Phenomenological Metaphysics as a Speculative Realism

ABSTRACT

The debate between speculative realism and phenomenology has become quite heated over the past years. The matter of contention is the possibility of a metaphysics that can provide knowledge of reality as it is in itself. The speculative realists accuse phenomenology of denying this possibility, confining knowledge to the sphere of subjectivity. What has been overlooked in this debate is the similarity between the speculative project of Quentin Meillassoux and a Husserlian metaphysics. This article looks at these positions from a reconciliatory point of view. After outlining the debate, conceding the problematic nature of realism for phenomenology to the speculative realists, it will be shown that there is a place for a realist metaphysics within phenomenology. After showing the similarities between Meillassoux’s philosophy and a phenomenological metaphysics, and the legitimacy of qualifying the latter as a speculative realism, the conclusion will reflect on the modal notions at play in them.

ORCID

Lorenzo Girardi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5175-4812

Notes

1 Where possible, all references are to the English editions of works used in this article. In cases where English editions were not available, the translations are my own.

2 Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, xi–xii.

3 See ibid., 185.

4 Notably, Zahavi points out that Sparrow is incoherent insofar as he claims “that phenomenology has no method, that it has a transcendental method that prohibits metaphysical commitments, and that its method commits it to idealism.” Zahavi, The End of What?, 292.

5 See ibid., 301–04.

6 Even anti-correlationism as a criterion for speculative realism is debatable considering the vastly different evaluations of correlationism within speculative realism.

7 In her article in memory of Tengelyi, Inga Römer also briefly relates his work to that of Meillassoux and other realists, though she does not go into the similarities of their positions. See Römer, From Kant to the Problem of Metaphyiscs, 127–30.

8 See Sparrow, The End of Metaphysics, 148–49.

9 Curiously, Sparrow doesn’t seem to object when Levi Bryant uses this argument. See ibid., 164.

10 Two excellent and recent accounts regarding realism and phenomenology are Sophie Loidolt’s Phenomenological Sources, Kantian Borders and Richard Polt’s Traumatic Ontology. The former shows the awareness of phenomenology’s limits and shows the importance of phenomenology as an object-guided enterprise that stays within the limits of correlationism. The latter shows that phenomenology itself already points toward the transgression of correlationism.

11 Husserl, Logical Investigations, 595 (italics in original).

12 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 60 (italics in original).

13 See Husserl, Ideas I, xx.

14 Much more can be said on Husserl’s relation to realism. For example, although any naive “thing in itself” fundamentally escapes phenomenological investigation, this notion plays a central role in Husserl’s account of perception where it functions as the internal horizon of any object of experience. See Husserl, Ideas I, §143–44. This seems to be a fundamental realist aspect of Husserlian phenomenology that precludes dismissing it as subjectivist without further qualifications. Most likely many speculative realists would simply dismiss this realism as either incoherent or unjustifiable by phenomenology. The road to realism through phenomenological metaphysics as outlined in this article, however, should be harder for them to dismiss due to its explicit non-correlational character and its similarities with one of the exemplary speculative realist philosophies.

15 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.

16 See ibid., 27.

17 Ibid.

18 See Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, 17. He goes as far as unjustly dismissing Alexander Schnell’s discussion of the “speculative foundation of phenomenology” on this basis. See Schnell, The Speculative Foundation of Phenomenology.

19 Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, 31.

20 As with Levi Bryant’s argument (see note 9), Sparrow bars phenomenology from any form of even motivated speculation, though he sees no problem when others talk about a motivated speculation. See ibid., 61.

21 See Husserl, Grenzprobleme, xiii.

22 Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, 87.

23 The mention of the term “phenomenological metaphysics” is also rare in Husserl, most notably occurring in Eugen Fink’s outline for the continuation of the Crisis work. See Husserl, Crisis, 400.

24 See Husserl, Ideas I, 44.

25 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 156 (italics in original).

26 See Husserl, Ideas I, xii.

27 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 31.

28 See Husserl, Grenzprobleme, 410.

29 Ibid., 123.

30 Husserl, Grenzprobleme, 102.

31 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 22–23.

32 Husserl, Die Lebenswelt, 480.

33 Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, 7 (italics in original).

34 See Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 156–57.

35 Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, 412.

36 Ibid., 172.

37 See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 86.

38 See Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, 18–19.

39 See Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, 184–85.

40 See ibid., 190.

41 Husserl, Erste Philosophie II, 505–06.

42 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 50.

43 See Staehler, What is the Question to Which Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation is the Answer?, 100.

44 See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 148.

45 See ibid., 100.

46 Ibid., 30.

47 Ibid., 139.

48 Ibid., 108 (italics in original).

49 Ibid.

50 Mensch, Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, 160.

51 See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 150.

52 Ibid., 139.

53 Ibid., 148.

54 See Meillassoux, After Finitude, 28.

55 Ibid., 57 (italics in original).

56 Ibid., 76.

57 Ibid., 80 (italics in original).

58 Ibid., 66 (italics in original).

59 See ibid., 81.

60 Ibid., 79–80.

61 Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, 231 (italics in original).

62 Mensch, Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Idealism, 162.

63 Ironically, Sparrow has also noticed the proximity of Meillassoux’s philosophy to a possible phenomenological metaphysics. Unfortunately, he only allows for the possibility of a complete reworking of phenomenology on the basis of speculative realism, ignoring the possibility of such a project already being present within phenomenology itself. See Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, 189.

64 Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, 170.

65 See Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, 176.