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Abstract
This article assesses how the decisions taken in and after 2011 in Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh strained and shattered the lingering consensus and common threat perception that had, since 1981, provided a baseline for regional cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It explores how the rifts after 2011 have hit on weak-points within the GCC in ways that complicate any potential recoherence or “coming-back-together” in anything close to the pre-2017 form. This occurred as the pragmatic flexibility within the GCC was eroded by a “zero-sum” mentality that has split GCC states along multiple lines rather than just a “clean” break over a specific issue. While the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has become a new and exclusionary center of gravity in Arab Gulf politics, the article ends by examining the prospects for regional order against the backdrop of a fractured GCC and the prospects for greater balance as the disengagement of US interest accelerates the internationalization of the political economy and international relations of Persian Gulf states.
Notes
1 For examples, see the chapters in Kamrava (ed.), Gateways to the World: Port Cities in the Persian Gulf (2016).
2 Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (2011).
3 Billing and Arnold, “GCC Monetary Union ‘Dead’ after UAE Pullout – Analysts”, Arabian Business, 20 May 2009.
4 Dargin, “The Dolphin Project: The Development of a Gulf Gas Initiative”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies NG 22 (2008), pp. 23‒4; Al Jazeera, “Riyadh Protests Qatar-UAE Bridge”, 29 June 2005.
5 Critchlow, “Saudis Demand Say in Emirates Pipeline”, The New York Times, 12 July 2006.
6 Wright, “Fixing the Kingdom: Political Evolution and Socio-Economic Challenges in Bahrain”, CIRS Occasional Paper 3 (2010), pp. 12‒13.
7 Miller, Desert Kingdoms to Global Powers: The Rise of the Arab Gulf (2016), p. 8.
8 Kechichian, “The Gulf Security Pact: Another GCC Dilemma”, Al Jazeera, 24 February 2014.
9 Cited in Kamrava, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (2018), pp. 81‒2.
10 Al Arabiya, “Oman Goes Blunt ‘Against’ a Gulf Union”, 7 December 2013.
11 Freer, Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies (2018), p. 157.
12 Kerr, “Dubai Eager to Capitalise on Iran Opening”, Financial Times, 21 January 2014.
13 Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950‒1971 (2004), p. 231.
14 Al Jazeera, “Qatar 1996 Coup Plot: New Details Reveal Saudi-UAE Backing”, 17 December 2018.
15 Pinto, “From ‘Follower’ to ‘Role Model’: The Transformation to the UAE’s International Self-Image”, Journal of Arabian Studies 4.2 (2014), p. 234.
16 Nonneman, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities”, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, ed. Potter and Sick (2004), p. 183.
17 Heard-Bey, “Conflict Resolution and Regional Co-Operation: The Role of the Gulf Co-Operation Council 1970–2002”, Middle Eastern Studies 42.2 (2006), p. 210.
18 Henderson, “Meet the Two Princes Reshaping the Middle East”, Politico, 13 June 2017.
19 Kirkpatrick, “The Most Powerful Arab Ruler Isn’t M.B.S. It’s M.B.Z.”, The New York Times, 2 June 2 2019.
20 Al-Noqaidan, Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE: Expansion and Decline (2012), p. 9; Boghardt, “The Muslim Brotherhood on Trial in the UAE”, The Washington Institute, Policywatch 2064, 12 April 2013.
21 Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy”, Middle East Journal 65.4 (2011), p. 540.
22 Roberts, “Reflecting on Qatar’s ‘Islamist’ Soft Power”, Berkley Center for Religion and Brookings, Policy Brief, 6‒7 April 2019.
23 Bahry, “The New Arab Media Phenomenon: Qatar’s Al-Jazeera”, Middle East Policy 8.2 (2001), pp. 91‒3.
24 Anon., “Qatar’s Consensual Politics Complement and Clash with ‘War on Terrorism’ Thinking”, Gulf States Newsletter 27.708 (18 April 2003) p. 12.
25 Sultan, “Al Jazeera: Reflections on the Arab Spring”, Journal of Arabian Studies 3.2 (2013), p. 261.
26 Warren, “The ʿUlamāʾ, and the Arab Uprisings, 2011–13: Considering Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the ‘Global Mufti,’ between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Legal Tradition, and Qatari Foreign Policy”, New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014), p. 17.
27 Roberts, “Qatar and the UAE: Exploring Divergent Responses to the Arab Spring”, The Middle East Journal 71.4 (2017), p. 560.
28 Spencer, “Naval Battle between UAE and Saudi Arabia Raises Fears for Gulf Security”, The Daily Telegraph, 26 March 2010.
29 Heard-Bey, “Conflict Resolution and Regional Cooperation: The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council 1970–2002”, Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42.2 (2006), p. 209.
30 Krieg, “Introduction”, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Krieg (2019), pp. 1–2.
31 Anon., “Saudi Arabia: Difficult Geopolitical Context”, Gulf States Newsletter 36.926 (21 June 2012), p. 3; Anon., “Morsi’s Fall Prompts ‘Re-Set’ in Gulf Ties with Egypt”, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 9 July 2013.
32 Kirkpatrick, “Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi”, The New York Times, 1 March 2015.
33 Werr, “UAE Offers Egypt $3 Billion Support, Saudis $5 Billion”, Reuters, 9 July 2013.
34 Arnold, Torchia, and Aboudi, “Egypt Got $23 Billion in Aid from Gulf in 18 Months – Minister”, Reuters, 2 March 2015.
35 Freer, “From Co-Optation to Crackdown: Gulf States’ Reactions to the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring”, The Qatar Crisis, POMEPS Briefings 31, ed. Lynch (2017), p. 68.
36 Kirkpatrick, “Qatar’s Support of Islamists Alienates Allies Near and Far”, The New York Times, 7 September 2014.
37 Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar: The Gulf’s Problem Child”, The Atlantic, 5 June 2017.
38 Kabalan, “Kuwait’s GCC Mediation: Incentives and Reasons for Failure”, The GCC Crisis at One Year: Stalemate Becomes New Reality, ed. Azzam and Harb (2018), p. 24.
39 Sciutto and Herb, “Exclusive: The Secret Documents That Help Explain the Qatar Crisis”, CNN, 11 July 2017.
40 Anon., “Cold War in the Heat: Why Gulf Countries are Feuding with Qatar”, The Economist, 21 June 2018.
41 O’Toole, “What is Oman’s Stance on the Qatar-Gulf Crisis”, Al Jazeera, 1 December 2017.
42 Gulf News, “What Are the 13 Demands Given to Qatar?”, 23 June 2017.
43 Al-Shaibany, “Rouhani Meets Rulers of Oman and Kuwait to Reduce Iran-GCC Tensions”, The National, 15 February 2017.
44 Nelson, “Nonprofit Urges Multinational Companies to Shun Qatar”, Politico, 3 July 2017.
45 Diwan, “The GCC is Becoming More – and Less – than the Sum of its Parts”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 13 August 2018.
46 Coates Ulrichsen, “The Exclusionary Turn in GCC Politics”, Arab Center Washington, 21 August 2018.
47 Author interviews with two senior Obama administration officials, Washington, DC and Houston, August and November 2018.
48 Gulf News, “Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council Announces 7 Joint Initiatives”, 19 January 2019.
49 Walsh and Al-Batati, “Ally Attacks Ally in Yemen’s War Within a War”, The New York Times, 29 August 2019; England and Kerr, “UAE Attacks on Yemen Reveal Fractures in Saudi-Led Coalition”, Financial Times, 19 August 2019.
50 Anon., “Saudi-Emirati Co-ordination Council: All You Need to Know”, The National, 7 June 2018.
51 Information compiled by the author from press releases available on the GCC website and local media reports in GCC member-states.
52 Anon., “Iran and P5+1 Sign Breakthrough Nuclear Deal”, Gulf States Newsletter 37.959 (28 November 2013), p. 3.
53 Coates Ulrichsen, “Why Have the Gulf States Intervened Militarily in Yemen?”, Baker Institute for Public Policy, 27 March 2015.
54 Taylor, “U.S. Interests at Risk in Arab Allies’ Bitter Feud”, The Washington Times, 4 October 2017.
55 Author interviews with diplomats from Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, Washington DC, August 2017, June 2018, August 2019, and October 2019, and Qatari officials in Doha, May 2018 and January 2019.
56 Doha Forum, “Gulf Regional Security”, workshop discussion at the Doha Forum, Qatar, 14 December 2019.
57 White House, “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit”, Press Release, 21 May 2017; emphasis in capital letters is as in the original text of President Trump’s remarks.
58 Landay and Bayoumy, “Exclusive: Khashoggi Murder Further Complicates ‘Arab NATO’ Plan – U.S. Sources”, Reuters, 8 November 2018.
59 Kalin and Westall, “Costly Saudi Defenses Prove no Match for Drones, Cruise Missiles”, Reuters, 17 September 2019; Kirkpatrick and Hubbard, “Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities Tests U.S. Guarantee to Defend Gulf”, The New York Times, 19 September 2019.
60 Sly, “The UAE’s Ambitions Backfire as it Finds Itself on the Front Line of U.S.-Iran Tensions”, The Washington Post, 11 August 2019; Luck, “Iran Crisis: Why Gulf Arabs Increasingly See US as a Liability”, Christian Science Monitor, 8 January 2020.
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Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is Fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, 6100 Main Street, Baker Hall MS-40, Suite 120, Houston, TX 77005.