Does political uncertainty affect water resources development? The case of the Eastern Nile

Figures & data

Fig 1. The Nile Basin.

Table 1. Irrigation and hydropower potential of Nile Basin countries.

Country	Irrigation potential (000 ha)	Irrigation area (000 ha)	Hydropower potential (MW)	Installed capacity (MW)
Burundi	185	14	1366	36
Congo	NA	11	530,000	2829
Egypt	4434	3266	3210	2825
Eritrea	NA	28	NA	NA
Ethiopia	3637	190	162,000	378
Kenya	352	67	30,000	611
Rwanda	160	4	3000	59
Sudan	4843	1946	1900	225
Tanzania	828	190	20,000	339
Uganda	202	9	10,200	155

Fig 2. Schematic of the Nile Economic Optimization Model (for simplicity, only reservoir and irrigation nodes are numbered).

Table 2. The three dimensions of uncertainty considered in this analysis.

	Hydrological	Economic	Political
Contributing factors	*Natural climate variability (interannual, interdecadal, etc.) *Land conversion impacts on local climate & runoff generation *Long-term drivers (e.g., climate change)	*Infrastructure cost overruns *Unknown rate of regional development (demand-side uncertainty) *Supply costs (inefficiency losses, mismanagement) *Macroeconomic drivers (global economic forces, technological change)	*Infrastructure development decisions *Benefit-sharing agreements (e.g., power, food and other trade) *Lack of agreement over property rights (e.g., water rights) *Foreign policy shifts (e.g., change in alliances or willingness to take military action)
Scenarios considered in this research	Variation in runoff: 1) Low (15% below mean) 2) Long-term mean 3) High (10% above mean)	Variation in value of energy: 1) Low (US$0.04/kW-h) 2) Medium (US$0.07/kW-h) 3) High (US$0.10/kW-h)	Variation in coordination: 1) Full (Infrastructure, power trade & irrigation allocation) (COOP) 2) Infrastructure + power trade (ELINFCOOP) 3) Infrastructure only (INFCOOP) 4) None (NOCOOP)

Table 3. Differences in assumptions governing the variation across political scenarios.

Assumption	COOP	ELINFCOOP	INFCOOP	NOCOOP
New infrastructures	Mabil; Beko Abo	Same as COOP	Same as COOP	Beko Abo; Dal; Kajbar; Dagash; Shereiq
Energy benefits	As specified in Table 1; power trade yields additional gains of US$0.03/kW-h, split equally between Sudan & Ethiopia	Same as COOP	Same as COOP; but no gains from power trade	Same as INFCOOP; energy value is also US$0.03/kW-h lower in Sudan due to higher generation cost
Target (maximum) water consumption
Municipal/industrial demand (bcm/y)	Egypt: 4.3 Sudan: 1.0	Same as COOP	Same as COOP	Same as COOP
Irrigation water target (bcm/y) ^a	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 51.2 Sudan: 15	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 51.2 Sudan: 18	Same as ELINFCOOP	Same as ELINFCOOP
Evaporative losses (bcm/y) ^b	Ethiopia: 3.5 Egypt: 10–12 Sudan: 2.5	Same as COOP	Same as COOP	Ethiopia: 3.2 Egypt: 10–12 Sudan: 4.2
Total target demand (bcm/y)	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 55.5 Sudan: 18.5	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 55.5 Sudan: 23.5	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 55.5 Sudan: 23.5	Ethiopia: +1 Egypt: 55.5 Sudan: 23.5

a For Ethiopia, this is in addition to ∼2 bcm/y of irrigation water use in the vicinity of Lake Tana. The COOP scenario assumes that Egypt and Sudan follow the 1959 Nile Water Agreement; i.e., Egypt maintains target water demand of 55.5 bcm/y (for municipal/industrial + irrigation), and Sudan has 18.5 bcm/y (for municipal/industrial + irrigation + evaporation from new dams).

b For Sudan, this does not include evaporative losses from Gebel el Aulia, Sennar, or the original Roseires, because these dams preceded or were accepted as part of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement.

Table 4. Total economic benefits (in billions of US$/y) under different scenarios of political uncertainty.

Country	Ethiopia	Sudan	Egypt	Total
Scenario
Full cooperation (COOP)	2.99	1.94	3.00	7.94
Infrastructure and power trade (ELINFCOOP)	3.17	2.03	2.79	7.99
Infrastructure cooperation only (INFCOOP)	2.87	1.73	2.79	7.38
No cooperation (NOCOOP)	2.31	1.87	2.71	6.89

Notes: All results assume mean runoff and medium electricity price. Bold indicates the best outcome for each country under each flow scenario.

Table 5. Total economic benefits (in billions of US$/y) under different scenarios of hydrological uncertainty and political uncertainty.

Country	Ethiopia		Sudan		Egypt		Total
Scenario	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP
Low flow	$2.1	$1.7	$1.60	$1.67	$2.2	$1.9	$5.9	$5.2
Mean flow	$3.0	$2.3	$1.94	$1.87	$3.0	$2.7	$7.9	$6.8
High flow	$3.0	$2.3	$2.00	$1.92	$3.2	$3.0	$8.2	$7.1

Notes: All results assume a medium value of energy, e.g., US$0.07/kW-h. Only full cooperation or non-cooperation is shown. Bold indicates the best outcome for each country under each flow scenario.

Table 6. Total economic benefits (in billions of US$/y) under different scenarios of economic uncertainty.

Country	Ethiopia		Sudan		Egypt		Total
Scenario	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP	COOP	NOCOOP
Low price	$1.8	$1.3	$1.53	$1.31	$2.8	$2.5	$5.6	$5.1
Medium price	$3.0	$2.3	$1.94	$1.87	$3.0	$2.7	$7.9	$6.8
High price	$4.2	$3.3	$2.36	$2.42	$3.2	$2.9	$9.8	$8.6

Notes: All results assume mean runoff. Only full cooperation or non-cooperation is shown. Bold indicates the best outcome for each country under each flow scenario.