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ABSTRACT
Since the crisis over Ukraine erupted, relations between Russia and the EU have been characterised by the coexistence of competition and cooperation. How can we explain this ambiguity? First, a distinction is made between the multi-actor structure of low politics versus polarised discursive positions in high politics. Construal-Level Theory is invoked to explain how low politics is characterised by concrete images, while high politics is characterised by abstract, ideologised images. Second, the article considers the interaction between both levels and argues that the contagion from more cooperative low level practices to the defrosting of EU-Russia relations is unlikely.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributor
Dr Tom Casier is Jean Monnet Chair and Reader in International Relations at the University of Kent’s “Brussels School of International Studies” (BSIS). He led BSIS as Academic Director from 2014 to 2017 and is currently Director of the Global Europe Centre. He was also Visiting Professor at KU Leuven. Tom Casier’s research focuses mainly on Russian foreign policy and EU–Russia relations, with a particular interest in power and identity. An edited volume (with Joan DeBardeleben) entitled EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions was published with Routledge in 2018. Recent articles have appeared in Cooperation and Conflict, Geopolitics, International Politics, Contemporary Politics, Europe-Asia Studies and others. He has provided policy advice for different institutions and organisations, including the European Parliament, House of Lords and the US State Department.
Notes
1 The cooperation in these four common spaces was translated into Roadmaps, agreed in Moscow in 2005 (Roadmaps Citation2005).
2 Russia’s global trade in goods dropped in 2015 by 19.7% (DG Trade Citation2018).
3 Some authors have argued that domestic politics matter considerably for the issue position of leaders (Putnam Citation1988), a factor which is often related to the distribution of costs and benefits over domestic actors (Milner and Tingley Citation2015, 14).
4 The same holds for student mobility and collaborative research projects: they result from a multitude of decisions by individual students and academics and, as such, do not imply high political decisions.
5 For a more extended argumentation about low psychological distance in energy relations between Russia and the EU, see Casier (Citation2016b).
6 Despite this negative evaluation, Forsberg notes that interdependence “can be regarded as a factor that has prevented the parties from further escalating their confrontation” (Forsberg Citation2019).
7 Scholars themselves differ over what exactly Moscow defines as its vital interests and analysts have variously emphasised geopolitical control, power distribution, status or regime survival (see among many others: Götz Citation2015; Mearsheimer Citation2014; Forsberg Citation2014; White Citation2018).
8 Rathbun argues that uncertainty is central to all traditions in International Relations theory, but is understood differently across them (Rathbun Citation2007).
9 On sanctions between the EU and Russia, see inter alia Romanova (Citation2016).
10 Note that this also contrasts with the gas spats of 2006 and 2009 when the disruption of Russian gas supplies to some member states sent shock waves through the EU and became seen as an issue of high politics.
11 In terms of the effects of an increased presence of US LNG on the EU energy market, it has been argued that the increasing American share is unlikely to outcompete Russia, but rather to make the European gas market more competitive and flexible (Mitrova and Boersma Citation2018).
12 Geopolitical motives need to be distinguished from the geopolitical “wrapping”, i.e. the use of geopolitical and security arguments to gain commercial benefit, as described in this article. As to the former, it has been argued that Russia has the geopolitical objective with Nord Stream 2 to bypass Ukraine. In the case of Southern routes, both the EU (with the Southern Gas Corridor) and Russia (with Turkstream) had geopolitical objectives (Siddi Citation2019).
13 A similar statement was made before the Ukraine crisis in Casier (Citation2012).