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Abstract
This paper discusses European policies towards the Qatar crisis in the context of the evolution of broader past and present European policies towards the Gulf. It starts with a summary discussion of historical patterns of relations between Europe and the Gulf, before briefly sketching the major changes in the regional environment after the Second World War, beginning with the US supplanting the UK as the dominant hegemon, through to the changes wrought by Trump’s elevation to the US presidency. It then turns to a discussion of the effects of these changes for the Gulf and other regional states and their policy postures, before going on to examine the ways in which European states and the EU have interpreted and reacted to this changing environment. These reactions are often at one and the same time a reaction to the changes and uncertainties in US policy under Trump, since this changing US role is also a crucial ingredient both in the region and for Europe’s room for manoeuvre. Against this background, the paper will outline European policies towards the Gulf theater in particular, focusing on Iran and the JCPOA nuclear deal, and the GCC (or Qatar) crisis –– while also briefly considering the Yemen crisis and the impact of Gulf competition on and in the Libyan theater. From October 2018, the Khashoggi affair added an additional dimension to the crisis, as did the renewed oil price crash amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020.
Notes
1 I have examined the patterns and dynamics of relations between Britain and the Gulf in “Constants and Variations in British-Gulf Relations”, Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States, ed. Kéchichian (2001), pp. 325‒50.
2 This argument has been developed at greater length for the case of Saudi Arabia in Nonneman, “Saudi-European Relations, 1902‒2001: A Pragmatic Quest for Relative Autonomy”, International Affairs 77.3 (July 2001), pp. 631‒61.
3 For a detailed account and analysis of these relations, see: Nonneman, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities”, Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War, ed. Potter and Sick (2004), pp. 167‒92.
4 See: Nonneman, “EU-GCC Relations: Dynamics, Patterns and Perspectives”, The International Spectator 41.3 (July‒September 2006), pp. 59‒74.
5 See: Nonneman, “Europe, the US, and the Gulf After the Cold War”, European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq, ed. Mauer and Möckli (2011), pp. 13‒36.
6 Freer, personal correspondence, 8 July 2020.
7 See: Young, “The Gulf’s Eastward Turn: The Logic of Gulf-China Economic Ties”, Journal of Arabian Studies 9.2 (December 2019), pp. 236‒52; Ehteshami, “Asianization of the Persian Gulf”, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf: Political Economy, War and Revolution (2013), pp. 88‒105; and Davidson, “The Gulf Arab States and Asia Pacific: Geo-Economics and Interdependency”, Shifting Geo-Economic Power of the Gulf: Oil, Finance and Institutions, ed. Legrenzi and Momani (2011), pp. 183‒98.
8 This shift and the concomitant US turn to “surrogate warfare” in the Middle East is discussed incisively in Krieg, “Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and US Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, International Affairs 92.1 (2016), pp. 97‒113.
9 See: Krieg, “The Weaponization of Narratives Amid the Gulf Crisis”, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (2019), pp. 91‒108.
10 Cafiero, “The ‘Trump Factor’ in the Gulf Divide”, Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Krieg (2019), pp. 127‒44.
11 For a discussion of the concept of relative autonomy of Middle East states in the regional and global system, see: Nonneman, “Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies: The Relationship with Europe, ed. Nonneman (2005), pp. 6‒18. For an incisive look at the dynamics of the Arab Gulf states’ foreign policy in this context, see: Baabood, “Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy, with Special Reference to the EU”, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies, ed. Nonneman (2005), pp. 145‒73; and Wright, “Foreign Policy in the GCC States”, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Kamrava (2011), pp. 72‒93.
12 Some of the best analysis and overview of this evolution can be found in: Stephens, “The Arab Cold War Redux: The Foreign Policies of the Gulf Cooperation Council States since 2011”, The Century Foundation, 28 February 2017; Young, “The Interventionist Turn in Gulf States’ Foreign Policies”, AGSIW Issue Paper 4 (June 2016); and the superb collection of papers by Young, Ehteshami, Roberts, Al-Rasheed, Philips, and Gaub, brought together in the LSE Middle East Centre’s Collected Papers: The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States, vol. 1 (April 2015) On the UAE, the best recent contribution on the subject is Salisbury, “Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy”, Chatham House Research Paper, 1 July 2020.
13 Under Shaikh Tamim, Qatar kept a few what Andreas Krieg calls “legacy operations” in Syria and Libya until 2014 [Krieg, personal correspondence, 6 July 2020]. For the most insightful analyses of Qatari foreign policy, see: Kamrava, “The Foreign Policy of Qatar”, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, ed. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2014), pp. 157‒84; Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (2013) (especially chap. 2: “The Subtle Powers of a Small State”, pp. 46‒68; and chap. 3: “Foreign Policy and Power Projection”, pp. 69‒104); Mansour, “Qatar’s Global Activism: Pursuing Ambition in the Midst of Domestic and Regional Transitions”, Diplomatic Strategies of Leading Nations in the Global South, ed. Braveboy-Wagner (2016), pp. 345‒69; Soubrier, “Evolving Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Study of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates”, The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies Before and After the Arab Spring, ed. Almezaini and Rickli (2017), pp. 144‒66; Roberts, Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State (2016); Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring (2014); Wright, “Foreign Policies with International Reach: The Case of Qatar”, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, ed. Held and Coates Ulrichsen (2011), pp. 296‒312; and, most recently, Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis (2020).
14 Krieg, personal correspondence, 6 July 2020.
15 On the period before the Qatar boycott, see: Stephens, “The Arab Cold War Redux”; Young, “The Interventionist Turn in Gulf States’ Foreign Policies”; Young, “Foreign Policy Analysis of the Gulf Cooperation Council”, LSE Middle East Centre, Collected Papers: The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States 1 (April 2015), pp. 4‒12; Al-Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy: Loss without Gain?”, LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers: The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States 1 (April 2015), pp. 32‒40; Phillips, “Gulf Actors and the Syria Crisis”, LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers: The New Politics of Intervention of Gulf Arab States 1 (April 2015), pp. 41‒51; and Almezaini, “The Transformation of UAE Foreign Policy Since 2011”, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Coates Ulrichsen (2017), pp. 191‒203. On the period since 2017, see: Cafiero, “The Saudi-Emirati Alliance in a Polarized Middle East”, The Gulf Crisis: Reshaping Alliances in the Middle East, ed. Al-Jaber and Neubauer (2018), pp. 29‒58; Nonneman, “The Qatar Crisis Through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis”, The Gulf Crisis: The View from Qatar, ed. Miller (2018), pp. 98‒108; and Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis.
16 Coates Ulrichsen, “Introduction”, The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Coates Ulrichsen (2017), p. 2.
17 Even so, the Qatari troops did get involved in some significant exchanges of fire with the Houthis and remained for nearly three weeks beyond the start of the Quartet’s Boycott at the request of the Saudi Chief of Staff, according to Andreas Krieg (personal correspondence, 6 July 2020).
18 For an excellent recent view of European approaches to the Gulf, see: Bianco, “A Gulf Apart: How Europe Can Gain Influence with the Gulf Cooperation Council”, European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief (February 2020).
19 See: Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran’s Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations”, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies: The Relationship with Europe, ed. Nonneman (2005), pp. 174‒96.
20 UK Govt, “New Mechanism to Facilitate Trade with Iran: Joint Statement [of UK, Germany & France]”, 31 January 2019. See also: Rafati and Vaez, “Europe Tests the Boundaries on Iran”, Foreign Affairs, 4 February 2019. For a thoughtful, expert analysis of how the mechanism could work, see: Batmanghelidj and Geranmayeh, “Trading with Iran Via the Special Purpose Vehicle: How It Can Work”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 7 February 2019.
21 Euractiv, “France, Italy, Denmark Back European-Led Naval Mission for Hormuz”, 24 July 2019.
22 RFE/RL, “Eight Countries Back European-Led Naval Mission in Strait of Hormuz”, 20 January 2020.
23 Fitzpatrick, “Pompeo’s Attempted Dismantlement of the Iran Nuclear Deal”, Atlantic Council Blog Post, 29 May 2020.
24 See: UK Govt, “Upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime – Statement by Ambassador Jonathan Allen, UK Chargé d’Affaires to the UN, at the Security Council Meeting on Non-Proliferation”, 30 June 2020. Also see the earlier statement by the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, in January 2020: EEAS, “Statement by High Representative Borrell as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, 14 January 2020. Also see: Fitzpatrick, “IAEA Mildly Reprimands Iran Over Suspect Nuclear Sites”, Atlantic Council Blog Post, 22 June 2020; and Reuters, “EU’s Borrell Extends Timeline for Dispute Mechanism on Iran Deal”, 24 January 2020.
25 For the best recent analysis of the Yemen conflict, see: International Crisis Group, “Rethinking Peace in Yemen”, Middle East & North Africa Report 216 (2 July 2020).
26 Discussions with current and former EU and other European diplomats in Brussels, Berlin, London and Doha, 2018‒20; also see the 2 July 2020 letter of the Swedish, German and UK Foreign Ministers to the Financial Times: Linde, Maas, and Raab, “Yemen Needs International Help to Escape Tragedy”, Financial Times, 1 July 2020; and European Commission, “International Cooperation and Development: Yemen”, n.d.
27 Deutsche Welle, “Germany Approves Saudi Targeting System Sale Despite Yemen War Ban”, 20 September 2020.
28 I am indebted to Cinzia Bianco of ECFR, Berlin, for this observation.
29 Stone, “Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Finland Stop Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia in Response to Yemen Famine”, The Independent, 23 November 2018; Dudley, “Why More and More Countries Are Blocking Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE”, Forbes, 7 September 2018.
30 Boffey and Jones, “MEPs Back Call for EU Members to Halt Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia”, The Guardian, 25 October 2018.
31 Sabbagh and McKernan, “UK Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia Unlawful, Court of Appeal Declares”, The Guardian, 20 June 2019.
32 Doward, “Britain Boosts Arms Sales to Repressive Regimes by £1bn”, The Guardian, 25 April 2020; Forrest, “UK Arms Sales to Saudi-Led Coalition Up by Almost 50 Per Cent, Despite Arms Trade Treaty”, The Independent, 24 December 2019.
33 Deutsche Welle, “German Spy Agency Warns of Saudi Intervention Destabilizing Arab World”, 2 December 2015.
34 Off-the-record discussions with European diplomats and officials, 2017‒19, London, Brussels, Washington and Doha. See also: The Economist, “The Middle East’s Punchbag: Iran and Saudi Arabia Take Their Rivalry to Lebanon”, 16 November 2017.
35 MEMO, “Italy to Stop Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia”, 29 December 2018.
36 EEAS, “Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini on the Killing on the Saudi Journalist Jamal Khashoggi”, 23 October 2018.
37 Off-the-record conversations with European officials, 2018‒20.
38 BBC, “UK Imposes Sanctions Against Human Rights Abusers”, 6 July 2020.
39 Freer, “EU-GCC Parliamentary Relations”, The European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council: Towards a New Path, ed. Abdul-Ghaffar and Colombo (forthcoming 2021). For the case of Bahrain, Matthiessen already in 2013 showed this to be the case, in his “EU Foreign Policy Towards Bahrain in the Aftermath of the Uprising”, The Gulf States and the Arab Uprisings, ed. Echagüe (2015), pp. 77‒85.
40 Al Jazeera, “France’s Macron Slams Turkey’s ‘Criminal’ Role in Libya”, 30 June 2020.
41 Krieg, personal correspondence, 6 July 2020.
42 Off-the-record discussions with diplomats, officials and military and intelligence personnel from a number of European states and the EU, London, Brussels, Berlin, Doha, and Washington, 2016‒20.
43 See: Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, pp. 70‒89.
44 Off-the-record discussions with senior European –– including EU –– diplomats, Doha, 2018 through March 2020. Also see, for example: Al Jazeera, “EU’s Mogherini Urges Direct Talks to End Gulf Crisis”, 23 July 2017.
45 See: European Commission, “Trade Policy: Gulf Region”, 5 May 2020; and Saudi Gazette, “EU Becomes Largest Trading Partner of GCC With Two-Way Trade Exceeding €143 Billion”, 8 April 2018.
46 See: European Commission, “Liquified Natural Gas”, 5 June 2020. Also see: Osiewicz, “Europe Seeks Peaceful End to the Gulf Crisis”, Middle East Institute, 28 June 2017.
47 Discussions with French, German, and British officials in 2017‒20, Paris, London, Berlin.
48 Koch, “Constructing a Viable EU-GCC Relationship”, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research Paper 34, London School of Economics and Political Science (January 2014).
49 Observations based on numerous off-the-record conversations with politicians, diplomats, and military and intelligence officials from a range of Western countries and the EU’s External Action Service, throughout the period 2012‒20, in Washington, DC, London, Brussels, and Doha.
50 EEAS, “EU Backs Mediation Efforts to Resolve Gulf Crisis”, press release, 4 July 2017.
51 See, for example: Al Jazeera, “EU’s Mogherini Urges De-Escalation of Qatar-Gulf Rift”, 19 June 2017.
52 EEAS, “EU and Qatar Sign a Cooperation Arrangement”, press release, 7 March 2018.
53 EEAS, “Federica Mogherini Met with the Foreign Minister of Qatar, Sheik Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani”, Press Release, 21 June 2018.
54 Henrik Hololei, EU Director of General Mobility and Transport, speaking at the CAPA Summit in Doha on 5 February 2019, attended by the author.
55 Off-the-record conversation, early 2019.
56 For an excellent overview of interests and reactions of EU states until early 2018, see: Freer, “Exploring European and Russian Perspectives on the Gulf Crisis”, The Gulf Crisis: Reshaping Alliances in the Middle East, ed. Al-Jaber and Neubauer (2018), pp. 151‒70. Also see: Bianco, “A Gulf Apart”.
57 For this and other statements, and a further exploration on the evolution of mutual relations, till early 2018, see: Freer, “Exploring European and Russian Perspectives on the Gulf Crisis”, pp. 160‒3.
58 Discussions with German current and former diplomats and think thank officials, Doha and Berlin, 2019‒20.
59 Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, p. 89.
60 For more, see: Freer, “Exploring European and Russian Perspectives on the Gulf Crisis”, pp. 157‒60.
61 Arab News, “Macron Says Military Equipment Sales to Ally Saudi Arabia Part of ‘War on Terror’”, 9 May 2019; Al Jazeera, “France’s Macron Slams Turkey’s ‘Criminal’ Role”.
62 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “Foreign Secretary Welcomes Qatar’s Commitment to Combat Terrorism”, Press release, 23 July 2017.
63 Arabian Business, “Britain Starts Talks with UAE for Post-Brexit Trade Deal”, 12 February 2019.
64 Guarascio, “London Pushes to Take Saudis Off EU Dirty Money Blacklist”, Reuters, 8 February 2019.
65 Cafiero and Al-Makahleh, “Kuwait’s Role in London’s Return East of Suez”, Gulf International Forum, 27 February 2018.
66 Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, p. 2017.
67 Discussions with British diplomats and other officials in Doha and London, 2017‒18; 2020.
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Gerd Nonneman
Gerd Nonneman is Professor of International Relations and Gulf Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar, Education City, PO Box 23689, Doha, Qatar.