INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2008: THE AMBIGUITIES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

Abstract

The ‘normal’ politics of 2008, in between the big electoral events of 2004 and 2009, illustrated the ambiguities of democratic change. Hung gubernatorial elections in North Maluku and South Sulawesi led local elites to ask Jakarta to intervene. A long campaign of demonstrations and violent intimidation by fundamentalist groups against the unorthodox Islamic group Ahmadiyah persuaded the government to impose a semi-ban on the group. At the same time, a senior intelligence officer was put on trial over the 2004 murder of the human rights activist Munir. And the Corruption Eradication Commission continued to arrest powerful people for corruption, although these arrests also began to stimulate increasingly organised resistance. All in all, politics in 2008 demonstrated an openness, and even a willingness to learn, that augurs well for the future.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Indonesia Update conference, Australian National University, 19 September 2008.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Indonesia Update conference, Australian National University, 19 September 2008.

Acknowledgements

With thanks to Ross McLeod, Chris Manning, Ken Ward, Sebastiaan Pompe, Mas Achmad Santosa, Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia Corruption Watch and Greg Churchill for helpful discussions. The responsibility, naturally, remains mine.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Indonesia Update conference, Australian National University, 19 September 2008.

¹Tanribali Lamo's father, Ahmad Lamo, also a military officer, had been appointed caretaker governor of South Sulawesi under similar circumstances of electoral deadlock in 1966 (Tempo, 29/1–4/2/2008).

²‘Jakarta's own prophet’, Tempo Magazine, No. 10/VIII, 6–12/11/2007, and other cover stories in the same edition.

³‘In 2006, there were 265 corruption cases involving local legislative bodies with almost 1,000 suspects handled by prosecutorial offices across Indonesia. In the same year, the same offices had 46 corruption cases implicating 61 provincial Governors or District Heads’ (Rinaldi, Purnomo and Damayanti 2007: 5).

⁴Similarly, nearly all the members of the Padang municipal assembly were convicted of corruption in 2005, but were freed by the Supreme Court in August 2008 (Suara Karya, 1/8/2008).

⁵The IMF–Indonesia ‘Letters of Intent’ are available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/cpid/default.aspx?view=loi&sort=cty>. Loan agreements with the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) similarly included anti-corruption targets, until the group was disbanded following a request from Indonesia in January 2007.

⁶Other anti-corruption initiatives included the National Law Commission, the National Ombudsman Commission, the Judicial Commission, the Prosecutorial Commission, the National Police Commission and the anti-money laundering agency PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre). Most have been either ineffective or (in PPATK's case) are still taking shape (Nasution and Santosa 2008).

⁷ Tempo Magazine, 19–25/2/2008. According to Anwar Nasution, head of BPK and former senior deputy governor of BI, neither the withdrawal of these funds from LPPI nor their transfer to BI was recorded in the books of either organisation (Nasution, no date).

⁸The official anti-money-laundering agency PPATK recently made revelations about another case involving envelopes. It identified 480 travel cheques, each worth Rp 50 million, apparently distributed to members of Commission IX in June 2004. They were related to a campaign by central banker Miranda Goeltom to be appointed senior deputy governor of the central bank. A Tempo investigative report suggests the money came from business interests. KPK is questioning the parliamentarians (Tempo Magazine, 23–29/9/2008).

⁹A 2003 World Bank study expressed pessimism about the prospects of the Corruption Eradication Commission, citing ‘unfavorable global experience with such agencies’ (World Bank 2003: xiii). Weak political support is the biggest risk factor.

¹⁰Military candidates have done poorly in these elections (Today (Singapore), 10/5/2008).

¹¹In a survey by the Indonesian Research and Development Institute (IRDI) released on 1 September (IRDI 2008), 2,600 respondents were asked who they would vote for as president on that day. Six names dominated the results. Of respondents with a high education, 45% supported SBY whereas only 14% supported Megawati. Conversely, only 30% of those with low education supported SBY, while 47% supported Megawati. Some 50% of those who worked as civil servants supported SBY, as did 55% of those on government pensions, while 46% of farmers and fishers supported Megawati.