Greenland’s ambiguous action space: testing internal and external limitations between US and Danish Arctic interests

ABSTRACT

As a self-governing nation that exercises jurisdiction over most policy areas, Greenland is constantly testing its foreign policy and self-determination action space. Predominantly having aimed at increasing its action space towards Denmark, especially since inaugurating home rule in 1979 and self-government in 2009, Greenland has for the past decade been increasing its engagement as a direct partner to the US. In this paper, I analyse three cases where the Greenland-Denmark-US relations in different ways are delimited and affected by great power relations between the US, China, and Russia. In doing so, I demonstrate how Greenland increasingly uses its action space to affect the outcome of policies and initiatives that lie within the ‘grey zones’ between Greenlandic and Danish power relations. The paper contributes to the understanding of how state-like actors balance their relations in ambiguous ways towards larger states and creates action spaces to determine their own futures. The article argues that Greenland, by balancing the internal and external limitations determined by Greenland’s relations to Denmark and the US, is creating an ambiguous action space, where Greenlandic politicians can and do affect their action options. At the same time, these politicians must acknowledge that Greenland’s action space is constantly evolving against a backdrop of deepening relations between Nuuk and Washington, as well as increasing international tensions. The article is based on an analysis of official documents, media outlets and elite interviews.

KEYWORDS:

• Greenland
• Arctic
• self-determination
• great power competition
• action space

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the Greenland Research Council for funding the research project of which this paper is part. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal Duncan Depledge for their important and substantial feedback and input, and Maria Ackrén and Ulrik Pram Gad for their invaluable supervision throughout the process. Finally, the author wishes to thank Timothy Argetsinger and Jennifer Jul Reenberg for proofreading and providing suggested edits to the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

^1. Gjerstad and Rogers, Knowledge is power: Greenland, great powers, and lessons from the Second World War.

^2. U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.

^3. Sørensen, ”Kina i Arktis: Stormagtsambitioner og indenrigspolitiske prioriteter”; Staun, ”Rusland i Arktis: Fra Arktis som ressourcebase til sikring af suverænitet”: 54.

^4. Waltz, Theory of international politics.

^5. Browning, “Small, smart and salient? Rethinking identity in the small states literature”; see also the discussion by Keohane in ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics”.

^6. Thorhallsson, Steinsson and Kristinsson, “A Theory of Shelter: Iceland’s American Period (1941–2006)”; Brady and Thorhallsson, “Small States and the Turning Point in Global Politics”; Mariager and Wivel, “From Nordic Peacekeeper to NATO Peacemaker: Denmark’s Journey from Semi-neutral to Super Ally”.

^7. Among others, see Archer, “Greenland, US bases and missile defence: new two-level negotiations?”; Gad, National identity politics and postcolonial sovereignty games: Greenland, Denmark, and the European Union; Olesen,”Lightning rod: US, Greenlandic and Danish relations in the shadow of postcolonial reputations”; Jacobsen and Gad, “Setting the scene in Nuuk: Introducing the cast of characters in Greenlandic foreign policy narratives”.

^8. í Jákupsstuvo and Berg, “The Faroe Islands’ security policy in a process of devolution”; Bertelsen, “Science diplomacy and the Arctic” for discussions of micro-states and smallness in the North Atlantic. The term “micro-state” could have been applied in this article, but since the US is so overwhelmingly a great power in relation to Greenland, applying “micro” or “small” would make no difference in this context.

^9. Olsvig, “’Uagununa nunarput’ (‘It’s our country’). Greenland’s aim to move from trilateralism with Denmark and the US, to US–Greenlandic bilateralism”.

^10. As questions about the Kangilinnguit naval base were only briefly touched upon in some of the interviews, that case is mostly analysed through written sources, including government reports delivered to parliament. Two applications to access to documents under the Danish Freedom of Information Act about US-Greenland-Denmark security relations are part of the written documents analysed in this article. Among the written sources, government and parliament documents were prioritised, while also media outlets were secondarily consulted.

^11. Media outlets include Greenlandic, Danish and US media articles where primary sources are interviewed or quoted.

^12. Interviews with 11 current and former government officials, including politicians and diplomats or civil servants, were conducted in the period May 2021 to May 2022. The interviews included two US diplomats, two Danish governments officials, three Danish parliamentarians, one Greenlandic government official and three Greenlandic politicians. To verify the interview data informal talks were conducted with two other Danish government officials, as well as with two additional US government officials, and various Greenlandic government officials and politicians. The interviews mostly evolved around the recent US-Greenland relations (2018–2021). One informal talk with a Greenlandic municipal politician was also conducted to include insights to the Kangilinnguit case seen from a municipal point of view. In conducting elite interviews, I am aware that the interviewees being part of the decision-making powers on different levels, can have biased opinions or a specific agenda. Thus, the empirical data is triangulated throughout the paper by consulting written sources. As some of the interviewees expressed their wish to be anonymous due to the delicate nature of the issues, all interviews are anonymised.

^13. This paper includes cases that took place during some of the years I was an elected official, as I was member of the Danish Parliament from 2011 to 2015, the Parliament of Greenland from 2013 to 2018, and a minister of the Government of Greenland from 2016 to 2018. My knowledge on aspects of the cases analysed is thus also partly informed by these years in politics. I have sought clear and triangulated empirical data for the paper, as mentioned in the above, to ensure a non-biased description of the cases.

^14. Mouritzen, “A hundred years of Danish action space”, “Grænser for handlefrihed: Skandinaviske stater i asymmetrisk bilateralt diplomati”.

^15. Petersen, “Danmark som international aktør 705–2005”.

^16. Mouritzen, “Grænser for handlefrihed”: 9.

^17. Others have done extensive analyses of Greenland’s foreign policy agency through constructivist theories and described Greenland’s agency and ability conduct sovereignty games towards Denmark, which also provides insight to how a state-like actor such as Greenland can claim its existence in IR. See Jacobsen and Gad, ‘Setting the scene in Nuuk: Introducing the cast of characters in Greenlandic foreign policy narratives’; Gad, National identity politics and postcolonial sovereignty games: Greenland, Denmark, and the European Union; Jacobsen, ‘Greenland’s Arctic advantage “; Rahbek-Clemmensen “Denmark and Greenland’s Changing sovereignty and security challenges in the Arctic”; Olsvig and Gad, ”Grønland som udenrigspolitisk aktør’.

^18. Olsvig and Gad, ”Grønland som udenrigspolitisk aktør”: 178.

^19. Mouritzen, “A hundred years of Danish action space”: 115.

^20. Ibid.: 117.

^21. Petersen, ”Danmark som international aktør 705–2005”: 46.

^22. Mouritzen, ”Grænser for handlefrihed: Skandinaviske stater i asymmetrisk bilateralt diplomati”: 11.

^23. Other methods include to conduct parallel actions resembling the actions of others who are like oneself or applying foreign policy lessons from previous successes or failures is, yet another method described by Mouritzen. See Mouritzen, “A hundred years of Danish action space”: 146.

^24. Mouritzen, “Grænser for handlefrihed: Skandinaviske stater i asymmetrisk bilateralt diplomati”: 20–21.

^25. Olsvig and Gad, ”Grønland som udenrigspolitisk aktør”.

^26. In August 2022, the Danish Minister of Defence and the Greenlandic Minister of Foreign Affairs signed a new agreement on Greenlandic involvement in the preparations of the coming defence spending agreements. See Danish Ministry of Defence, Ny aftale mellem Danmark og Grønland om inddragelse af forberedelser til forsvarsforliget.

^27. Olsvig and Gad, Outdated lines of communication undermine legitimacy; Olsvig and Gad, Greenland obviously has its own defence policy.

^28. Gad, “National identity politics and postcolonial sovereignty games: Greenland, Denmark, and the European Union”.

^29. Fisheries is the main business and export of Greenland and has been so for decades.

^30. Rahbek-Clemmensen, “Denmark and Greenland’s Changing sovereignty and security challenges in the Arctic”; Sørensen, “Kina i Arktis: Stormagtsambitioner og indenrigspolitiske prioriteter”; Szymanski, “Wrestling in Greenland. Denmark, the United States and China in the land of ice”.

^31. For example, through the Igaliku-Agreement. See US Department of State, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland.

^32. Government of the United States of America, Government of Denmark, Government of Greenland, Memorandum of Understanding concerning use of Sondrestrom aviation facility. Interviews with Danish government officials conducted May 15 and 18, 2021, confirm that the dialogue between Greenland, Denmark and the US has been continuous since 1991, but that there has been a pause in the meetings in the Permanent Committee from 2014 to 2018. The interviewees confirm that the US needs for domain awareness and military presence are well known by the governments of Greenland and Denmark.

^33. Kristiansen, ”Grønland får snart en repræsentant i Washington”.

^34. Olsvig, “’Uagununa nunarput’ (It’s our country)”.

^35. Forsby, “America First”: Denmark’s Strategic Navigation in the Era of US-Chinese Rivalry”; Berthelsen, “Science diplomacy and the Arctic”; Jiang, “Danmarks politik i forhold til kinesiske investeringer”; Sørensen, “Kina i Arktis: Stormagtsambitioner og indenrigspolitiske prioriteter”.

^36. During the years of debate, numerous parliamentary questions were asked from both the Danish parliament and the parliament of Greenland, focusing on the environmental aspects of abandoning, and cleaning up the site. See for example Danish Ministry of Defence ”GRU Alm. del – endeligt svar på spørgsmål 47 Status – Miljøoprydning Grønnedal. Local politicians were also preoccupied with future use of the site as well as the benefits that citizens of Arsuk had had from the military presence, such as transport and health care support. Information from informal talk with former municipal politician, 9 June 2022.

^37. Ivittuut had been a small mining town, going all the way back to the mid 1800ʹs, and was a significant provider of cryolite to the US production of aluminium during the WWII, and thus has a long history of being a significant site for both the US, Denmark, and Greenland.

^38. Kaasgaard, ”DF vil sende flygtninge til Grønland”, Altinget, 16 September 2015.

^39. Sørensen, “Chinese investments in Greenland”: 92.

^40. Government of Greenland, Transportkommissionen – Betænkning.

^41. Bislev, Gad and Zeuthen, “China seeking Arctic Resources – The Arctic seeking resources in China”; Sejersen, “Infrastructural (re)configurations and processes of (de)securitization”.

^42. Bertelsen “Science diplomacy and the Arctic” 2020; Matzen, “Denmark spurned Chinese offer for Greenland base over security: sources”, Reuters, 6 April 2017; Matzen and Daly, “Greenland’s courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark”, Reuters, 22 March 2018; Danish Radio, ”USA advarer Claus Hjort om kinesisk entreprenør på Grønland”, Ritzau via dr.dk, 25 May 2018;, Hinshaw and Page, “How the Pentagon Countered China’s Designs on Greenland; Washington Urged Denmark to Finance Airports that Chinese Aimed to Build on North America’s Doorstep”, Wall Street Journal (Online), 10 February 2019.

^43. Rambøll, Fem scenarier vedrørende Kangerlussuaq lufthavns fremtid.

^44. Jacobsen and Olsvig, “From Peary to Pompeo”; Government of Denmark and Government of Greenland, Aftale mellem regeringen og Naalakkersuisut; Sejersen, “Infrastructural (re)configurations and processes of (de)securitization”.

^45. U.S. Department of Defence, Statement of Intent on Defence Investments in Greenland.

^46. Lihn, ”Partii Naleraq har forladt koalitionen”´, Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation, 9 September 2018.

^47. Danish Ministry of Defence, Politisk aftale om Arktisk Kapacitetspakke til 1,5 mia. kroner.

^48. Government of Denmark, Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2022: 20–21.

^49. Kristiansen, ”Politikere: Inatsisartut har ikke set forsvarsaftale”, Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation, 11 February 2021. Faroese parliamentarians issued a similar statement, see Joensen,”Færøerne kritiserer udmelding om radar”, Sermitsiaq.AG, 12 February 2021.

^50. This disappointment was reiterated at interviews with three Greenlandic politicians conducted June 16, 6 December 2022, 2021, and 17 February 2022.

^51. Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om en Arktis-Kapacitetspakke. Own translation.

^52. While Greenlandic politicians criticized the plans for a defence education, Faroese politicians were critical towards a planned radar in Faroe Islands, an issue that had been considered controversial in Faroese politics before. See í Jákupsstuvo and Justinussen, ”Grænser for færøsk paradiplomati?”.

^53. Veirum, ”Pele undsiger dansk milliard-aftale”. Sermitsiaq.AG, 7 June 2021; Filtenborg, ”Nej tak til øget dansk militær indsats i Grønland, siger udenrigsminister”, TV2.dk 6 June 2021.

^54. Danish Ministry of Defence, Enighed om principperne for Arktis Kapacitetspakke i Grønland.

^55. In the agreement text, direct reference was made to Denmark’s aim to meet the NATO wishes of furthering surveillance initiatives, and it was made clear, that Denmark saw it as crucial, that the systems acquired would contribute to NATOs strength targets, see Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om en Arktis-Kapacitetspakke.

^56. Sørensen, ”Medie: Løkke frygtede Kina og USA i Grønland på samme tid”, Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation, 24 April 2017.

^57. Mouritzen, “Grænser for handlefrihed”: 22.

^58. Olsvig, ”’Uagununa nunarput’ (It’s our country)”.

^59. The question of joint infrastructure investments and following up on the Statement of Intent was on the agenda in the following meetings of the Permanent Committee, access to documents in case number 2021–18,171/6,912,714.

^60. U.S. Department of Defence, Statement of Intent on Defence Investments in Greenland.

^61. Rambøll, Fem scenarier vedrørende Kangerlussuaq lufthavns fremtid.

^62. Sejersen, ‘Infrastructural (re)configurations and processes of (de)securitization’.

^63. Interviews conducted with US diplomats 26 May 2021, and 11 June 2021, confirm, that the US was very determined to show respect of Greenland’s own decision-making processes and did not want to stir up the waters more than necessary.

^64. Government of the United States of America, Government of Denmark, Government of Greenland, Memorandum of Understanding concerning use of Sondrestrom aviation facility.

^65. The open access parliamentary questions sent to the Government of Greenland in 2018 count 20 rounds of multiple questions related to the airport projects, the model of financing, the Danish loans and co-ownership and other aspects related to the projects asked by seven different politicians from six different parties (data from Inatsisartut’s website).

^66. Interview with Greenlandic politician, 16 June 2021.

^67. In the case of the airport package, Greenland set out with a high ambition of involving foreign investments through an open tender, while both the internal limitations were high due to domestic quarrels, and the external limitations by not being aligned with Danish and US interest, were high.

^68. Kjærgaard, ”Dansk Militær Opbygning i Grønland Og Fastholdelse Af Arktisk Lavspænding”; Sands, The US View on the Arctic.

^69. Pincus, “Three-way power dynamics in the Arctic”.

^70. Olsvig and Gad, Greenland obviously has its own defence policy.

^71. Interview with Greenlandic politicians on 6 December 2021.

^72. Mouritzen, ”Grænser for handlefrihed”: 23.

^73. Andersen, ”Pele Broberg foreslår islandsk model”, Sermitsiaq.AG 21 May 2021.

^74. Filtenborg, ”Nej tak til øget dansk militær indsats i Grønland, siger udenrigsminister”, TV2.dk 6 June 2021.

^75. Interview with Danish government official conducted 18 May 2021, confirms that the Danes were clear on what the US expectations were towards Denmark living up to its responsibilities in ensuring domain awareness and solving military tasks in Greenland.

^76. Mouritzen, “A hundred years of Danish action space”: 115.

^77. Petersen, ”Danmark som international aktør 705–2005”: 47.

^78. Mouritzen, ”Grænser for handlefrihed”: 23. Own translation.

^79. Olsvig, “’Uagununa nunarput’ (‘It’s our country’)”.

^80. At a 15 June 2022, event at the Wilson Center in the US, the Premier of Greenland strongly highlighted Greenland’s wish to engage further with the US, indicating ongoing negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between Greenland and the US. At the event, government officials from the US State Department and Greenland’s Ministry of Mineral Resources highlighted the vast opportunities to cooperate further on mineral resource exploration and development, see Wilson Center, Trade, Minerals, and the Green Transition in Greenland: A Conversation with Prime Minister Múte B. Egede. 15 June 2022.

^81. The very clear alignment is a recent development especially made clear to the public after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Greenland’s engagement in Western sanctions against Russia. Earlier, an alignment with the West has not been as clear. See Gad et al., “Imagining China on Greenland’s road to independence”.

^82. Mouritzen, “Denmark’s super Atlanticism”.

^83. Mouritzen, “A hundred years of Danish action space”: 117.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Greenland Research Council through a grant from the Government of Greenland’s funds for research education.