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Abstract
Does top-down accountability spur bureaucrats to improve service provision? This paper highlights the potential drawbacks of top-down accountability for building a responsive bureaucracy. Based on an online survey experiment involving 923 bureaucrats in China, we find that bureaucrats are less responsive to citizens’ needs when they are exposed to the risk of being sanctioned and the recent remedial policy of principled tolerance cannot offset such effects. In contrast to scholars arguing that increased top-down accountability pressure improves government responsiveness, these findings imply that insulating bureaucracy allows them to do their jobs more responsively. The findings enhance our understanding of accountability and responsiveness in China and beyond.
Acknowledgments
The authors appreciate Vivian Jing Zhan, Tangbiao Xiao, Deyong Ma, Chuanmin Chen, Peng Hu, and participants in the Political Culture, Psychology, and Behavior Research Workshop at Nanjing University for their helpful comments. The authors also thank two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and insightful comments. The authors are responsible for the remaining errors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Besley and Burgess, ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness’; Binzer Hobolt and Klemmensen, ‘Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective’; Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Faguet, ‘Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs?’; Fearon, ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians’; Ofosu, ‘Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?’; Raffler, ‘Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability?’; Speer, ‘Participatory Governance Reform’; Tsai, Accountability without Democracy; Xu, ‘Bureaucratic Representation and State Responsiveness during Times of Crisis’.
2 Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, ‘Out of Step, Out of Office’; Fearon, ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians’; Ferraz and Finan, ‘Electoral Accountability and Corruption’.
3 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Grossman and Slough, ‘Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries’.
4 We limit our argument to the very specific type of bureaucratic activities, the prosocial but potentially troublesome activities, for the generalizability of our finding. Even with good intentions, some prosocial activities may inadvertently violate existing rules or norms. This inherent risk could make bureaucrats hesitant to act, fearing potential disciplinary consequences from superiors focused solely on compliance.
5 Grossman and Slough, ‘Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries’; Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’.
6 Chen, Keng, and Zhang, ‘China’s Bureaucratic Slack’; Li, Ni, and Wang, ‘Blame Avoidance in China’s Cadre Responsibility System’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’; Wang and Yan, ‘Bureaucratic Slack in China’.
7 Thanks to the reviewer for pointing out this nuanced distinction.
8 Besley and Burgess, ‘The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness’; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, ‘Out of Step, Out of Office’; Fearon, ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians’; Ferraz and Finan, ‘Electoral Accountability and Corruption’; Ofosu, ‘Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?’; Xu, ‘Bureaucratic Representation and State Responsiveness during Times of Crisis’.
9 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Huang, ‘The Mechanism for Joint and Individual Accountability Based on the Multilayered “Principal–Agent” Relationships’; Kung, Cai, and Sun, ‘Rural Cadres and Governance in China’; Olken, ‘Monitoring Corruption’; Raffler, ‘Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability?’; Schlæger and Wang, ‘E-Monitoring of Public Servants in China’; Wedeman, Double Paradox.
10 Bhavnani and Lee, ‘Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance’; Björkman and Svensson, ‘Power to the People’; Lieberman and Zhou, ‘Self-Efficacy and Citizen Engagement in Development’; Tsai, Accountability without Democracy.
11 O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’; Wang, Tying the Autocrat’s Hands.
12 Wedeman, Double Paradox; Zhu, Huang, and Zhang, ‘“Big Tigers, Big Data”’.
13 Edin, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China’; Wang, ‘Seeking Performance or Control?’.
14 Li and Zhou, ‘Political Turnover and Economic Performance’.
15 Kung, Cai, and Sun, ‘Rural Cadres and Governance in China’.
16 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Wang and Han, ‘Cosmetic Responsiveness’.
17 Chen, Keng, and Zhang, ‘China’s Bureaucratic Slack’; Grossman and Hanlon, ‘Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations?’; Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’; Tu and Gong, ‘Accountability Intensity and Bureaucrats’ Response to Conflicting Expectations’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’; Wang and Yan, ‘Bureaucratic Slack in China’.
18 Tu and Gong, ‘Accountability Intensity and Bureaucrats’ Response to Conflicting Expectations’.
19 Edin, ‘State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China’; Li and Zhou, ‘Political Turnover and Economic Performance’.
20 Bhavnani and Lee, ‘Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance’; Tsai, Accountability without Democracy.
21 O’Brien and Li, ‘Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China’.
22 Kung, Cai, and Sun, ‘Rural Cadres and Governance in China’; Tu and Gong, ‘Accountability Intensity and Bureaucrats’ Response to Conflicting Expectations’.
23 Grossman and Hanlon, ‘Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations?’.
24 Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’.
25 Chen, Keng, and Zhang, ‘China’s Bureaucratic Slack’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’; Wang and Yan, ‘Bureaucratic Slack in China’.
26 Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’.
27 Tu and Gong, ‘Accountability Intensity and Bureaucrats’ Response to Conflicting Expectations’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’.
28 Kung, Cai, and Sun, ‘Rural Cadres and Governance in China’; Tu and Gong, ‘Accountability Intensity and Bureaucrats’ Response to Conflicting Expectations’.
29 Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’.
30 Xi Jinping. “Zai Shengbuji Zhuyao Lingdaoganbu Xuexi Guanche Dang de Shibajie Wuzhong Quanhui Jingshen Zhuanti Yantaoban Shang de Jianghua (Speech at the Special Seminar on Implementing the Spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Party for Major Leading Cadres at the Provincial and Ministerial Levels).” 2016. Retrieved July 28, 2023 from http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-05/10/c_128972667.htm
31 Li and Zhou, ‘Political Turnover and Economic Performance’; Oi, ‘The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy’; Su, Tao, and Yang, ‘Rethinking the Institutional Foundations of China’s Hypergrowth’; Tsai, Accountability without Democracy; Walder, ‘Local Governments as Industrial Firms’; Zeng and Wong, ‘Time Is Power’.
32 Li, ‘Politics of Anticorruption in China’.
33 There was a total of 1.316 million persons in 2017, 1.737 million in 2018, 1.849 million in 2019, 1.954 million in 2020, 1.215 million in 2021, and a total of 1.838 million in 2022. See the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission. “Quanguo Jijian Jiancha Jiguan Jiandu Jiancha Shencha Diaocha (Statistical Report On the Supervision, Inspection, Review and Investigation of National Discipline Inspection and Supervision Agencies (Multiple Years).” Retrieved July 28, 2023 from https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowenn/202101/t20210126_84660.html
34 Chen, Keng, and Zhang, ‘China’s Bureaucratic Slack’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’; Wang and Yan, ‘Bureaucratic Slack in China’.
35 The initial response to the problem of bureaucratic slack was actually to increase accountability pressure over the bureaucracy. In Oct 2014, the then Premier Li Keqiang pointed out at the meeting of main heads of the State Council departments that bureaucratic slack is as bad as corruption and should also be severely punished. Fortunately, this policy did not last long. The Chinese government soon shifted the policy towards reducing accountability pressure over the bureaucracy, and proposed the principled tolerance policy to encourage more responsible activities.
36 See Note 1 above.
37 General Office of the CPC Central Committee. “Guanyu Jinyibu Jili Guangda Ganbu Xinshidai Xin Dandang Xin Zuowei de Yijian (Opinions on Further Encouraging Cadres to Take on New Actions in the New Era).” 2018. Retrieved July 28, 2023 from https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-05/20/content_5292263.htm
38 Shao, ‘Yin Xiangmu Kuisun Beizhi Fupin Buli Neimenggu Yi Xiang Dangwei Shuji Xiangzhang Tongshi Huoxing (Party Secretary and Government Head of a Township in Inner Mongolia Were Sentenced for Loss in Poverty Alleviation Projects)’.
39 Cai, State and Agents in China.
40 World Bank, World Development Report 2004.
41 Han, ‘Liyi Biaoda, Ziyuan Dongyuan Yu Yicheng Shezhi-Duiyu “Naoda” Xianxiang de Miaoshuxing Fenxi (Interest Expression, Resource Mobilization and Agenda Setting: A Descriptive Analysis of the Phenomenon of “Trouble Making”)’.
42 Fu and Distelhorst, ‘Grassroots Participation and Repression under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’.
43 Fu and Distelhorst; Yuen, ‘Friend or Foe? The Diminishing Space of China’s Civil Society’.
44 Lee and Zhang, ‘The Power of Instability’.
45 Xu, ‘To Repress or to Co-Opt?’.
46 Steinhardt, ‘Defending Stability under Threat’; Truex, ‘Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression’.
47 Han, Du, and Shao, ‘Opportunistic Bargaining’.
48 Zeng and Feng, ‘Politicized Adjudication Vis-à-Vis Petitioners in Chinese Criminal Justice’; Feng and Zeng, ‘Stability Justice’.
49 For officials who make mistakes relating to economic issues, as in the case of the two officials mentioned in this paper, punishment is not determined by law but by the people. Some accusations are neither legal nor rational, but they could become legal punishment through judicial trials. The boundary between mistakes and criminality is too blurred. That is why we choose a very tiny procedural fault to design our experiment, i.e. to avoid ambiguity in respondents’ interpretation about the consequence of that wrongdoing.
50 As shown in the case of Yao and Zhang, punishment triggered by misconduct can vary greatly.
51 Zhan and Qin, ‘The Art of Political Ambiguity’.
52 Stern and Hassid, ‘Amplifying Silence’.
53 Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’.
54 Stern, Environmental Litigation in China; Stern and Hassid, ‘Amplifying Silence’; Zhan and Qin, ‘The Art of Political Ambiguity’.
55 Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’.
56 Stern, Environmental Litigation in China.
57 Rich, ‘Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability’.
58 Krupnikov and Findley, ‘Survey Experiments’.
59 For the protection of research participants, the questionnaire was reviewed and approved by the academic and ethics board of the School of Humanities, Southeast University, on September 18, 2019.
60 Mahoney, The Logic of Social Science.
61 The reasons for choosing a very slight procedure fault are three-fold. First, given the uncertainty of punishments in Chinese politics, a very slight procedure fault can avoid respondents’ different interpretations of the consequence of that wrongdoing as much as possible. Second, it should be easy to respond to citizens’ needs without fault if a respondent is to do so. In other words, the wrongdoings in our experiment should be easy to correct. Last, if even a very slight procedure fault could deter civil servants from adopting actions good for the people, it would suggest that the accountability institutions are somehow problematic.
62 Instead of the substantive satisfaction of citizens’ demands, Ding (2020) finds that the state can theatrically deploy visual, verbal, and gestural symbols to foster an impression of good governance in responding to the citizens’ complaints, which she defines as “performative governance.”.
63 For those who are required to conduct public inspections and circulate criticisms for loaning village collective funds in violation of regulations, their annual assessment cannot be rated as excellent. See “Interim Measures for Accountability for Illegal Acts of Rural Collective Financial Management in X City.”.
64 Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, ‘Introduction’.
65 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Meng and Su, ‘When Top-down Meets Bottom-Up’; Wang and Han, ‘Cosmetic Responsiveness’.
66 Ding, ‘Performative Governance’.
67 There are always risks in using village collective funds, even if one sticks to all the procedures required by the Regulations on the Administration of Rural Collective Assets. So, respondents who choose to lend village collective funds in experimental scenarios are the ideal type of public servants who will sacrifice their own interest to preserve public interest (Perry, 1996), and we take this as a sign of responsive bureaucrats.
68 Robins and Morgenstern, ‘The Foundations of Confounding in Epidemiology’.
69 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Wang and Han, ‘Cosmetic Responsiveness’; Wedeman, Double Paradox; Zhu, Huang, and Zhang, ‘“Big Tigers, Big Data”’.
70 Chen, Pan, and Xu, ‘Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness’; Wang and Han, ‘Cosmetic Responsiveness’; Ding, ‘Performative Governance’; Wedeman, Double Paradox.
71 Chen, Keng, and Zhang, ‘China’s Bureaucratic Slack’; Wang, ‘Frightened Mandarins’; Wang and Yan, ‘Bureaucratic Slack in China’.
72 Grossman and Slough, ‘Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries’.
73 Stern and Hassid, ‘Amplifying Silence’.
74 Han, ‘Liyi Biaoda, Ziyuan Dongyuan Yu Yicheng Shezhi-Duiyu “Naoda” Xianxiang de Miaoshuxing Fenxi (Interest Expression, Resource Mobilization and Agenda Setting: A Descriptive Analysis of the Phenomenon of “Trouble Making”)’; Tsai, Accountability without Democracy.
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Pei Zhong
Pei Zhong is Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration, Southeast University, China. She received her PhD in political science from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her research interests are political support and political compliance.
Yu Zeng
Yu Zeng is an Associate Professor of Political Science in School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China. He has published in journals such as Journal of Contemporary China, The China Quarterly, China Information, Law and Society Review, Social Science Research, and Economics & Politics. His research focuses on political selection, judicial politics, and political business cycle in China.