Abstract
Confidence building measures (CBMs) have long been employed as a tool for both conflict reduction and resolution. What started as a Cold War phenomena, CBMs have routinely been employed to deal with a myriad of conflicts in a variety of locations. In the Middle East, CBMs have been integral parts of both formal treaties and disarmament agreements between Israel and the Arab states. The 20th anniversary of the Oslo Accords provides a good opportunity to reassess the role of CBMs in the Oslo process. During the initial stages of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, much emphasis was placed on the role and importance of CBMs. These CBMs were unsuccessful, however, because there was neither a strong foundation for negotiations, nor a real commitment on the part of the leaderships of both parties to implement and support the measures.
Notes
1 Numerous analyses of the Oslo accords exist. Since this paper is really only interested in the role of CBMs within the Oslo process, a complete overview of the process is not discussed. For more information on the negotiation process, see CitationAbbas (1995), CitationCorban (1994), CitationMakovsky (1996), and CitationSavir (1998).
2 For full text of the agreements, see the Israeli Foreign Ministry's website at http://www.mfa.gov.il/ or the Journal of Palestine Studies which also regularly publishes texts of the negotiated documents.