Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which the introduction and tightening of transfer pricing frameworks deter income shifting strategies by European multinational companies. To do so, we have built an index that measures the transfer pricing framework strictness by host country and year. Then, tax rate differentials are used to capture profit-shifting incentives and are interacted with the strictness index to assess whether the host country's transfer pricing framework impacts profit-shifting behaviour. The index is shown to increase significantly over the sample period, indicating that the scrutiny of related party transactions by European governments has increased over the period 2001–2009. Using a sample of European foreign subsidiaries, the results suggest that the stricter the transfer pricing framework the lower the tax rate difference sensitivity of reported earnings. This indicates that tightening the transfer pricing framework is capable of dissuading multinational companies from shifting profits from higher- to lower-tax countries.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
ORCID
Mário Marques http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9402-5182