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Notes
1Both papers are in this issue. Unidentified references to Antony and Pietroski are to these works. All unindentified references to my work are to my book.
2Non-Chomskians don't have this problem; thus, Elizabeth Camp Citation2007 gets the book pretty right and Mark Crimmins Citation2007 gets it dead right.
3Most of these papers arose from very productive conferences in the philosophy of linguistics held annually in Dubrovnik since 2005. As a result most have been published in the Croatian Journal of Philosophy, which has become a centre for the philosophy of linguistics.
4For convenience I focus on the competence to produce certain outputs.
5I apply ‘rule’ to syntax not with its technical sense in linguistics but with a broader sense covering what linguists call ‘principles’[3, n. 1].
6This issue of theoretical interest is further explored in [2008a: sec. 4.1].
7For my views on this reality see [178–89; also Citation2006c: 597–604; Citation2008a: secs. 4.2, 5; 2008b].
8Smith [2006: 441] is not part of the consensus. I have responded [2006c: 585–6].
9Smith is more brutal, describing my lack of commitment as ‘lily-livered’[2006: 451]. I have responded [2006c: 579 n. 7].
10So Pietroski's claim that ‘Devitt's case for his own view relies on some unwarranted assumptions about … I-languages’[657] is false. So too is his similar view about linguistic competence, but I have no space to argue the matter.
11Smith [2006: 443–6] and Miscevic Citation2006 criticize my view on intuitions. My response to Miscevic includes some development of the view [2006c: 594–5].
12Five of the book's fourteen theses are clearly committed to cognitivism. Seven oppose a cognitive theory of some sort.
13All these claims, bar one, are about the representation of rules and I think those are adequately supported on the spot or by later evidence [210–20]. The exception is a claim about the representation of angles, resulting from the final two words in the following passage quoted by Antony: ‘It is not plausible to suppose that the kingfisher represents any … facts about refraction and angles’[49]. This claim is inconsistent with others in the book (e.g. [21, n. 5]) and I should never have made it.
14She substitutes a corollary [52] of the Razor for the Razor itself. This is weird. The Razor is stated many times in the book and the substitution does not even serve her hostile purposes.
15My thanks to Georges Rey and Barbara Scholz for comments on a draft of this paper.