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ABSTRACT
Theorizing posits that moral judgment and reasoning stem from intuitions from at least one of six cognitive moral modules. Research has examined how media exposure influences aspects of moral development among children and adolescents. These lines of research remain largely unintegrated, however, and extant theories lack an explicit developmental perspective. We argue that Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is a useful tool for contextualizing past findings and thus review the extant literature in this area. Secondly, we integrate developmental theory with MFT and the Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars. This paper will help researchers to understand how human development and media use interact to influence moral module salience, with implications for understanding effects of exposure on children and adolescents.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 It is important to note that Moral Foundations Theory has generated controversy within the field of moral and evolutionary psychology. Suhler and Churchland (Citation2011) note three main criticisms. First, they call attention to what they determine to be conceptual confusion, particularly around the term ‘innate,’ arguing that Haidt and colleagues do not provide specifics for how humans acquire moral norms; thus, it is difficult for researchers to empirically test if these modules are indeed innate. Further, the authors call into question the notion of ‘modularity.’ Second, Suhler and Churchland (Citation2011) question the taxonomy of the five (at the time of writing) moral foundations, which we describe in more detail in the second footnote. Third, the authors note that if there are indeed mental modules as Haidt theorizes, we would expect the brain to be neurobiologically consistent with this account in multiple ways. According to Suhler and Churchland, empirical studies of the brain are not consistent with the theory. Haidt and Joseph (Citation2011) respond to these critiques by noting that, first, their use of the term ‘innate’ is consistent with other accounts (see Marcus, Citation2004) and their use of the term ‘modularity’ means that there are functionally specialized cognitive mechanisms consistent with the work of Barrett and Kurzban (Citation2006), which signal properties of modularity. Second, Haidt and Joseph (Citation2011) write that they are open to research into other moral foundations, and third, that the bar set by Suhler and Churchland (Citation2011) is so high that no nativist theory could possibly pass their requirements.
2 Scholars have also critiqued the selection process and taxonomy of these particular moral foundations. For example, Suhler and Churchland (Citation2011) note that at least two other potential moral values exist in societies around the world: industry and modesty. These, however, are not included within the foundations offered by MFT. Haidt and Joseph (Citation2011) respond by noting that they never claimed the foundations to be an exhaustive list, and subsequently included the liberty/oppression foundation following empirical research.
3 Although MFT does argue for clear categories or foundations, in any given moral situation, multiple foundations may be relevant. For example, certain religious rules about a given moral act may call into question both authority and purity. Thus, moral behavior is generally more complex than MFT acknowledges. However, in our view, our argument encompasses this criticism. We claim that the primary foundation that is activated varies by age and consequent development of the child. Thus, a given act may indeed include more than one moral foundation and hence, possible intuition, but the one that is activated will be affected by factors including media exposure as well as child developmental factors.
4 Again, whereas MFT argues for distinct moral foundations and subsequent intuitions, the fact that children interpret moral behaviors differently at different ages underscores the notion that a given depiction may primarily fall into one category or another, but interpretations may affect which moral foundation is activated. In this paper, we argue that this suggests the permeability of moral categories to at least some extent.