018) Online: www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/09/04/the-oslo-handshake-years/jPV391Qd0u9T32V3SS407H/story.html.
10 The Peace to Prosperity Plan can be accessed here: ‘Peace to Prosperity’ (White House) online: www.whitehouse.gov/peacetoprosperity/. For some background, see Ian Black, ‘This deal of the century for the Middle East will be just another bleak milestone’ The Guardian (London, 30 January 2020) online: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/30/donald-trump-israel-palestinians-middle-east.
11 See Deval Desai and Andrew Lang, ‘Introduction: Global Un-Governance’ 11(3) Transnational Legal Theory (this issue).
12 On the nature of the Middle East’s particular ‘ungovernability’, see Fouad Gehad Marei et al, ‘Interventions on the politics of governing the “ungovernable”’ (2018) 67 Political Geography 176.
13 On the notion of Palestine as a ‘laboratory’, see John Collins, Global Palestine (Hurst, 2011).
14 As important for the US was Syria’s participation in the coalition in exchange for US trilateral talks to address Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights that began with the Madrid Conference and persisted fruitlessly until Assad senior’s death in 2000.
15 Avi Shlaim, Israel and Palestine (Verso, 2009) 155–156.
16 Formally, the Palestinian delegation was part of the Jordanian delegation. It included Haidar Abdel Shafi from Gaza and Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi from the West Bank. While the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was not granted any formal status due to Israeli demands, some PLO advisors played important roles behind the scenes.
17 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representation of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (18 November 1988) UN Doc A/43/827 online: https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6EB54A389E2DA6C6852560DE0070E392
18 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (Oxford University Press, 1997) 683.
19 UNSC Res 242 (22 November 1967) UN Doc S/Res/242, online: https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136.
20 The PLO was founded in 1964 by the Arab League and was declared as the sole representative of the Palestinian people a decade later. While it had coordinated resistance operations especially from neighbouring states during this period, (particularly from Jordan during ‘Black September in 1970 and then southern Lebanon during its civil war), it was forced to abandon its base in Lebanon in 1982 for exile in Tunis. Being so far from Palestine partly explains the Organisation’s willingness to countenance accommodation with Israel: Massad (n 3) 6.
21 See Shlaim (n 14) ch 15.
22 See Sayigh (n 17) ch 25.
23 Lori Allen, ‘Martyr bodies in the Media: Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada’ (2009) 36(1) American Ethnologist 161.
24 Especially see Raja Shihadeh, ‘Can the Declaration of Principles Bring About a ‘Just and Lasting Peace’?’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 553.
25 Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, ‘(In)dependent lives? International lawyers and the politics of state-building in the Palestinian advocacy field’ (2016) 4 London Review of International Law 393, 406.
26 Raja Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories (Brill, 1997).
27 Over the last decade or so, a rich vein of scholarship utilising the ‘settler colonial’ framework has been applied to Palestine. For example, see Lorenzo Verancini, ‘Israel-Palestine through a settler-colonial studies lens’ (2019) 21 (4) Interventions 568; and Patrick Wolf, ‘Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native’ (2006) 8 (4) Journal of Genocide Research 387.
28 Miller (n 3) 333.
29 Ibid 387.
30 For example, Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton University Press, 1993); Ardi Imseis, ‘On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2003) 44(1) Harvard International Law Journal 65; and David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (State University of New York Press, 2002).
31 Especially see Orna Ben-Naftali et al, ‘Illegal Occupation: The Framing of the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2005) 23 Berkley International Law Journal 551; and Aeyal Gross, The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
32 See Sayed (n 6) 83. This extends to the territorial focus of inquiry as most scholars focus only on the occupied territories and thus exclude Israel proper. Sayed calls on us to consider the entire territory from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River as one governance regime.
33 Sayed (n 6) 86. Also see Michelle Burgis, ‘A Discourse of Distinction? Palestinians, International Law, and the Promise of Humanitarianism’ (2009) 15 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 41.
34 For example, according to 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, property can only be seized or destroyed by the occupying power where the ‘necessities of war’ are applicable. Since 1967, Israel has seized and destroyed thousands of houses, sometimes facilitating the construction of settlements.
35 Miller (n 3) 340; Sayed (n 6) 119.
36 Although ‘interpretive governance’ is an important strand within the literature, dominant global governance approaches tend to focus more on developing functional and empirical accounts about institutions and actors in a context of globalisation. James Rosenau was the first scholar to coin the term ‘global governance’ in the late 1980s in his pioneering work on regimes. Later in a 1992 book by Rosenau and Czempiel, one of their central concerns was to explore governing without government: James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government (Cambridge University Press, 1992); and this dichotomy then between government and governance or governing persists in the literature. Although ‘global governance’ was not a widely used term until the mid-late 1990s, Barnett and Duvall argued in 2005 that it had ‘attained near-celebrity status’ as ‘one of the central orienting themes in the practice and study of international affairs of the post-Cold War period.’ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’ in Michael Barnett and Raymon Duvall (eds) Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1–32, 1.
37 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Governance: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?’ (2015) 19 Annual Review of Political Science 89, 90.
38 Amitav Acharya, ‘The Future of Global Governance: Fragmentation May be Inevitable and Creative’ (2016) 22(4) Global Governance 453.
39 Emanuel Adler and Steven Bernstein, ‘Knowledge in Power: The Epistemic Construction of Global Governance’ in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 294–318, 295.
40 Ibid, 302.
41 Especially this special issue’s Introduction on institution building and ungovernance.
42 RAW Rhodes, ‘Waves of Governance’ in David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) 39.
43 Rhodes (n 42) 40. Also see Mark Bevir, ‘Interpretive Theory’ in Mark Bevir (ed), The SAGE Handbook of Governance (Sage, 2011) 51–64.
44 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective’, David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2012) 83.
45 Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B Neumann, ‘Governance to Governmentality: Analysing NGOs, States and Power’ (2006) 50(3) International Studies Quarterly 651, 655.
46 Tanja A Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Governance without a state: Can it work?’ (2010) 4(2) Regulation & Governance 113, 113–114.
47 Thomas Risse, ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’, David Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2010) 708.
48 Andrew Brandel and Shalini Randeria, ‘Anthropological Perspectives on the Limits of the State’, in Anke Draude et al (eds) Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood (Oxford University Press, 2018) 74.
49 Berit Bliesmemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding and the Analysis of State-Formation’ (2010) 4 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 111, 121.
50 On this paradox, see Anders Persson, ‘Palestine at the end of the state-building process: Technical achievements, political failures’ (2018) 23 Mediterranean Politics 433.
51 Ibid 434.
52 Most (in)famously, the Sykes-Picot agreement: Exchange of Letters between France and Great Britain respecting the Recognition and Protection of an Arab State in Syria (signed 9/16 May 1916) 221 CTS 323.
53 Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations (8 June 1919) 225 CTS 188.
54 This was first expressed in the Balfour Declaration and then incorporated into the Preamble of 1922 Mandate text: ‘Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country’, ‘The Palestine Mandate’ (The Avalon Project, Yale Law School) online: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp. I explore the Mandate text in detail in Michelle Burgis, ‘Transforming (Private) Rights through (Public) International Law: Readings on a ‘Strange and Painful Odyssey’ in the PCIJ Mavrommatis Case’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 873.
55 UNGA Res 181 (II) (29 November 1947) UN Doc A/RES/67/19, online: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253
56 For Gordon, ‘Colonial powers do not conquer for the sake of imposing administrative rule on the indigenous population, but they end up managing the conquered inhabitants in order to facilitate the extraction of resources. After the 1967 war Israel assumed responsibility for the occupied residents, undertaking the administration of the major civil institutions through which modern societies are managed: education, health-care, welfare and the financial and legal systems. Simultaneously it began expropriating Palestinian land and water, the most important natural resources in the region. Neve Gordon, ‘From Colonization to Separation: exploring the structure of Israel’s occupation’ (2008) 29(1) Third World Quarterly 25, 28.
57 The settler population across the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) now exceeds 620 000 Israelis. See: ‘Settlements’ (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) online: www.btselem.org/topic/settlements. This constitutes between 19% and 23% of the West Bank’s population: Imseis (n 29) 21.
58 Ardi Imseis, ‘Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020’ (2020) European Journal of International Law 1. DOI:10.1093/ejil/chaa055
59 As per 1(i) of Resolution 242: ‘Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict’. UNSC Resolution 242/1967 (n 18).
60 Such policies were formulated almost immediately after Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as well as the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula) in 1967. For example, the Allon Plan of 1967 envisaged extensive Israeli settlements and strategic control across the West Bank. Many later plans and polices have built on this initial blueprint. Elihsa Efrat, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Geography of Occupation and Disengagement (Routledge, 2006), 25–29.
61 Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Oneworld, 2006) 193.
62 See Mandy Turner, ‘Completing the Circle: Peacebuilding as Colonial Practice in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2012) 19 International Peacekeeping 492, 495.
63 This metaphor is also employed more generally in relation to the role of the law of occupation in Palestine in Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Occupied Zone – “a Zone of Reasonableness”?’ (2008) 13 Israel Law Review 41. Also see Alice M Panepinto, ‘Jurisdiction as Sovereignty Over Occupied Palestine: The Case of Khan-al-Ahmar’ (2017) 26 Social & Legal Studies 31; and Kerry Rittich, ‘Occupied Iraq: Imperial Convergences?’ (2018) 31 Leiden Journal of International Law 479.
64 Edward Said, ‘The Morning After’ (1993) 15(20) London Review of Books online: www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v15/n20/edward-said/the-morning-after
65 Thus, according to Bell, the ‘move within the Oslo peace process to an emphasis on negotiations and complex autonomy arrangements … as an interim solution can be viewed as a mechanism for inching the parties towards agreement on the right of external self-determination as traditionally conceived. However, it can also be argued that the Oslo peacemaking process as it has developed has begun to reshape understandings of whether a stand-alone right of Palestinians to external self-determination remains.’ Christine Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford University Press, 2008) 229.
66 Baruch Kimmerling and JS Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History (Harvar University Press, 2003) 356–361.
67 Bell and Pospisil’s notion of ‘political settlement’ is useful here, which stresses that rather than strive for consensus, parties instead agree to disagree. This ensures, however, that fundamental points of contention (such as Jerusalem’s status or the rights of refugees) persist, requiring a managerial regime of containment so that such insecurity does not threaten the settlement itself as well as spill over and heighten regional and even global instability. Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil, ‘Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement’ (2017) 29 Journal of International Development 576.
68 Miller (n 3) 383.
69 Omar M Dajani, ‘Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks’ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 61, 84–88.
70 According to Gordon, ‘the general mood in the Occupied Territories during the first decades [after 1967] was very different from that today. For several years the Israeli military government published annual reports entitled ‘Accountability’, suggesting that Israel felt a need to provide an account of the social and economic developments taking place in the regions that it had captured. In these reports the civilising mission of the colonial principle is omnipresent. Israel portrayed itself as bringing progress to the Palestinians. The thrust of the claims made in the reports can be summed up as follows: thanks to our interventions, the Palestinian economy, industry, education, health-care and civilian infrastructure have significantly developed … Many of the military reports also underscore Israel’s ongoing efforts to normalise the occupation … The ultimate aim of the military government … was to render the occupation invisible. Gordon (n 56) 31–32.
71 For example, Mustafa notes how Lieutenant-General Dayton characterised the success of the policy when no violent backlash resulted in the wake of Israel’s deadly assault on Gaza 2008–2009. Tahani Mustafa, ‘Damming the Palestinian Spring: Security Sector Reform and Entrenched Repression’ (2015) 9 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 212, 224.
72 More recently, this has played out in relation to Israel’s policy of deducting funds from the taxation revenues that it sees as commensurate with PA payments made to Palestinians imprisoned inside Israel. See Noa Landau and Jack Khoury, ‘Palestinian Authority Returns Slashed Tax Revenues to Israel’ Haaretz (2 May 2019) online: www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-palestinian-authority-returns-slashed-tax-revenues-to-israel-1.7194183.
73 Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘Zone’ in Ben-Naftali et al, The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 516–547, 520–521.
74 See ‘Palestine’s West Bank Archipelago’ (Brilliant Maps, 2017) online: https://brilliantmaps.com/palestine-archipelago/. Please note that this map does not include the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem as parts of the occupied Palestinian territories. Weizman, an architect by training, also notes how the Wall produces ‘barrier archipelagos’. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (Verso, 2007), ch 6.
75 According to Berda, closure was first used as a consistent policy ‘in Gaza in the wake of the First Intifada and during the outbreak of the First Gulf War.’ Yael Berda, Living Emergency: Israel’s Permit Regime in the Occupied West Bank (Stanford University Press, 2018) 37.
76 Especially see Sara Roy, ‘De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo’ (1999) 28(3) Journal of Palestine Studies 64–82; and Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘Violence’ in Ben-Naftali et al, The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 431–447, 441–444.
77 For example, see ‘Gaza blockade: restrictions eased but most people still locked in’ (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2020) online: www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-blockade-restrictions-eased-most-people-still-locked
78 Jasbir K Puar, The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability (Duke University Press, 2017). Of course, given that Gaza is one of the most densely populated spaces on earth with an extremely fragile health infrastructure, Covid-19 presents a particularly challenging threat to the population. Especially see Bram Wispelwey and Amaya Al-Orzza, ‘Underlying Conditions’ (London Review of Books Blog, 2020) online: www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2020/april/underlying-conditions
79 ‘Israel has no interest in the Palestinians as its own subjects and has therefore withdrawn all disciplinary and biopolitical arrays that were deployed in the first years of the occupation’. Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir, ‘Between Imaginary Lines: Violence and its Justification at the Military Checkpoints in Occupied Palestine’ (2011) 28 Theory, Culture & Society 55, 60.
80 Gordon captures this sense of living after biopower, when he argues that it ‘is not only that the Palestinian body is no longer considered to be an important object of management and that Israel has abandoned its objective of constituting the occupied inhabitant as an economically efficient subject, it has also adopted a series of policies which in effect weaken and destroy the Palestinian body.’ Gordon (n 56) 41. Indeed, under the separation principle the Palestinian body is no longer conceived to be an object that needs to be meddled with and shaped.
81 Omar Dewachi, Ungovernable Life: Mandatory Medicine and Statecraft in Iraq (Stanford University Press, 2017) 7.
82 Ibid 9.
83 Marei et al (n 11) 1.
84 Ben-Naftali (n 30) 523–524.
85 Dewachi (n 81) 7.
86 Notably as stated in the political communique to the 1988 declaration of independence, Abdullah (n 16).
87 As per Article 5 Oslo I (n 5).
88 As per the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel (Knesset, 2009) online: www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm. This only formalised Israel’s de facto annexation of Jerusalem and 28 neighbouring villages through its application of law there two weeks after the end of the June War in 1967. See Ben-Naftali (n 30) 529–530. The municipal area of the city gained through expropriation of Palestinian lands expanded from 6.5 km² to 71 km²: Imseis (n 58), 19.
89 For example, according to Gordon, in ‘1994 the Occupied Territories were under closure for 43 days, in 1996 the territories were closed-off for 104 days, and in 1997 for 87 days.’ Gordon (n 56) 39.
90 Andy Clarno, ‘A Tale of Two Walled Cities: Neo-Liberalization and Enclosure in Johannesburg and Jerusalem’ (2008) 19 Political Power and Social Theory 159.
91 Khalidi (n 61) 201–202.
92 Ben-Naftali (n 30) 541–542.
93 Ibid, 525.
94 Ibid, 526–528.
95 Especially see John Dugard and John Reynolds, ‘Apartheid, International Law and the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (2013) 24 (3) European Journal of International Law 867, who compare the situation in Palestine to that of South Africa; and Sayed, who argues that the ethnic distinction (between Jews and Arabs) has served as the underlying framework for governing the entire territorial space of Mandate Palestine since 1967. Sayed (n 6) 88.
96 Most notable was the significant change that occurred in the labour market. After Israel’s occupation began in 1967, there was a steady rise in the integration of Palestinian workers in the Israeli labour market, which accounted for a large portion of household income. For example, by 1977, ‘almost one-third of workers from the West Bank were employed in low-skill construction and agricultural jobs in Israel.’ Berda (n 74) 81. From the 1990s, such participation plummeted as did the Palestinian economy as a result. Particularly see Roy (1999).
97 Particularly see Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli Water Conflict (IB Tauris, 2008).
98 See Ben-Naftali (n 30) 543–546.
99 Turner (n 61) 495.
100 Toufic Haddad, Palestine Ltd.: Neoliberalism and Nationalism in the Occupied Territory (IB Tauris, 2016).
101 Particularly see Berda (n 74); Irene Calis, ‘Routine and rupture: The everyday workings of abyssal (dis)order in the Palestinian food basket’ (2017) 44 American Ethnologist 65; Dewachi (n 81); Rema Hammami, ‘On (not) suffering at the Checkpoint: Palestinian Narrative Strategies of Surviving Israel’s Carceral Geography’ (2015) 14 borderlands 1; Ariel Handel, ‘Exclusionary surveillance and spatial uncertainty in the occupied Palestinian territories’ in Elia Zureik et al (eds), Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power (Routledge, 2010); Mikko Joronen and Mark Griffiths, ‘The affective politics of precarity: Home demolitions in occupied Palestine’ (2019) 37 EPD: Society and Space 561; Kotef and Amir (n 79).
102 For example, see Handel (n 101) 259–275.
103 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, volume I (Penguin, 1978) Part Five.
104 Berda (n 74) 128.
105 Orna Ben-Naftali, ‘Violence’ in Ben-Naftali et al, The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Cambridge University Press, 2019) n431–447.
106 Berda (n 74) 109.
107 Kotef and Amir (n 79) 66.
108 Monika Barthwal-Datta, ‘Securitising Threats without the State: A Case Study of Misgovernance as a Security Threat in Bangladesh’ (2009) 25 (2) Review of International Studies 277, 285.
109 Berda (n 74) ch 4.
110 Miller (n 3) 377; and Weizman (n 74) 157.
111 Gordon (n 56) 27.
112 For example, see fatality statistics documented by Btselem: ‘Statistics’ (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) online: www.btselem.org/statistics.
113 Berda (n 74) 124.
114 Persson (n 50) 446.
115 Handel (n 101) 261–264.
116 Emphasis in original, Ibid, 264.
117 Ibid, 264–266.
118 Ibid, 268.
119 Ibid, 269. This is also pointed out by Hammami (n 101) 4. For a study of the uncertainty arising from Palestinian identity documents, see Tobias Kelly, ‘Documented lives: fear and the uncertainties of law during the second Palestinian intifada’ (2006) 12(1) Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 89.
120 Handel (n 101) 269.
121 Julie Peteet, Space and Mobility in Palestine (Indiana University Press, 2017) 119.
122 Ibid, 61.
123 Ibid, 64. Also see Kivalnd’s wonderful consideration of Haiti under occupation as a form of statelessness, where occupation not only entails foreign domination, but also a sense of being too busy—too occupied—as a result of an excess of diverse governance actors and policies. Chelsey L Kivland, ‘Unmaking the State in “Occupied” Haiti’ (2012) 35 PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 248, 252.
124 Kotef and Amir (n 79) 66–67.
125 Ibid.
126 Michal Huss, ‘Mapping the Occupation: Performativity and the Precarious Israeli Identity’ (2019) 24 Geopolitics 756, 757.
127 Breaking the Silence, ‘Pictures at 3AM’, quoted in Hedi Viterbo, ‘Future-Oriented Measures’ in Orna Ben-Naftali et al, The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Cambridge University Press, 2019) 118–140, 136.
128 Huss (n 176) 761.
129 For an overview, peruse the website of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions online: https://icahd.org/.
130 This is also the case for certain ‘unrecognised’ villages within Israel, such as al-Araqeeb in the Naqab/Negev in southern Israel, which has been demolished several times.
131 Some of these places are iconic and have become sites of regular political tourism. I myself took my students to the Bedouin village of Susia (in the Hebron Hills, Area C of the West Bank) with the assistance of local civil society groups. For some background on house demolitions, particularly see the work of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Breaking the Silence and Al-Haq.
132 Joronen and Griffith (n 101) 564.
133 Quoted in Ibid, 565.
134 Ibid, 566.
135 Ben-Naftali (n 30) 546.
136 Mikko Joronen, ‘Spaces of waiting: Politics of precarious recognition in the occupied West Bank’ (2017) 35 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 994–1011. Also see Peteet (n 121) ch 4.
137 Calis (n 101) 74.
138 Ibid.
139 Joronen (n 136) 995.
140 For Marei et al (n 12) 3, ‘The politics of governing the “ungovernable” de-centers the state, and requires it to morph into multiple guises and integrate into increasingly elaborate global networks. This reconfiguration produces new spaces of encounter and arenas of contestation … ’