The grassroots of Putin’s ideology: civil origins of an uncivil regime

ABSTRACT

This article attempts to explore three illiberal discursive practices (metaphysical state, right post-colonialism, and Orthodox pan-Slavism) that structure Putin's ideological course and help to understand why justifications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine sound logical in Russian discourse. It argues that throughout the 1990s illiberal grassroots organizations popularized these discursive practices of the Soviet right-wing intelligentsia, engaged large masses in their projects, recruited members of Putin's elites as followers, and were partially absorbed by the administration. My interviews with the representatives of the illiberal civic movement and Putin’s administration indicate that grassroots organizations successfully delivered their ideological modus operandi to the post-Yeltsin ruling class. Hence, an acute resemblance of the illiberal grassroots movement’s discursive practices with those of the Kremlin is hardly likely to be accidental. Putin and his allies engaged with this preexisting illiberal civil society and ultimately drew on its ideas and tapped into its networks for support.

KEYWORDS:

• Illiberalism
• propaganda
• Russian Federation
• political culture
• ideology
• civil society

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Institute of self-governance in the Russian Empire, 1864–1919.

2 Stroev is mistakenly illustrated as a Gorbachev reformist, strongest “red belt” communist governor, and Yeltsin’s ally after his 1996 designation to the Chairman of the Upper Chamber. I argue that he was a devoted Russian traditionalist.

3 The term “symphony” is an Eastern Orthodox theological concept that postulates accord between the church and state, presuming their equality and complementarity.

4 Namely Buvalko, Zelikov, Selivestrov, and Dubentsov (Rezul’taty vyborov 1997).

5 In his first term, Putin carefully approached the state nationalism narrative as obscherossiiskii patriotizm (all-Russia patriotism] and later evolved it into a slogan of state nationalism as the national idea (Putin 2003; TASS 2016).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by American University [grant number Graduate Research Award, Janet Oppenheim Award].

Notes on contributors

Ivan Grek

Ivan Grek, PhD, specializes in illiberal grassroots movements in Russia. Dr. Grek is a deputy director of The Russia Program at George Washington University.