Migrating beyond networks: the mechanisms of sending state intervention

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the mechanisms through which sending state policies intervene in labor migration flows. Relying primarily on data from the Philippine state’s system of overseas contract migration, this article compares the main modalities of sending state intervention with those identified by the dominant theories of migration causation – social capital/migrant networks theory, which posits that the linkages between sending and receiving countries facilitate migration flows. Sending state policiesmimic or complement the two main mechanisms of migration facilitation: risk/cost mitigation and the initiation of contacts. They offer more formalized variations of the information distribution and material support that occurs through migrant networks, and serve as a useful, and sometimes necessary, counterpart to receiving states that are seeking to solve labor market challenges or to exert more control over existing migration flows. Finally, sending state can go beyond existing linkages through the explicit targeting of particular markets and the development of domestic human capital.

KEYWORDS:

• Labor migration
• migration theory
• sending states
• Philippines

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. ‘With the right policy choices, sending countries can reap the economic benefits of out-migration while protecting their citizens who choose to migrate for work.’ Sudhir Shetty, World Bank Chief Economist for the East Asia and Pacific region (quoted in World Bank, 2017).

2. This essential logic applies very broadly to many different types of migrations, voluntary or forced, economic or political. While I acknowledge the recent critiques of the analytical separation between these types of migration (see, e.g. Erdal & Oeppen, 2018) for the purposes of this paper, which aims to address the ways in which sending states intervene in international flows of labor, I will limit my focus to policies that treat migration as economically motivated and more or less free from non-economic coercion. As a result, this analysis will exclude those state acts – such as political persecution or expulsion – that can produce large flows of migrants, many of whom end up constituting an immigrant labor force in their countries of destination, but who are legally classified as refugees or asylees, rather than immigrant or migrant labor.

3. While this article will focus on the risk mitigation impact of the Philippine state’s information campaigns, these campaigns also obviously buttress the demonstration effect of migrant networks.

4. The POEA, which operates as a sub-agency of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), is a nodal agency in the Philippine state’s labor migration policy. The POEA’s remit is very broad, covering every aspect of labor migration governance, from administration and documentation of labor migrants (Overseas Filipino Workers or OFWs in the state’s lexicon), regulating and monitoring recruiting agencies, to the marketing OFWs to foreign governments and employers.

5. It should also be noted that POEA programs often target youth and people who have yet to enter the labor market – in addition to the PEOSs, which often operate through university career fairs, the primary and secondary school curricula also include topics on migration (Siddiqui et al., 2008). While this paper has largely tabled the question of the Philippine state’s participation in the country’s ‘culture of migration,’ the targeting of youth in its information programs, as well as the POEA’s participation in a media environment saturated with references to migration suggests that the state’s role here is not insignificant.

6. Some of these services, such as shelter, are provided to all Filipino/as living abroad. Others, such as the catastrophic medical assistance or financial assistance to families, are provided exclusively to OFWs who have paid the US$25 fee for membership in OWWA.

7. Illegal recruitment is also prosecuted under the criminal law, with penalties that include imprisonment – from one year to life – and fees that range from 1 to 5 million pesos, depending on the gravity of the violation (Republic Act 10,022).

8. In 2014, approximately 0.5% of land-based OFWs, or 8234 migrants, were deployed through the GPB (POEA 2015).

9. Former POEA official.

10. Between 1995 and 2010, OFWs going to Taiwan represented 13 percent of yearly new hires (POEA Statistics, Deployment per Country per Skill per Sex 1993–2010).

11. In 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte include TESDA a reorganization of a number of agencies whose work was related to poverty and development. These agencies were moved under the immediate supervision of the Cabinet Secretary, who reports directly to the President (Executive Order No. 1, s. 2016).

12. TESDA’s main website provides quick-links to certification programs to only three categories of job-training programs: overseas performing artists, household services, and maritime work (at http://www.tesda.gov.ph/default.asp). The emphasis on performance artists and domestic workers persist alongside and despite recent programs that categorize these jobs as particularly vulnerable to employer abuse.

13. A note on English. The English-language proficiency of the Philippine population is often cited as an explanation for the country’s high rates of labor migration. This comparative advantage, however, cannot be separated from state policy, because English is not a language that is spoken in the home except among the elite and professional classes. Filipino/a workers entering low-skilled professions like domestic labor or construction acquire English primarily through the education system, education system which is unique in its promotion of bilingualism through English-immersion, beginning in secondary school. Even other sending countries with significant colonial histories from English-speaking countries, such as Pakistan or India, do not offer English-only public education as a national policy.

14. In 2013, remittances were at $25.1 billion, bringing in more revenue than the top export industry, electronics, which had revenues of $23.9 billion. (Philippine Statistics Authority, National Statistics Office, ‘Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines: 2013,’ (30 June 2014)) And it is not an outlier in this respect: nearly 50 other countries in the world received remittances equal to or higher than 5% of their GDPs. (World Bank. Migrant Remittance Inflows 1970–2014).

Additional information

Funding

This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under Grant #1435946.

Notes on contributors

Suzy Lee

Dr. Suzy Lee is an assistant professor in the Department of Human Development, at Binghamton University, New York. She is also the program director for the M.S. in Human Rights.  She obtained a PhD in sociology from New York University and JD from Harvard Law School.