Governing digital circulation: the quest for data control and sovereignty in Germany

ABSTRACT

How is the circulation of digital data to be governed? This question is the subject of often conflicting political rationalities. Focusing on internet and data politics in Germany, we identify fundamental problematizations in governing data circulation on the basis of a mixed-methods analysis of the public–political discussion. In doing so, we elaborate the genealogy of a tension between two political rationalities. On the one hand, there are the political rationalities of a global information society since the 1990s. These have propelled the free circulation of data across national borders and Germany’s integration into an international and competitive telecommunications and information technology market. In these rationalities, state intervention in the circulation of data is seen as a dangerous obstacle to economic competitiveness and social prosperity. On the other hand, there are the political rationalities of a digitally sovereign statehood since the early 2010s. These consider state intervention in data circulation as a guarantor of economic prosperity, democracy and the ability to govern. We argue that prominent political technologies of territorial regulation of data circulation currently discussed and experimented within Germany can be interpreted as attempts to harmonize this field of tension.

KEYWORDS:

• Germany
• territory
• digital sovereignty
• data politics
• digital circulation
• data flows

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/690536/EPRS_IDA(2021)690536_EN.pdf/.

2 See https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/trans-atlantic/ellalink/.

3 All translations of German citations within this paper are by the authors.

4 See https://www.internethalloffame.org/brief-history-internet/.

5 The first website in Germany was probably hosted at the Research Centre Electron Synchrotron in Hamburg in 1992; cf. https://blog.hnf.de/so-kam-das-web-nach-deutschland/.

6 Cf. https://www.zeit.de/online/2008/41/telekom-datenklau/.

7 Cf. https://netzpolitik.org/2009/datenleck-bei-schuelervz-war-groesser-als-bekannt/.

8 Cf. https://rp-online.de/digitales/internet/chronik-der-datenskandale/.

9 Hans-Peter Uhl, quoted in Amman et al. (2014).

10 See https://www.telekom.com/de/verantwortung/datenschutz-und-datensicherheit/archiv-datenschutznews/news/sicherheit-telekom-verstaerkt-praesenz-am-internetknoten-de-cix-349806/.

11 See https://www.telekom.com/de/verantwortung/datenschutz-und-datensicherheit/archiv-datenschutznews/news/sicherheit-telekom-verstaerkt-praesenz-am-internetknoten-de-cix-349806/.

12 Cf. https://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2013-11/schlandnet-telekom-nsa-internet; https://netzpolitik.org/2013/schengen-routing-de-cix-und-die-bedenken-der-balkanisierung-des-internets/.

13 Cf. https://media.ccc.de/v/30C3_-_5210_-_de_-_saal_g_-_201312282030_-_bullshit_made_in_germany_-_linus_neumann#t=3124/.

14 See https://netzpolitik.org/2015/telekom-am-internetknoten-de-cix-es-gibt-keine-aenderung-der-peering-policy-man-fuehrt-die-netzgemeinde-vor/.

15 Since the late 2000s, military policy debates on ‘cyber security’ and ‘cyber defence’ can also been observed in the public discourses in Germany. Initially, however, these are hardly linked to the concepts of ‘digital sovereignty’ or ‘technological sovereignty’. It is only in the late 2010s and early 2020s that evidence can be found that establishes relationships between discourses on ‘digital sovereignty’ and the discourses on ‘cyber defence’ in relation to the Bundeswehr; e.g. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/140246/1e0dc3929c81cb5db1d6d8fc8249346f/vertrauenswuerdige-it-element-der-digitalen-souveraenitaet-data.pdf; and https://www.bitkom.org/sites/main/files/2021-05/bitkom_positionspapier-smarte-bundeswehr.pdf.