Phenomenology and phenomenography in educational research: A critique

Abstract

The use of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method in the educational research literature has risen in popularity, particularly by researchers who are interested in understanding and generating knowledge about first-person events, or the lived experiences of students in certain educational contexts. With the rise of phenomenology and phenomenography as a method, some conceptual mistakes and associated confusion have also arisen; however, accounts examining both are limited. As a result, this paper will be concerned with the discussion of two issues: (1) for the sake of conceptual clarity, I provide a brief outline of phenomenology and phenomenography; and, (2) I then turn my attention to a critical discussion of phenomenography. In the latter case, I argue that when phenomenography departs from phenomenology it actually weakens its legitimacy as an approach to research. In order to overcome this problem, I argue that it makes sense to consolidate phenomenography within the broader research agenda of phenomenology which extends on the work of Husserl. Of course, the caveat to this idea is contingent upon a significant shift within phenomenography so it closely aligns itself with phenomenological principles and methods. As a way forward, I offer research direction to those who may be interested in the study of human experience by opening-up interdisciplinary dialogue about phenomenology, and at the same time I explore core methods used in phenomenology that extend on the continental tradition of phenomenology.

Keywords:

• Phenomenology
• phenomenography
• educational research
• method(ology)
• knowledge
• experience

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For some examples, see the following: “Phenomenography: Describing conceptions of the world around us” (Marton, 1981), “Phenomenography: A research approach investigating different understandings of reality” (Marton, 1986), “Phenomenography: Exploring different conceptions of reality” (Marton, 1988b), “Phenomenography and the art of teaching all things to all men” (Marton, 1992), “Phenomenography” (Marton, 1994a), “Reflections on phenomenography: Toward a methodology” (Dall’Alba & Hasselgren, 1996), “Phenomenography in higher education [Special Issue]” (Bruce & Gerber, 1997), “The idea of phenomenography and the pedagogy of conceptual change” (Marton & Pang, 2008), and “On the unit of description in phenomenography” (Marton & Pong, 2005).

2 For some examples, see the following: “Variation and commonality in phenomenographic research methods” (Åkerlind, 2005a), “Phenomenographic methods: A case illustration” (Åkerlind, 2005b), “Learning about phenomenography: Interviewing, data analysis and the qualitative research paradigm” (Åkerlind, 2005c), “From phenomenography to variation theory: A review of the development of the variation theory of learning and implications for pedagogical design in higher education” (Åkerlind, 2015), “Learning to do phenomenography: A reflective discussion” (Åkerlind, Bowden, & Green, 2005), “The potential of combining phenomenography, variation theory and threshold concepts to inform curriculum design in higher education” (Åkerlind, McKenzie, & Lupton, 2014), “Phenomenography: Opening a new territory for LIS research” (Bruce, 1999), “Variation and the secret of the virtuoso” (Ko & Marton, 2004), “Phenomenography” (Limberg, 2005), “Toward a pedagogy of learning” (Lo, Marton, & Pang, 2004), “Describing and improving learning” (Marton, 1988a), “On the structure of teachers’ awareness” (Marton, 1994b), Necessary Conditions of Learning (Marton, 2015), Learning and Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997) and “On some necessary conditions of learning” (Marton & Pang, 2006).

3 I am cognisant that there exists some literature that has touched on this topic, such as the following: “The uses of phenomenology and phenomenography: A critical review” (Cibangu & Hepworth, 2016), “Phenomenographic or phenomenological analysis: does it matter? Examples from a study on anaesthesiologists’ work” (Larsson & Holmström, 2007), and “Context and Methodological Decontextualization in Nursing Research with Examples from Phenomenography” (Friberg, Dahlberg, Petersson, & Öhlén, 2000), and “Phenomenography – a “good-for-nothing brother” of phenomenology?: Outline of an analysis” (Hasselgren & Beach, 1997). In saying this, my paper is distinctly different in the sense that my intention is to argue that phenomenography would benefit from the broader research agenda of phenomenology, particularly in relation to the methods (i.e. phenomenological reduction or the practice of bracketing) that should be employed by those who want to engage in this type of research.

4 Husserl did not coin the term phenomenology, however, he did formalise a distinctive phenomenological method, which in turn led to a general phenomenological movement in Europe. By formalising his phenomenological method in his works, Husserl provided a foundation for other philosophers to interpret phenomenology differently, and as a result, spawned a diverse array of works from well-known proponents, such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so on. Despite its pervasive influence in the Continental tradition of philosophy, it is worth mentioning that phenomenology does not have an agreed method. In saying this, it could be argued that the interpretation of phenomenology by well-known proponents is the basis of their method.

5 Due to space limitations, and for the purposes of this section, I will mainly focus on Husserl’s phenomenological method. Since Husserl is often attributed with being the founder of phenomenology, it seems apt to sketch-out some of the subject-matter, particularly the central concepts of his method. Although I am the first to acknowledge that his ideas relating to phenomenology changed throughout his extensive corpus, Husserl’s work offers a conceptually rich methodological framework that serves as a useful starting point on this topic.

6 From here on in, I will follow the academic convention of citing Husserl’s work using the initials of the English titles in the translations referred to in the reference section of this essay, followed by the investigation or part number, relevant section or paragraph number, volume number in bold (i.e. vol. 1 = I; vol. 2 = II) and the associated page number of the English translation. Thus the reference would read as follows: LI, I, Intro., §1, II, p. 166.

7 The use of the term “intentional” or “intentionality” has nothing to do with intending in the sense of being goal directed or doing something with purpose. In this context, the term is a mode of being and is concerned with meaningful correlates of conscious acts.

8 I am highly cognisant that there is a significant problem here about whether universals are real or not. For instance, Plato would hold that universals are eternal forms, and actual objects in the material world instantiate these. Although interesting, it is not possible, and arguably not relevant to expand on this line of thought in more detail in this essay.

9 It is worth noting that I am using a common example derived from metaphysics of two red billiard balls throughout my paper because is highlights the characteristics or qualities of a universal in philosophy. For instance, the example brings to our attention three major kinds of characteristics or qualities, such as: (1) types or kinds (e.g. ball/sphere); (2) properties (e.g. redness); and, (3) relations (e.g. next to). Equally, I could have used the example of two green chairs in a room, or something similar, but I have decided to go with two red billiard balls.

10 In Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book, Husserl (1913/1982) reinforces the primacy of intuition as the “principle of all principles” because every act of knowledge is legitimised by “ordinary presentive intuition” (see Ideas I, §24, p. 44).

11 See Husserl’s example of looking at, and touching a sheet of paper from Ideas I, §35, pp. 69–73.

12 In Marton’s (1981, p. 178) own words, a second order-order perspective involves: “… orientat[ing] ourselves toward people’s ideas about the world (or their experience of it) and … [by making] … statements about people’s ideas about the world (or about their experience of it).”

13 Each piece of work by Marton (1986, 1988b) has a section titled, “phenomenography and phenomenology”, “phenomenology vs. phenomenography”, and in Marton and Booth (1997), there is a section titled, “Is phenomenography phenomenology?”. In each respective section, the four points of difference have already been covered in this section. These being: (1) “second-hand” descriptions; (2) an interest in investigating people’s experience of something becoming the object of research. In this case, a new point of difference follows relating to “bracketing” not being used and/or required in phenomenographic research; (3) individual and collective levels of description; and, (4) categories of description. In Learning and Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997), chapter 6 titled, “The Idea of Phenomenography” confirms these so-called differences between phenomenography and phenomenology.

14 In the chapter titled, “Phenomenography: Exploring different conceptions of reality”, Marton (1988b) uses the sub-headings of “Measuring and Improving Language Proficiency”, “Free Recall Learning” and “Learning from Academic Texts” to highlight how phenomenography originated from a particular interest in learning within an educational context. In the same work, Marton outlines what he calls “three lines of phenomenographic research” that have been concerned with researching the following: (1) content-related studies of general learning; (2) studies of learning and teaching in various content domains; and, (3) representing conceptions of the world and its relating category of description to each.

15 The four qualitative differences in outcome of learning identified in Marton (1975) and Martin and Säljö (1976a, 1976b), were as follows: (Level A) the subject or student provided an accurate reflection of the ideas and content intended by the author of the text; (Level B) the subject or student presents some of the ideas and content intended by the author of the text found in (A); (Level C) the subject or student gave an explanation which is mostly contrary or the exact opposite of what was intended by the author in the text; and, (Level D) the subject or student contributed ideas and content that were either not relevant or in most cases an attempted literal translation of what they thought was intended by the author of the text.

16 Phenomenographic research has also been known to use a variety of means to “collect data” that range from group interviews, observations, drawings, written responses, historical documents, artefacts, equipment, and so on; however, the favoured method is the individual interview.

17 The section from chapter 6 that I am referring is titled, “Methods of Phenomenographic Research – Constituting the Object of Research” (see Marton & Booth, 1997).

18 For some examples of phenomenographic methods of research, see the following: “Phenomenography and the art of teaching all things to all men” (Marton, 1992), Necessary Conditions of Learning (Marton, 2015), Learning and Awareness (Marton & Booth, 1997), “On some necessary conditions of learning” (Marton & Pang, 2006), “The idea of phenomenography and the pedagogy of conceptual change” (Marton & Pang, 2008), “On the unit of description in phenomenography” (Marton & Pong, 2005), Classroom Discourse and the Space of Learning (Marton & Tsui, 2004).

19 It begs the question: If phenomenography is interested in the investigation of human experience, then why does it limit or restrict itself to “educational settings”?

20 It is worth pointing out that Giorgi’s work shares a number of resemblances with Marton’s work. This is due to Marton adopting some of Giorgi’s ideas found in his work. Although, Giorgi describes his work as “phenomenological psychology”, there are many striking similarities with phenomenography. For some examples, see the following: “Sketch of a psychological phenomenological method” (Giorgi, 1985a), Phenomenology and Psychological Research (Giorgi, 1985b), The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology (Giorgi, 2009), and “The descriptive phenomenological psychological method” (Giorgi, 2012).

21 You cannot have phenomena without phenomenological reduction or the practice of bracketing because that is how we come to have the phenomena as common in the first place. When you remove bracketing, this in turn means you have no way of establishing a phenomenon about which you can measure variations among individuals.

22 My use of the term “broad” in “broader research agenda of phenomenology” is intentional because phenomenography is mainly concerned with empirical descriptions of learning, and hence shares many similarities with Giorgi’s (2009) Descriptive Phenomenological Method which is grounded in Husserlian phenomenology, albeit specifically modified for the purposes of psychology. Interestingly, Giorgi (1986) argues that there is “strong convergence” between phenomenology and phenomenography, and depending on what is being researched (i.e. nature of phenomenon being investigated) may in fact bring each closer together than each actually realise. From a logical point of view, since phenomenology precedes phenomenography as a tradition, and knowing that phenomenography already picks-and-chooses ideas, concepts, methods, and so on from phenomenology, it makes sense that phenomenography consolidate itself within the broader research agenda of phenomenology. What I have in mind here, is sometimes referred to as “empirical phenomenology” in the social sciences. In this case, the latter aligns nicely with some of Giorgi’s work (1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1999, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, and others like Van Manen (1990, 2014, 2016).

23 I am referring to three reductive pathways that can be practised. These being as follows: the Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, I am limited in what I can say on this matter, but for some interesting literature on this topic, see: “The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis” (Depraz, 1999), and “Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction” (Luft, 2004).

24 It is worth noting Varela’s (1996, pp. 338–341) response to some common traps or myths in relation to phenomenology. These being as follows: (1) Phenomenological analysis is not just introspection; (2) Intuition is not some fluffy stuff; (3) There is life beyond the objective/subjective duality; and, (4) Better pragmatics are needed.

25 Schmicking (2010, pp. 50–51) refers to phenomenologists as “toolmakers” who use “phenomenological tools” in their work. He extends on the analogy by outlining a list of phenomenological tools, which phenomenologists use, that range from: (1) Phenomenological reduction; (2) Investigating particular phenomena (“description”); (3) Mereological analysis; (4) Investigating invariant structures and relationships; (5) Analyzing typical/invariant modes of appearing; (6) Analyzing the static (embodied/kinaesthetic) constitution of objects/experiences; (7) Analyzing genetic (embodied/kinaesthetic) constitution of objects/experience; (8) (Hermeneutic) Interpretation of the meaning of existential phenomena; (9) Interpreting experimental (dysfunctional) data and explanations; and, (10) Interpreting vicarious experience and second-person methods in general. When you take into consideration the contestable nature of phenomenological enquiry in the research literature (see for example, Van Manen, 2017; Smith, 2018), it makes sense to be cautious of the ways it could be used in educational research. Indeed, the recent debate between Van Manen (2017) and Smith (2018) highlights how phenomenology is part of an ongoing debate between its practitioners that remains unresolved.

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Steven A. Stolz

Steven A. Stolz, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer (Teaching and Research) and Program Director of the Master of Teaching at The University of Adelaide, Australia. He has a diverse array of research interests, which ranges from: epistemology, phenomenology, embodied cognition, ethics or applied ethics, narrative inquiry, psychology, virtue and character development. At the moment, his primary area of scholarship is concerned with the relationship between theory and practice, particularly how theory informs practice, and/or how practice informs theory. Recent publications of note include: “Theory and Philosophy in Education Research: Methodological Dialogues” (Routledge), “MacIntyre, Rationality and Education: Against Education of Our Age” (Springer), and “Measuring Up in Education: Philosophical Explorations for Justice and Democracy Within and Beyond Cultures of Measurement in Educational Systems” (Routledge).