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ABSTRACT
In June 1944 the Red Army achieved a strategic surprise on the Karelian Isthmus although Finnish forces had previously made several observations indicative of an attack. The paper presents a number of drivers underlying the Finnish intelligence failure. First, Soviet forces succeeded in concealing the extent of the build-up, causing defenders to underestimate the size of opposing forces. Second, Finnish military intelligence suffered from fragmented collection and analysis. Third, military decision-makers failed to understand the significance of Soviet preparations and Soviet tactical improvements due to a combination of situational constraints, group processes, and organizational stagnation. These generated a predominant view that within the limited options available, sufficient preparations had been made to repel a potential Soviet attack on the Karelian Isthmus.
Resumen
En junio de 1944, el Ejército Rojo logró una sorpresa estratégica en el istmo de Carelia, aunque las fuerzas finlandesas habían hecho previamente varias observaciones indicativas de un ataque. El artículo presenta una serie de factores subyacentes al fallo de la inteligencia finlandesa. Primero, las fuerzas soviéticas lograron ocultar el alcance de su desarrollo, lo que provocó que los defensores subestimaran el tamaño de las fuerzas opositoras. En segundo lugar, la inteligencia militar finlandesa sufrió de una obtención y análisis fragmentados. En tercer lugar, los responsables de la toma de decisiones militares no entendieron la importancia de los preparativos soviéticos y las mejoras tácticas soviéticas debido a una combinación de restricciones situacionales, procesos grupales y estancamiento organizacional. Esto generó una visión predominante, de acuerdo con la cual, dentro de las limitadas opciones disponibles, se habían hecho suficientes preparativos para repeler un posible ataque soviético sobre el istmo de Carelia.
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Ralf Lillbacka
Dr. Ralf Lillbacka has been a Senior Lecturer in the Sector of Social Services and Health Care at Novia, the University of Applied Sciences, Vaasa, Finland, since 2004. Previously, he was a Social Science Researcher at Abo Akademi University, Vaasa, Finland, where he earned his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science. He has published extensively on issues of intelligence and military science, primarily on matters concerning intelligence and security in Northern Europe.