Effort and risk-taking in tournaments with superstars – evidence for teams

Figures & data

Figure 1. Average point differentials: Team UAS and main competitors.

Notes: Performance by tournament and team, N =$1,832$ . 1972 and 1976 Olympics not included.

Figure 2. Effort and risk-taking over time.

Effort and risk-taking over time. Only first-round round-robin games (without Team USA participation) of Olympic and FIBA World Cup basketball tournaments are included.

Table 1. Association of competing with a superstar and effort.

	full sample period		after 1991^a
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Olympics	World Cup	Olympics	World Cup
Group U.S.A	0.013**	0.003	−0.011**	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Group U.S.A$\times$after 1991	−0.020***	−0.009
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Group U.S.A$\times$US weak	-	-	0.023*	0.006
			(0.012)	(0.010)
Win percentage	0.006	−0.008	−0.001	−0.014*
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Games number	−0.004***	−0.005***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Team-decade fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Additional binary controls^b	yes	yes	yes	yes
$N$	724	878	348	546
Mean dep. var.	0.119	0.110	0.107	0.104
$R^2$	0.438	0.374	0.327	0.298

The Dependent variable is the number of personal fouls per player-minute. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Only games without US participation included. ^a Reduced sample of tournaments from $1992$–$2019$. ^b Additional binary variables are interactions of the probability to advance from the group stage and the number of wins the observed team has accumulated less than the team with the most wins within the group before the observed game. Columns ($1$) and ($2$) include a dummy equal to $1$ if the observed game was played in the group of Team U.S.A, $0$ otherwise. Columns ($3$) and ($4$) include a variable equal to $1$ if the observed game was played in a tournament with a weak Team U.S.A (see Section 3.1), $0$ otherwise.

Table 2. Association of competing with a superstar and risk-taking.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Olympics	World Cup	Pooled
Group U.S.A	−0.083**	−0.062	−0.049**
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.023)
Group U.S.A$\times$U.S.A weak	0.228**	−0.033	0.035
	(0.105)	(0.098)	(0.050)
Olympic tournament	-	-	−0.040*
			(0.021)
Win percentage	−0.108*	0.163**	−0.015
	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.047)
Game number	−0.030**	0.032**	−0.006
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Team-decade fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes
Additional binary controls^a	yes	yes	yes
$N$	348	546	896
Mean dep. var.	0.514	0.584	0.556
$R^2$	0.399	0.342	0.323

Tournaments from $1992$–$2019$ are included. The Dependent variable is the ratio of three-point attempts over all attempts from the field. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Only games without US participation included. ^a Interactions of the probability to advance from the group stage and the number of wins the observed team has accumulated less than the team with the most wins within the group before the observed game. In addition, I include a variable equal to $1$ if the observed game was played in a tournament where Team U.S.A was weak (see Section 3.1), $0$ otherwise.

Figure 3. Effort of treated and non-treated teams before and after the FIBA reform.

Average number of fouls per player-minute for treatment and control groups over decade for 1960–2014. Decade 1: 1960–1969, decade 2: 1970–1979, decade 3: 1980–1991, decade 4:1992–1999, decade 5: 2000–2009, decade 6: 2010–2019. The red vertical line indicates the FIBA reform to allow professional player to compete in international tournaments. This reform came into effect at the 1992 Only games without US participation included. N =$1,602$

Table 3. Effect of 1991 reform on effort – difference-in-difference estimates.

	Olympics^a			FIBA World Cup^b
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$GroupUS{A}_i\times d_g$	−0.011**	−0.015***	-	−0.002	−0.002	-
	(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Semi elasticity^c	[−10.3]	[−10.3]		[−3.3]	[−3.3]
${\delta }_1$	-	-	−0.010	-	-	−0.006
			(0.007)			(0.010)
${\delta }_2$	-	-	−0.016**	-	-	0.005
			(0.007)			(0.007)
${\delta }_3$	-	-	−0.019***	-	-	−0.005
			(0.006)			(0.006)
Additional controls^d	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
$N$	724			878
$R^2$	0.161	0.169	0.214	0.107	0.137	0.172

The Dependent variable is the number of fouls per player-minute. ${\delta }_1$ measures the diff-in-diff effect for years $1992$–$1999$, ${\delta }_2$ for years $2000$–$2009$, and ${\delta }_3$ for years $2010$–$2019$. The $1972$ and $1976$ Olympics are excluded. ^a All first-round round-robin games from Olympic Games, $1960$–$2016$ included. Mean of dependent variable is $0.119$. ^b All first-round round-robin games from the FIBA World Cups, $1963$–$2019$ included. Mean of dependent variable is $0.110$. ^c Semi-elasticity (calculated using the unweighted sample-mean as the base, multiplied by $100$) gives the percentage change in effort. ^d All specifications include the win percentage for all games before the observed game, a continuous count of games a team played, as well as binary variables indicating interactions of the probability to advance from the group stage and the number of wins the observed team has accumulated less than the team with the most wins within the group. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level), in parentheses. Only games without Team U.S.A participating included.

Table 4. Association of competing with a superstar and effort – alternative effort measures.

	own points		total points		attempts (>1991 only)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Olympics	World Cup	Olympics	World Cup	Olympics	World Cup
Group U.S.A	0.043***	0.004	0.088***	−0.008	−0.015**	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Group U.S.A	−0.059***	−0.031	−0.133***	−0.023
$\times$ after 1991	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Additional controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
team-decade fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
$N$	724	878	724	878	348	546
$R^2$	0.495	0.493	0.510	0.482	0.415	0.229

The Dependent variable for columns (1) and (2) is the number of points scored by player-minute. The Dependent variable for columns (3) and (4) is the number of total points scored by player-minute in a game. The Dependent variable for columns (5) and (6) is the number of throwing attempts from the field by player-minute for a team. All control variables as in Model 1 are included. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Only games without US participation included.

Table A1. Association of competing with a superstar and effort – alternative specification.

	full sample period		after 1991^a
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Olympics	World Cup	Olympics	World Cup
Group USA	0.009**	0.003	−0.006*	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Group U.S.A$\times$after 1991	−0.011**	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)
group U.S.A$\times$U.S.A weak			0.021*	−0.003
			(0.011)	(0.007)
Win percentage	−0.003***	−0.004***	−0.003**	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Game number	0.007	−0.008	0.004	−0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Team fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Tournament fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Additional binary controls^b	yes	yes	yes	yes
$N$	724	878	348	546
Mean dep.var.	.119	.110	.107	0.104
$R^2$	0.380	0.280	0.234	0.196

The Dependent variable is the number of personal fouls per player-minute. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Only games without US participation included. ^a Reduced sample, including only tournaments from the period $1992$–$2019$. ^b All specifications include the same control variables as used for Table 1. Columns ($3$) and ($4$) also include a variable equal to $1$) include a variable equal to $1$ if the observed game was played in a tournament with a weak Team U.S.A (see Section 3.1), $0$ otherwise.

Table A2. Association of competing with a superstar and risk-taking – alternative specification.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Olympics	World Cup	Pooled
Group USA	−0.057**	−0.065*	−0.055***
	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.020)
Group U.S.A$\times$U.S.A weak	0.199**	−0.017	0.032
	(0.086)	(0.056)	(0.040)
Win percentage	−0.109	0.178**	0.044
	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.050)
Game number	−0.027**	0.032**	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Team fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes
Tournament fixed-effects	yes	yes	yes
Additional binary controls^a	yes	yes	yes
$N$	348	546	896
Mean dep. var.	0.513	0.589	0.559
$R^2$	0.377	0.267	0.270

Only tournaments from $1992$—$2019$ are included. The Dependent variable is the ratio of three-point attempts over all two-point attempts. All specifications include team-decade fixed-effects. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Only games without US participation included. ^a All specifications include the same control variables as used for Table 2.

Table A3. Effect of 1991 reform on effort – alternative event-study model.

	Olympics	FIBA World Cup
${\delta }_{-1}$	−0.006	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.010)
${\delta }_1$	−0.011	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.010)
${\delta }_2$	−0.016*	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.009)
${\delta }_3$	−0.016**	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Add. controls^a	yes	yes
N	724	878
$R^2$	0.211	0.242

All estimates correspond to results tabulated in columns ($3$) and ($6$) of Table 3, including a pre-trend period control (${\delta }_{-1}$) for time period $1980$–$1991$. The Dependent variable is the average number of fouls per player-minute. ${\delta }_1$ for years $1992$–$1999$, ${\delta }_2$ for years $2000$–$2009$, and ${\delta }_3$ for years $2010$–$2019$. Olympic tournaments in $1972$ and $1976$ are not included. ^a All specifications include the same control variables as used for Table 3. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the $10$%, $5$%, and $1$% level, respectively. Standard errors (clustered on game level) in parentheses. Games with US participation excluded.

Figure A1. Cumulative point differentials for all teams.

Cumulative point differentials for all teams but Team USA. The red dashed line indicates the cumulative differential point for Team USA before and after 1991, for Olympics and FIBA World Cups. First-round robin games, Olympic tournaments and FIBA World Cup competitions for years 1960–2019.