Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer

Abstract

I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer's recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace.

Keywords:

• agency
• autonomy
• Weimer

Notes

¹ Just to clarify: since I partly define the idea of an autonomy trait in terms of the reasonable resistance and conformity of wills conditions, I do not treat these conditions themselves as autonomy traits. An autonomy trait is a property that confers on an agent an increased tendency not to be subject to foreign wills; the two conditions are parts of an account of what it is to be subject to foreign wills.

² Note, though, that I do deny that autonomous agents need be any more rational than non-autonomous agents. The point is simply that both kinds of agent might necessarily possess a minimum degree of rationality just by virtue of being agents.