4 Middle East and North Africa

Abstract

Key trends

• Conflicts in the Middle East remain highly regionalised and internationalised; rivalries among external powers play out across the region.

• The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) liberated the last ISIS-held territory in Syria. ISIS adapted by resorting to insurgency tactics, in both Syria and Iraq.

• Iraq’s post-ISIS stabilisation is tentative. By 2019, a large protest movement upended Iraqi politics, while US–Iran tensions also played out in the Iraqi arena.

• In Libya, a new, more brutal phase of civil war began, with more direct involvement of regional rivals.

• Egypt contended with regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula although the insurgency began to lose its strength.

• Israeli dominance and unilateralism shaped the trajectory of the Israel–Palestine conflict.

Strategic implications

• Syria is likely to remain an exporter of instability in the foreseeable future and to continue drawing external interference.

• Turkey’s intervention in Syria isolated the country from its regional interlocutors and NATO allies. Russia attempted to fill the diplomatic vacuum created by

  the sudden withdrawal of US forces from northern Syria.

• The influence of pro-Iranian militias, the weakness of the central government and US–Iran tensions put the stability of Iraq at risk.

• Many global powers see the conflict in Libya as an opportunity to expand their strategic influence in the Mediterranean.

• The Saudi-led coalition came under greater scrutiny in 2019, from the US and UK in particular.

• President Trump’s pro-Israeli policies alienated Palestinians and undermined the United States’ role as negotiator.

Prospects

• While a comprehensive and inclusive political settlement in Syria remains elusive, a new insurgency is brewing in southern Syria. The resurgence of ISIS is already under way.

• A lull in hostilities in northern Syria is possible, but prospects for peace are non-existent in the short term. Turkish forces in Syrian areas are creating tensions with local communities and fuel low-intensity conflict.

• A return to large-scale territorial control by ISIS is unlikely, but without adequate counter-insurgency efforts, Iraq will struggle to eliminate remaining militants.

• The Saudi-led coalition’s declining appetite for war in Yemen suggests a potential peace settlement more expansive than the Stockholm Agreement envisaged.

• Increased fragmentation in Libya raises concerns over a possible partition. Proxy wars are unlikely to end soon.

Notes

1 The nationwide state of emergency was invoked in 2014. Despite the 2014 Constitution essentially making a state of emergency renewable only once, and lasting a full period of six months, Sisi has kept the country under a full state of emergency by merely allowing it to lapse for a day, and then ordering parliament to approve a new state of emergency. In addition, he has also amended the State of Emergency Law to allow for strengthened powers to be devolved from institutions to the presidency, notably the nomination of courts and judges. Currently the State Security Supreme Courts oversee most criminal cases in Egypt, of which the judges are directly appointed by the president and his delegated authority. These courts have historically overseen foreign-espionage cases, in periods where the country is not under a state of emergency.

2 Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was the name initially given as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s replacement. It emerged in January 2020 that this was a nom de guerre and the ISIS leader’s name is Amir Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi.

3 Generally, Bedouins in the Sinai region have been deemed second-class citizens and find it difficult to access the mainland. This has led to many not holding Egyptian national identification, marginalised employment opportunities and minimal state investment or development in the region. Generally, levels of poverty and illiteracy remain much higher in the Sinai Peninsula (particularly North Sinai, with the south of the peninsula reaping rewards from the tourism industry) than anywhere else in the country.

4 The percentage of Egyptians living in extreme poverty rose to 32.5% in 2018, according to official data from the state-owned Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAMPAS), an increase of almost 5% since 2015. Egypt sets the poverty line higher than the World Bank (US$1.9/day), at US$1.3/day. See ‘32.5% of Egyptians live in extreme poverty: CAPMAS’, Egypt Today, 1 August 2019. Although figures are not available for each province, and Sinai in particular, it is believed the Bedouins are much poorer than Egyptians in the mainland. Recent announcements in 2019 included an ambitious US$315m development plan for the Sinai Peninsula, an increase of 75% on investment levels for 2018. No real data is available for prior years, particularly under the Mubarak regime, but investment is believed to be minimal.

5 ‘Skepticism looms over Egypt’s plan to develop Sinai’, Al-Monitor, 1 September 2019; Egypt Maritime Transport Sector, ‘Arish Port Development Plan’ (official site).

6 This number is contested by most independent observers including media and diplomatic missions who monitored the vote. In addition, complaints of interference in the process were rife. Diplomats reported that they were denied access to polling stations, that no texts of the amendments were available at polling stations, that the state deliberately misled voters, and that the offer of ‘Ramadan boxes’ was used for vote-buying.

7 See UN News, ‘Egypt: “Credible evidence” that “brutal” prison conditions prompted Morsi’s death, thousands more at risk’, 8 November 2019.

8 As the port-development plan continues, the Al Sokhna trading port in the mainland is a significant part of this project, and a significant element of Sisi’s broader Red Sea security policy. Currently, DP World has new contracts to complete a second container terminal at Sokhna by March 2020. Other contractors include China Harbour Engineering Company, which is constructing the pier and the refining works. Rawad Engineering Company has been brought in to undertake infrastructure works, which are due to be completed in March 2020. The Arish Port is owned by the Ministry of Defence, under the naval forces. The total cost of the development is estimated at EGP1.2bn (US$76.5m); see ECO Group, ‘El-Arish Port Master Plan’, 2020. The General Authority for the Suez Canal Economic Zone (led by a military general) is expected to finance and implement the development, management and operation of the port. See Menna A. Farouk, ‘Sisi transfers control of northern Sinai port to army for security reasons’, Al-Monitor, 24 July 2019.

9 Tacitly admitting that there has been significant displacement, a claim the military and presidency have yet to officially deny.

1 Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters’, 16 December 2019.

2 US Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, ‘Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress’, 1 April 2019–30 June 2019.

3 The name initially given as Baghdadi’s replacement was Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. It emerged in January 2020 that this was a nom de guerre.

4 World Bank Group, ‘Iraq Economic Monitor: From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery’, Spring 2018.

5 Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: State Appears Complicit in Massacre of Protesters’.

6 ‘Islamic State attack kills two security forces near northern Iraqi oilfields’, Reuters, 21 October 2019.

7 Loaa Adel, ‘4 paramilitary fighters injured by ISIS attack on Khanaqin’, Iraqi News, 13 April 2019.

8 ‘ISIS claims blast that killed 12 near Iraq’s Karbala’, National, 22 September 2019.

9 ‘Death toll rises in Baghdad protests, military declares curfew in Iraqi capital’, France24, 28 October 2019.

10 United Nations Security Council, ‘Implementation of Resolution 2470 (2019) – Report of the Secretary-General’, 5 August 2019.

11 United Nations Security Council, ‘Implementation of Resolution 2470 (2019) – Report of the Secretary-General’, 22 November 2019.

12 ‘Solving Iraq’s electricity crisis’, Castlereagh Associates, 30 May 2019.

13 Human Rights Watch, ‘Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis’, 22 July 2019.

14 World Bank, ‘Iraq’s Economic Update – October 2019’, 9 October 2019.

15 World Bank, ‘GDP per capita growth (annual %) – Iraq’.

16 Iraqi officials have avoided referring to themselves as mediators, rather, as Abdul-Mahdi stated, they are ‘trying to defuse the crisis’. Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Iraqi PM says he want to end tensions between Iran and US’, Associated Press, 21 May 2019.

1 ‘Security forces make deadly use of crowd control weapons in Gaza’, B’Tselem, 6 August 2019.

2 Jeremy Diamond and Elise Labott, ‘Secretary of State John Kerry: Two-state solution in “serious jeopardy”’, CNN, 28 December 2016. See also Harriet Sherwood, ‘Kerry: Two Years Left to Reach Two-State Solution in Middle East Peace Process’, Guardian, 13 April 2013.

3 This MOU replaced a previous $30bn ten-year agreement, which ran through FY2018. Congressional Research Service, ‘U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel’, 7 August 2019, p. 5.

4 Anna Ahronheim, ‘Iran increases Hamas funding in exchange for intel on Israel missiles’, Jerusalem Post, 8 August 2019.

5 Shlomi Eldar, ‘Behind Egypt’s gift to Islamic Jihad’, Al-Monitor, 21 October 2019.

6 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 2017, p. 9.

7 Orhan Niksic, Nur Nasser Eddin and Massimiliano Cali, ‘Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy’, World Bank, 17 July 2014, p. 5.

8 World Bank, ‘The World Bank in West Bank and Gaza’, 1 October 2019.

9 ‘Forced Unemployment’, B’Tselem, 6 June 2019.

10 Peace Now, ‘New 2018 Population Data for Israelis in the West Bank’, 2 October 2019; Peace Now, ‘Settlements Data: Jerusalem’, 2019.

11 Peace Now, ‘2,304 Settlement Units Promoted, 3 Outposts Regularized’, 4 August 2019.

12 ‘Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem)’, B’Tselem, 4 November 2019.

13 Twenty-five owners demolished their own homes after receiving demolition orders. ‘Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in East Jerusalem’, B’Tselem, 24 October 2019. See also Peace Now, ‘Jerusalem Municipal Data Reveals Stark Israeli–Palestinian Discrepancy in Construction Permits in Jerusalem’, 12 September 2019.

14 ‘Poll: More than 60% of Palestinians want Abbas to quit’, Middle East Monitor, 18 September 2019.

15 UN, ‘Accountability Needed to End Excessive Use of Force Against Palestinian Protesters in Gaza, Says Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the OPT’, 5 March 2019.

16 Almog Ben Zikri et al., ‘Palestinian Report: Israel and Hamas Reach Cease-fire; Israeli Army Lifts Restrictions’, Haaretz, 6 May 2019.

17 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Casualties’, https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/casualties.

18 Loveday Morris and Ruth Eglash, ‘Attacks by Israeli settlers surge as West Bank tensions boil’, Washington Post, 6 March 2019.

19 UN, ‘Gaza blockade causes “near ten-fold increase” in food dependency, says UN agency’, 13 May 2019.

20 Grace Wermenbol, ‘Netanyahu’s fifth term: The end of the two-state solution’, Atlantic Council, 15 April 2019.

1 ‘Proxies battle over Tripoli’, Africa Confidential, vol. 60, no. 16, 9 August 2019.

2 Emaddin Badi, ‘General Hifter’s southern strategy and the repercussions of the Fezzan campaign’, Middle East Institute, 7 March 2019.

3 Carla Babb, ‘VOA Interview with US AFRICOM Spokesman’, Voice of America, 25 October 2019.

4 ‘Libya’s unhealthy focus on personalities’, International Crisis Group, Briefing no. 57, 8 May 2018.

5 Jared Malsin and Summer Said, ‘Saudi Arabia promised support to Libyan warlord in push to seize Tripoli’, Wall Street Journal, 12 April 2019.

6 In September, news of seven UAE soldiers killed abroad – hours after an airstrike launched by the LAF against the Jufra air base – suggested the broader involvement of the UAE in the Libyan conflict. See ‘Yemen or Libya? Six Emirati soldiers “mysteriously” die in action’, New Arab, 15 September

2019.

7 P3: France, the UK and the US, three permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with direct interest in the Libyan crisis. The other three members of the group are Egypt, Italy and the UAE.

8 The victims were representatives of conflict parties engaged in negotiations for a ceasefire. The conflict in Murzuq between the SPF and the LNA-affiliated al-Ahli tribe had resumed in the summer, prompting the intervention of the LNA and, allegedly, of UAE UAVs.

9 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Press Briefing on Libya’, 20 December 2019.

10 Patrick Wintour, ‘Libya peace talks to go ahead in Berlin despite ceasefire setback’, Guardian, 14 January 2019; Leela Jacinto, ‘Can Europe, caught scrapping or napping, mend its credibility at Berlin talks on Libya?’, France 24, 18 January 2020.

11 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Displacement Tracking Matrix, ‘Tripoli Update’, 9 January 2020.

12 UNHCR, Operational Portal: Refugee Situations: Libya.

13 The vulnerability of the water supply system was also highlighted by the Man-Made River Authority in an annual report published in May, in which it said that it had suffered 106 attacks in 2018. Forty-two of the attacks (40% of the total number) were reported on the Hasawna–Jafara system, followed by the Ghadames–Zuwara–Zawiya system with 36 attacks. See Safa al-Haraty, ‘MMRA annual reports reveals more than 100 attacks on the water system during 2018’, Libya Observer, 13 May 2019.

14 In July, UNSMIL reported more than 38 attacks against health facilities and medical personnel, resulting in 11 deaths and more than 33 injuries.

15 The breakaway faction of the HoR also elected its speaker, Sadiq el-Kehili.

16 It also suggested strict coordination between the LNA and France, wary of the potential destabilisation of one of its allies in the Sahel.

17 As occurred to Gen. Abdulsalam al-Hassi, commander of the LNA’s Tripoli Operations Room, following the defeat in Gharyan in June.

18 During a meeting of the UN General Assembly, the AU reportedly asked for Salamé to be replaced, calling for the establishment of a joint UN–AU Special Representative to Libya. The appointment of an African envoy would have represented a diplomatic victory for the AU, which frequently complains of having been excluded from peace talks in Libya.

1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’, 30 January 2020; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (Syria), March 2019.

2 Soleimani was killed in January 2020 and was succeeded by Esmail Qaani.

3 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, ‘Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–2019)’, 25 June 2019.

4 US Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, ‘Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress’, 1 April 2019–30 June 2019.

5 ‘President al-Assad’s interview given to al-Sourya and al-Ikhbarya TVs’, SANA, 31 October 2019.

6 Syrian Network for Human Rights, ‘At Least 98,000 Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Syria Since March 2011’, 30 August 2019.

7 UN, ‘Describing Vast Scale of Need, Humanitarian Official Urges Security Council to Renew Authorization for Lifesaving Cross-Border Aid Delivery in Syria’, 19 December 2019.

8 UN News, ‘Syria: Civilians face “daily nightmare” in Idlib, says top UN official’, 7 January 2020.

9 World Food Programme, ‘WFP Syria Situation Report #12’, December 2019.

10 World Health Organization, ‘WHO Health Emergencies: Seven years of suffering: Syria facts and figures’, 2020.

11 UNHCR, ‘Syria: UNHCR Operational Update, January–July 2019’, 31 July 2019.

12 UNICEF, ‘Syria Crisis Fast Facts’, August 2019.

13 Nabih Bulos, ‘U.S. punishes Syria with sanctions – but allies like Jordan also pay a price’, Los Angeles Times, 10 September 2019.

14 US Embassy in Syria, ‘Passage of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019’, 20 December 2019.

1 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, ‘Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–2019)’, 25 June 2019.

2 ‘Trump authorises sanctions, slaps steel tariffs on Turkey’, France 24, 15 October 2019.

3 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Syrian Arab Republic: North East Syria displacement’, 18 December 2019.

4 OCHA, ‘OCHA Syria Flash update #9: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria’, 21–24 October 2019.

1 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Yemen’, 18 July 2019.

2 Dhia Muhsin, ‘Houthi use of drones delivers potent message in Yemen War’, IISS Blogs & Podcasts, 27 August 2019.

3 Andrew England and Simeon Kerr, ‘Riyadh holds talks with Houthis in effort to break Yemen deadlock’, Financial Times, 11 October 2019.

4 ‘US, Israel behind Yemen terrorist attacks: Houthi leader’, PressTV, 22 March 2015.

5 Shawn Snow, ‘US MQ-9 drone shot down in Yemen’, Defense News, 2 October 2017.

6 ‘Iran’s Khamenei backs Yemen’s Houthi movement, calls for dialogue’, Reuters, 13 August 2019.

7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Yemen: 290 detainees released with facilitation of the ICRC’, 30 September 2019.

8 ICRC, ‘128 detainees repatriated to Yemen from Saudi Arabia’, 28 November 2019.

9 ‘Yemen’s Houthis unilaterally release hundreds of detainees’, Reuters, 30 September 2019.

10 Simeon Kerr, ‘Yemen’s government agrees peace deal with southern secessionists’, Financial Times, 27 October 2019.

11 ‘UAE withdraws troops from Yemen’s southern port city of Aden’, Al Jazeera, 30 October 2019.

12 Anwar Gargash, ‘We’re proud of the UAE’s military role in Yemen. But it’s time to seek a political solution’, Washington Post, 22 July 2019.

13 Maher Chmyatelli and Rania El Gamal, ‘Houthi drone attack on Saudi oilfield causes gas fire, output unaffected’, Reuters, 17 August 2019.

14 Pierre Noel, ‘Saudi Oil Under Attack’, IISS Blogs & Podcasts, 17 September 2019.

15 UN News, ‘Nowhere is safe to hide in war-torn Yemen, say UN-appointed rights experts’, 3 September 2019.

16 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014, Report of the detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen’, 3 September 2019, pp. 68–9.

17 Ibid., p. 76.

18 Ibid., pp. 110–11.

19 OCHA, ‘2018 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, January–December 2018’, 20 January 2018, p. 3.

20 OCHA, ‘2019 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, January–December 2019’, 19 February 2019, p. 7; OCHA, Yemen: Situation Report – Highlights’, 5 February 2020.

21 OCHA, ‘2019 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, January–December 2019’, p. 16.

22 OCHA, ‘Yemen: Over 460K cases of cholera registered to date this year’, 8 July 2019.

23 OCHA, ‘2019 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan, January–December 2019’, p. 8.

24 OCHA, ‘Yemen Humanitarian Update Covering 26 July–28 August 2019’, 28 August 2019, p. 2.

25 ‘UN gets access to vital grain in Yemen port city of Hodeidah’, Al Jazeera, 5 May 2019.

26 International Organization for Migration, ‘Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) DTM-Yemen, Reporting Period: 15–21 December 2019’, 22 December 2019.

27 Ibid.

28 World Bank, ‘Yemen’s Economic Update–October 2019’, 9 October 2019.

29 OCHA, ‘Yemen: Over 460K cases of cholera registered to date this year’.

30 OCHA, ‘Yemen Humanitarian Update Covering 26 July–28 August 2019’.