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Abstract
Starting from the officially proclaimed readjustment of the People’s Republic of China’s national development road map, this article engages in a theory-guided evaluation of the country’s artificial intelligence (AI) strategy in connection with its smart city initiatives. The government’s official quest to steer China toward a ‘new mode of urbanization’ has, as this article argues, facilitated the rise of the country’s ‘sharing economy’/’platform economy’, with the mushrooming of a private AI economy offering ‘smart’ algorithm-optimized solutions to complex urban governance dilemmas. To (re)strengthen control and to cement central authority, the Chinese government has set out to regulate and standardize this emerging private platform economy sector—while also attempting not to interrupt the innovation drive of the Chinese AI landscape as such. This article argues that these regulation efforts, contrary to conventional top-down steering approaches, rely on central-local collaboration and network coordination that involves a number of multiple actors operating under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the central party-state.
Notes
1 Asimov, “Runaround,” 94–103.
2 Background: In July 2017, the Chinese State Council published its AI strategy paper; in December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) presented its ‘Vision and Action Plan’ for the years 2018–2020. In January 2018, the Chinese State Council released a white paper on AI standardization. Finally, in June 2019 the newly established Chinese National Governance Committee for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence published its general guidelines on ‘Responsible AI’.
3 Additionally, following a grounded theory approach, the article is also based on participatory observation as well as on discussions with Chinese scholars in Beijing and Hangzhou. The author’s fieldwork for this article has kindly been supported by the DFG (research project ‘Concepts of Political Change and Legitimate Modes of Governance in the People’s Republic of China in the Studies of Chinese Political Scientists’ (NO 1041/2-1; lead: Noesselt)).
4 Shanghai Municipal Government. “Shanghai shi tuijin zhihui chengshi jianshe 2011–2013 nian xingdong jihua” (Shanghai Action Plan 2011–2013 for the Promotion of Smart City Construction).
5 Heilmann, “Policy-Making Through Experimentation,” 68.
6 The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ goes back to the studies of Fritz W. Scharpf and Renate Mayntz published in the 1990s. For a summary of their research, see the SAGE Handbook of Governance (edited by Mark Bevir), especially the chapters on Metagovernance and Policy Network Theory.
7 NDRC, “Guanyu yinfa zujin zhihui chengshi jiankang fazhan de zhidao yijian de tongzhi” (Guidelines for Promoting the Healthy Development of Smart Cities).
8 Chan and Anderson, “Rethinking Smart Cities.”
9 Li et al., “Governing Urbanization and the New Urbanization Plan in China,” 515–534.
10 Li, “Report on the Work of the Government 2015.”
11 Li, “Report on the Work of the Government 2016.”
12 Li, “Report on the Work of the Government 2017.”
13 Xinhua, “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th CPC National Congress.”
14 The Chinese version is available online: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm.
15 The Chinese version is available online: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996.htm.
16 MIIT, “Gongye he xinxihuabu guanyu yinfa ‚tuijin xin yi dai rengong zhineng chanye fazhan san nian xingdong jihua (2018-2020 nian) de tongzhi” (MIIT on the Release of the ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting Development of a New Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–2020)’).
17 South China Morning Post, “China Unveils Targets for 2015.”
18 Guowuyuan (State Council), “Zhongguo zhizao 2025” (Made in China 2025).
19 See the companies City Brain website: https://www.alibabacloud.com/de/et/city; Zhang et al., “The City Brain,” 1–11.
20 Xinhua, “China Publishes Master Plan for Xiongan New Area”; Noesselt, “A Presidential Signature Initiative.”
21 Likewise, also the debates outside China do not operate with one unified ‘smart city’ definition. ‘Smart city’ and ‘digital city’ are often used as synonyms. With regard to the level of state bureaucracy and steering processes, ‘smart city’ stands for the digitization of urban governance and, in this vein, continues earlier ‘e-government’ and ‘e-governance’ strategies. E-government includes the establishment of an intranet of state institutions and government agencies, allowing to collect, store, and share information about central and local administrative acts. In addition to intra-government communication and coordination, it can also comprise web applications in the fields of the provision of public services, offering additional channels of interaction between the state bureaucracy and local society. E-government services are expected to increase a system’s efficiency. Moreover, transparency and accountability of administrative acts are regarded as a general precondition to generate and secure citizens’ trust and support for the established state institutions. E-governance, in contrast to the traditional understanding of e-government as a top-down steering process, further stresses the aspect of citizen participation and online modes of deliberation. The emergence of the concept of ‘smart city’ as such dates back to the year 2008, when leading IT companies started to present their visions of future urban governance added by cloud-computing systems.
22 Angelidou, “Smart City Policies,” S3; Albino et al., “Smart Cities,” 6–8; Moon, “The Evolution of E-Government among Municipalities,” 425; Dawes, “Governance in the Digital Age.”
23 For the history of DiDi Chuxing, see the company’s webpage: https://www.didiglobal.com/about-didi/about-us.
24 MOT. “Wangluo yuyue chuzuche jingying fuwu guanli zanxing banfa gongbu” (Provisional Regulations of the Online Taxi-Hailing Service Sector).
25 MOT. “Guanyu xiugai ‘wangluo yuyue chuzuche jingying fuwu guanli zanxing banfa’ de jueding, 2019” (Resolution on the Revision of the ‘Provisional Regulations of the Online Taxi-Hailing Service Sector’, 2019).
26 South China Morning Post. “One Year After Two Deaths Plunged Didi into a Safety Crisis, What’s Changed at China’s Ride-hailing Giant?”
27 DiDi, “Didi Chuxing Sets up JV with BAIC-BJEV.”
28 Borak, “Didi Is Using Its New AI Brain to Crack the Toughest Puzzle—Our Cities.”
29 See the company’s webpage: http://www.didi-labs.com/.
30 Abacus, “Didi Will Soon Roll Out a Self-driving Taxi Service in Shanghai.”
31 The Harbinger, “Interview with Founder and CEO of DiDi, Cheng Wei.”
32 Li, “Country Issues National Standards for Autonomous Vehicle Testing.”
33 Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution.”
34 Rifkin, The Third Industrial Revolution.
35 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, The Second Machine Age.
36 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, Machine, Platform, Crowd.
37 Liu, “Maerkusai yu Habeimasi jishu tongzhi lun zhi bijiao” (Comparison between Marcuse’s and Habermas’ Theories on Technocracy).
38 Liu, “Nier Boziman lun jishuzhuyi” (Neil Postman on Technocracy).
39 Postman, Technopoly.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism.
44 Cui and Cao, “Gongxiang jingji haishi linggong jingji” (Sharing Economy or Gig-economy).
45 Qi and Li, “Putting Precarity Back to Production.”
46 Chen, “Thrown Under the Bus and Outrunning It.”
47 Kitchen, “The Real-Time City?,” 1–14; Kitchen, “The Ethics of Smart Cities and Urban Science,” 1–15.
48 Crawford and Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process,” 93–128.
49 Brauneis and Goodman, “Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City,” 103–176 (p. 119).
50 Ibid., (p. 127).
51 As quoted in Abacus. “Chinese Internet Users Criticize Baidu CEO for Saying People in China Are Willing to Give Up Data Privacy for Convenience.”
52 Liu et al., “Da shuju shidai shuju zhuquan yu yinsi baohu mianlin de anquan tiaozhan” (The Security Challenge to Data Sovereignty and Privacy Protection in the Era of Big Data).
53 Horwitz, “Chinese Face-swapping App Goes Viral, Sparks Privacy Concerns.”
54 Lin, Abney, and Bekey, Robot Ethics; Lin, Jenkins, and Bekey, Robot Ethics 2.0.
55 IEEE, “Ethically Aligned Design.”
56 The Asilomar AI Principles as well as more information about the background of this initiative can be found online: https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/
57 For a dystopian demystification of AI-based governance, see also O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction.
58 Hardesty, “Making Computers Explain Themselves.”
59 Arnold and Scheutz, “The ‘Big Red Button’ Is Too Late,” 59–69 (p. 66).
60 Vladek, “Machines Without Principals,” 117–150 (p. 121).
61 Christensen, “Robots Learn to Lie.”
62 Bonnemains, Saurel, and Tessier, “Embedded Ethics,” 41–58 (p. 41).
63 CESI, “Rengong zhineng biaozhunhua baipishu” (White Paper on AI Standardization).
64 Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, “Rengong zhineng Beijing gongshi” (Beijing AI Consensus).
65 Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, “Beijing AI Principles.”
66 Xinhua, “China Issues Principles of Next Generation AI Governance.”
67 China Daily, “Principles Set to Regulate AI Research, Applications.”
68 MOST, “Kejibu: Xin yi dai rengong zhineng zhili yuanze” (MOST: Governance Principles of Next Generation AI).
69 Ibid.
70 Before this background, international companies have voiced their concerns regarding the PRC’s Cybersecurity Law. This basic law, passed by the National People’s Congress in November 2016 and entered into force in June 2017, prescribes that all data has to be stored in China, meaning on Chinese servers and subject to Chinese laws and national (security)regulations.
71 WHO, “Global Strategy on Digital Health 2020–2024.”
72 Takouleu, “AFRICA: Huawei Sets Up a $1.5 Billion Fund to Boost African Smart Cities.”
73 Smart Cities World Forum, “Huawei Launches Platform to Build Smart City Applications in German City.”
74 Bryan-Low et al., “Special Report - Hobbling Huawei: Inside the U.S. War on China’s Tech Giant.”
75 For an overview, see the official webpage of the European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/european-gnss/galileo/galileo-european-global-satellite-based-navigation-system
76 The White House, “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.”
77 Horn, “Machine-Breaking in England and France During the Age of Revolution,” 143–166.
78 Lee, AI Superpowers.
79 See, inter alia, the NDRC’s ‘Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Development of the Sharing Economy’ (2017), and the statements on the sharing economy in the government’s annual work report 2018.
80 Xinhua. “China’s Sharing Economy to Hit 4.5t Yuan This Year.”
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Notes on contributors
Nele Noesselt
Nele Noesselt is a Professor of Political Science with a special focus on China and East Asia at the Institute of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. Since 2017, she is the speaker of the AREA Ruhr Graduate School ‘Transnational Institution Building and Transnational Identities in East Asia’ (joint PhD program of the University of Duisburg-Essen and the Ruhr University Bochum). Her research agenda ranges from general issues of comparative politics and domestic governance to world politics and theories of international relations.